A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, July 8, 2018
A harbour of discontent
An article published in the New York Times generates a sobering frame of
accountability and corruption in Sri Lanka today. After publication in
print and online, the article generated extremely high readership,
sharing and other stories, referencing the original. The role, reach and
relevance of the New York Times was buttressed considerably since 2016
by domestic pushback in the US from quarters in Washington DC chagrined
by the paper’s unwavering and unflattering scrutiny of policy,
pronouncement and politics. The manner in which the story spread in Sri
Lanka was revealing, though this brief summary doesn’t do justice to the
nuance and variance present in the capture and contestation of the
original story, especially over social media.
The immediate and expected response from the Rajapaksa camp was to deny
and decry vehemently. This initial enfilade was followed by various
pronouncements over social media promising a more robust official
response, which however didn’t appear for days. In the meanwhile, the
former Central Bank Governor released content in response to the
article, which was picked up and distributed by the Rajapaksa camp as
evidence of the story’s false premises, and bias. The official response,
badly formatted and without spell-checking in English, was perhaps
first drafted in Sinhala. Stylistically, the English version was clearly
the product of many authors. By the time the Rajapaksas produced an
official response, the original article had gone viral.
At the same time and over social media, an unprecedented cacophony of
trolls – accounts with fake photos and names, activated after a long
period of being dormant, or freshly created – started to attack in
particular the journalist from the New York Times and those she had
worked with in Sri Lanka. Personal attacks produced by close associates
of the Rajapaksa camp over social media helped these trolls, in two
ways. One, by the production of content that tried to name and shame the
journalists involved in the story as having hidden agendas, partial to
or somehow architected by the UNP. Two, by the support they extended to
more vicious commentary by trolls by the act of actively liking their
content on Twitter – a process which cannot be automated or accidentally
occur.
These trolls, in a frenzy of activity, let loose a barrage of verbal
abuse against those partial to the merits of the story. Many of the
worst comments were explicitly liked by prominent, official, personally
curated accounts of the Rajapaksa camp, signifying that they were
partial to not just the pushback, but the expression used and the
violence engineered. On TV, politicians from the Joint Opposition held
up photos of those involved in the story and said that the entire
article was rehashing content first published in the Daily News
newspaper, some years ago. After the official response from Mahinda
Rajapaksa’s office, the former President, those close to him and the
troll army all noted how they would sue the New York Times.
Many, this writer included, roundly welcomed this move, as a way in
which facts and documents pertinent to the article would be through
court proceedings, be made public. The public and private pressure - not
all of which is in the public domain –directed at those who worked on
the story was so bad, and happened at such an accelerated pace, the New
York Times issued an unprecedented public warning noting that any issue
the former President had with the substance of the article should only
be taken up with the newspaper, and not by threats of violence or
retribution.This warning was echoed by the Committee to Protect
Journalists and the Foreign Correspondents Association of Sri Lanka, as
well as other domestic and international media freedom groups. The
shrill threats of suing the newspaper died down.
Late last week, Rajapaksa regime acolytes over social media, giving
their ‘personal’ opinion, noted that it would be a waste of money and
that it was far more useful to go after the conspirators in Sri Lanka
who fueled the story. Meanwhile, in response to a complaint lodged by a
government MP, the CID was reported to have launched an investigation
into the allegations noted in the New York Times article. The only
problem here was that the New York Times highlighted in some detail
content it claimed was sourced from on-going investigations into the
Hambantota Port deal and campaign financing around it. On social media,
this writer and others flagged the sheer absurdity, truly comedic if not
for how tragic a picture it painted of governance in 2018, of the CID
investigating an on-going investigation purportedly conducted by the CID
itself!
The farce only got worse (or better?) towards the end of the week.The
Media Secretary to the former President spun the original article as
somehow linked to a statement by John Kerry made in 2016 which had
helped the UNP government come to power, and that the New York Times,
ideologically partial to or part of Obama-Clinton liberalism, opposed
the incumbent US President as well as China, which in turn was why in
concert with senior figures in government, who with local collaborators
embedded in the mainstream media, conspired to produce the article - all
with a view to discrediting Mahinda Rajapaksa!
This writer has lived through and heard a lot of conspiracy theories
since 2002. This one though – by sheer force of imagination - was in a
different league.
For its part, the UNP – seemingly unaware of any on-going investigation
by the CID and dealing with a political nuclear winter after MP
Vijayakala’s pro-LTTE statement, distanced itself from allegations in
the article that it was forced to hand over the port to the Chinese. In
doing so, astute observers noted that the PM was no different to the
former President in denying allegations in the article which were
politically inconvenient, without any robust material evidence or public
debate. Meanwhile, China also unsurprisingly denounced the article as
fabrication and fiction. The pro-Rajapaksa troll and tripe army,
activated shortly after the article went live, focused their attention
more towards those in Sri Lanka, instead of a global media giant that
clearly couldn’t be dragged into their snake pit. From at first a
frothing Hydra-headed monster, the pushback – online and through more
traditional means, morphed into a sharper, more strategic, ominous spear
intentionally aimed increasingly at those in Sri Lanka, in tandem with
the Rajapaksa camp’s shift in focus to go after - legally or by other
means – those they perceived to be behind the article.
It is unlikely the lead author of the New York Times expected any of
this. The theatre of the absurd surrounding the publication of the
article holds some humbling lessons. Journalists, freelancers and fixers
in Sri Lanka tasked with helping international media institutions cover
in-depth stories now know the fate that will befall them if and when
they cross a line in the sand that raises the ire of those in power or
seeking to regain it. It is a chilling effect that will impact quality,
probative, investigative journalism. The current government will not
deliver on promises to hold the Rajapaksas accountable for corruption.
The Rajapaksas have much to hide, going by the raw nerve that was
touched and the telling dynamics of the responses to the article. China
has much to hide, going by what it has said and importantly, what it has
not said. It takes the New York Times to bring to public attention
investigations that are so dormant, the CID itself seems to be unaware
of them. It takes an international newspaper to focus, however
short-lived, public debate on issues our President, our Prime Minister,
the government, and domestic media should be leading the scrutiny
around.
The New York Times article may have set out to flesh-out Mahinda
Rajapaksa’s corruption. What it has inadvertently achieved is to flag
the current government’s inability and unwillingness to hold the former
President answerable. Clearly, accountability is just a word that
features in campaign manifestos.