A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Back to 500BC.
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Thursday, February 28, 2013
| A backward march towards 1915? |
By Dr. Ameer Ali-2013-02-26
![]() In the aftermath of a pyrrhic victory over the
LTTE and in a mood of triumphalism, President Mahinda Rajapaksa lectured to an
anxious nation that there would henceforth be no more Sinhalese, Tamils or
Muslims, and no more majority and minority in his country but only Sri Lankans.
Those who listened to those words at that time or read them afterwards heaved a
sigh of relief. After a little more than one quarter of a century of physical
and mental trauma inflicted upon the nation by a reckless civil war, there was
every reason for the people to believe that those words of the President would
be the harbinger for a bright future in which there would be genuine democracy
with its embedded qualities of freedom of expression, rule of law, equality of
opportunity and justice.
Disappointingly,
the political and administrative developments since then have made it clear that
the President's words were no more than political rhetoric. The war wounds still
remain unhealed; the national Legislature has lost its democratic aura and
credibility; the Judiciary – the ultimate refuge for the grieved in a democratic
society – has lost its independence; nepotism and corruption are rampant;
dissent to reigning views is suppressed; and the economy in the name of
globalization is increasingly falling under foreign ownership.
Much
has been written and commented upon these developments and to discuss them again
is not the intention here. What follows instead is a focus on another worrying
phenomenon that has all the hallmarks of a similar occurrence that took place
almost a century ago but in a different political and economic environment. The
spectre of 1915 is looming large on the horizon. Is the country marching
backwards?
The
mosque in Sri Lanka, and for that matter all over the world, is the most
conspicuous marker of Islamic religion and Muslim culture. Just as its
multiplicity announces to the world the growing strength and religiosity of
Muslims, so does any violence targeting the mosque translates automatically, at
least in the eyes of Muslims, into a kind of Islamophobia. Historically, the
market, like the mosque, is also closely associated with Islam and Muslims.
Makkah, where Islam was born in the 7th century, was a market city situated at
the cross roads of several caravan routes. Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, was
born amongst a trading clan and he understood how the market works. The Quran,
the Holy Book of Islam, and the hadiths, the sayings and practices of the
prophet, are replete with market terminology and principles of trade and
commerce. Among the Rightly-guided caliphs, Uthman, like several others after
him, accumulated his riches through the market and from trade. In short, Islam
was born and grew around the market, and trade and commerce are the most
representative professions of that religion
Accommodated them in Kingdoms
In
Sri Lanka, it was trade that brought the early Muslims to the shores of
Sarendib, and the mosque came along with them. Their arrival was not one of
trade following the flag but trade leading the crescent. The Sinhalese monarchs
of ancient and medieval times were more than happy to welcome their arrival and
accommodate them in their kingdoms, especially at a time when there was an acute
shortage of a native merchant class. Muslim traders, most of whom were Arabs at
the early stages, proved to be an invaluable asset to Sinhalese monarchs to
establish diplomatic relations with the Muslim world. Hence, the local rulers
had no qualms in allowing Muslims to practise their religion as long as it did
not disturb domestic peace and inconvenience the followers of Buddhism. To
practise Islam however, a mosque is essential to accommodate worshippers,
because the religion exhorts praying in congregation, led by an imam. Thus, as
opportunities for trade and commerce increased and the market expanded, more
Muslims arrived and with more Muslims, the number of mosques also must have
multiplied. The market-Muslim-mosque congruence operated harmoniously in a
tolerant Buddhist environment.
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The
advent of the Portuguese in the 16th century spelt disaster to this congruence.
Christian bigotry and economic rivalry forced the Portuguese to expel the Muslim
businessmen from the occupied territories and to severely restrict the economic
activities and religious practices of those who remained. The expelled sought
refuge and were accommodated in the independent Kandyan Kingdom. The
market-Muslim-mosque congruity resumed its existence in new surroundings. In
course of time, Muslims as a community became indigenized, their market
expertise won State recognition, and their mosques became another decorative
piece in the kingdom's religious and cultural kaleidoscope. Although the
anti-Muslim trend in the maritime districts eased somewhat during Dutch rule, it
was only under the British regime and after 1815, when the whole island fell
under the new colonial yoke, that the Muslim community had its previous freedom
fully restored and were allowed to settle anywhere in the country and engage in
any occupation of their choice. More Muslims, especially from the Indian
subcontinent, arrived, adding to the total number of Muslims. Immigration and
natural increase with sporadic conversions from other religious groups increased
the numerical strength of the Muslim community. Of a total population of just
over 4.1 million in the 1911 census, Muslims counted 6.9%.
The
plantation-led capitalist economy that developed in the 19th century created new
opportunities for trading and commerce. The Muslim community that had a
historical proclivity to engage in these professions utilized those
opportunities and maximized the rewards. However, the country's trading and
commercial sectors were not the monopoly of Muslims. There were also others. For
example, the 1911 census enumerated 51,020 Sinhalese, 19,850 Tamils and 29,239
Muslims as traders. Of the Muslim traders 18,037 were 19th century arrivals.
This means, of a total of 100,109 traders, the indigenized Muslims constituted
only about 11%. Yet, the Sinhalese traders could not compete, not only in the
export-import sector but also in the large retail sector which were in the hands
of the Muslims. The 51,020 Sinhalese traders were part of a rising class of
Sinhalese petty bourgeoisie which resented economic competition from foreigners
and minorities. It was this class, conjoined with Buddhist nationalists like
Anagarika Dharmapala, who campaigned against the ubiquity of Muslim businesses
and brought about the first Sinhalese-Muslim racial riots in 1915. In that
episode, it was a religious-related incident surrounding a mosque that provided
the immediate trigger. Although the anti-Muslim violence died down in the
following years, Dharmapala had already warned that "there will always be bad
blood between the Moors and the Sinhalese" (Dharmapala, 1965:541). Generally
speaking, 'anti-minority feelings of the Sinhala traders persisted in the
consciousness' (Kumari Jayawardena, 1986: 26).
Reduce influence of minorities
In
post-colonial Sri Lanka, even though the Muslim community, unlike the Tamils,
always supported the ruling Sinhalese regimes for pragmatic reasons, the
anti-Muslim consciousness of the Sinhalese did not fail to burst out into open
violence, especially in times of national economic adversity. At times, the
undue influence that Muslim Parliamentarians could exert in national
decision-making was another reason that angered the Sinhalese. In fact, one of
the reasons that impelled President J.R. Jayewardene to change the Constitution
from the Westminster model to a hybrid Gaullist model was to reduce the
influence of minorities, particularly of Muslims, in the national legislature.
It was to counter that move the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress was formed as a
political party. Yet, six decades after 1915, between 1976 and 2002, there had
been a total of 30, mostly localized, Sinhalese-Muslim riots in various parts of
the country (M.S.M. Anas, V. Amirdeen and A.J.L. Vazeel, 2002/2008). Once again,
after the defeat of the LTTE, sections of the Sinhalese Buddhists under the
leadership of the militant Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and its new offshoot, Bodu
Bala Sena (BBS), the nation is witnessing a new phase of Islamophobia.
Tolerated by elected
government
The
resumption of anti-Muslim campaigns to boycott Muslim businesses, avoid eating
in Muslim restaurants, and stop selling property to Muslims; rallies led by
militant Buddhist monks to attack mosques and demanding the government to close
them down; and political leaders re-labelling Muslims as aliens and urging them
to go back to Arabia – all echo the same anti-Muslim sentiments of the 1915
Sinhalese Buddhist agitators. The 19th century phase of this Muslim resentment
and its current phase have one thing in common, that is, an open economy. The
difference is that the earlier phase was suppressed by a colonial regime but the
current one is tolerated by a popularly elected government. The mosque and the
market are in a serious state of crisis.
The
post-1976 era coincided with the ushering in of an open economy that is
currently being vigorously promoted by neo-liberal economic policies modelled on
'Washington Consensus' and monitored through Bretton Wood agencies. Although by
nature open market economies create economic inequities, its late 20th century
reincarnation has worsened economic inequities and created and bred 'ethnic
hatred and global instability' (Amy Chua, 2003). This is a worldwide phenomenon
engendered by the so-called market democracy under the aegis of economic
globalization. Sri Lanka is no exception. It was economic inequity in the 19th
century that led to the riots in 1915, but that inequity reflected an
urban-rural divide in which poverty remained largely a rural phenomenon. The
ubiquitous retail Muslim trader in the villages and country towns inevitably
appeared as the epitome of this inequity and became an easy target for the
Sinhalese petty bourgeoisie and nationalists to vent their anger against
colonial capitalism. In contrast, the current scale of inequity, in spite of
respectable growth rates after 2009, has no such divide but a national
phenomenon. It is systemic. Then why have the Muslims become the target of
attack this time?
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