A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, April 28, 2013
Reporting genocide in Sri
Lanka
28/04/2013
28/04/2013
"Still
Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka’s hidden war" by Frances
Harrison
Reviewed
by Manny Thain, first published in Socialism Today, magazine of the Socialist Party (CWI England &
Wales)

This
book recounts the horrific experiences of Tamils in the last few months of the
conflict between Sri Lankan armed forces and the separatist Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory on 18 May 2009.
Frances Harrison, a BBC correspondent in Sri Lanka for a number of years,
describes her book as follows: “It is not a history of the whole war… It is an
account of the victory from the perspective of the defeated”.
Each
chapter tells the story of a particular individual and his or her closest
family. As their stories run concurrently, and follow people forced down a
narrow corridor of northeast Sri Lanka, the narrative can be repetitive. It is
harrowing and hard to stomach, but it does drive home the hellish conditions as
the Tamils struggled desperately to flee the carnage. It emphasises the
relentless, murderous offensive by the Sri Lankan armed forces – and the
subsequent merciless, systematic repression of the Tamil population. It also
points to the failed strategy of the Tamil Tigers who, for a number of years,
controlled the north-eastern quarter of the island.
Despite
their grim, heart-rending stories, the book is at its best when quoting directly
from the Tamils. There is little analysis, although there are a couple of pages
of useful facts at the end of each chapter.
Harrison
begins with the United Nations (UN) withdrawing its aid workers from the war
zone, under orders from the Sri Lankan regime, in September 2008. For many
Tamils, this was seen as the turning point. It meant there were no international
agencies or journalists in the area to report on the massacres or
intervene.
The
UN consistently danced to the Sri Lankan regime’s tune. In mid-April 2009, the
UN secretary-general praised Rajapaksa’s regime for observing a temporary truce
– when Tamils were cowering from incoming shells. The UN Security Council
allowed a £1.2 billion International Monetary Fund loan to Sri Lanka to go ahead
at the end of April, as the war entered its most brutal stage.
At
the start of the offensive, people fled their homes with whatever they could
carry, loading up tractors, rickshaws or motorbikes with food, spare clothes,
tools, blankets, photo albums, radios, laptops. Under the relentless
bombardment, they were forced into and through a succession of small villages,
and into designated, so-called ‘no-fire zones’. Their possessions got fewer and
fewer. Monsoon rains lashed down. Crops could not be harvested. The regime
controlled the food supplies, sending in a fraction of what was needed. By
February 2009 there were no vegetables on sale, by March no fish. A bag of rice
could cost a car. Saris were turned into sandbags.
Even
here there were great acts of solidarity. ‘Korben’ (not his real name), a
wheelchair bound charity worker, recounts how fishermen, who spent hours trying
to land a catch amid the bombardments and navy patrols, would give away half the
fish to the injured.
Food
was hard to get even for those with a bit of money, like Korben. He had savings
in the LTTE’s Bank of Tamil Eelam. In a surreal episode, Korben explains how the
bank continued to function out of a hut, made of sandbags and coconut-tree
trunks, on the narrow spit of sand onto which they had all been corralled. The
bank staff had print-outs of the customer accounts and, according to Korben,
they disbursed money very quickly to those in credit.
As
the Sri Lankan armed forces advanced, the Tamils were herded into the ‘no-fire
zones’, where they were shelled and bombed, trapped between the army and the
LTTE. The numbers of injured soared. The bloated corpses of human beings lay
side-by-side with dead cattle. Doctors in makeshift field hospitals were reduced
to using butchers’ knives to amputate children’s limbs, without
anaesthetic.
A
doctor, ‘Niron’, estimates that 2,000 shells landed on or around Uddayarkattu
hospital as fighting intensified at the end of January 2009. Whenever they
relocated the field hospital, they painted a red cross on the roof, and GPS
coordinates were forwarded to the Red Cross to pass on to the Sri Lankan army.
Every time, they were bombed – deliberately targeted. Others describe ‘heaps’ of
wounded women and children when a queue for milk powder was shelled. Most
estimates for the total of Tamils killed range from 40,000 to 100,000.
After
the final battles (16/17 May), tens of thousands of people were desperately
trying to surrender. Families became separated in the panic. They had to cross a
lagoon, up to their chins in water, wading past dead bodies. Once across, they
were forced into queues, to be checked by armed forces personnel and masked
Tamil rebels who had switched sides. Their job was to identify LTTE fighters but
others, such as doctors, were seen as important witnesses who also had to be
silenced. It was a completely arbitrary procedure.
A
massive camp, Manik Farm, had been set up and it quickly swelled to become the
largest refugee camp in the world, holding 282,000 Tamils. It was run with UN
aid and international money. Huge posters of Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brothers
were displayed all over the site, grinning down at the defeated.
Conditions
in the camp were unimaginably bad, with negligible healthcare, and starvation
rations of rotten vegetables, the soya meal crawling with weevils. There was no
sanitation to speak of. Gang-rape by Sri Lankan troops was commonplace. People
were in a state of absolute terror, struggling to stay alive, too afraid to
speak out.
International
aid agencies and a small number of local charities were permitted only the most
restricted access. Journalists were only allowed in for occasional, carefully
choreographed guided tours. Some people were able to bribe their way out with
the help of friends or relatives from outside but that, too, was fraught with
danger, often involving travel to the capital, Colombo, then arranging flights
out. All the while, there was the risk of being picked up by the Criminal
Investigation Department or paramilitary forces which acted with impunity.
In
Harrison’s concluding chapter, she points out that the Sri Lankan military has
grown by 100,000 troops since the end of the war. It has taken over land and
businesses in the north and east, which is now a militarised zone with one Sri
Lankan soldier for every eleven citizens. People from the Sinhalese majority are
being brought in to settle traditionally Tamil areas.
The
US Agency for International Development reported that 89% of Tamil families did
not have a single member with a job or income in the northeast. In Kilinochchi,
a former LTTE stronghold, a quarter of families live on less than half the
official poverty line. Secret detention sites operate in the region. Torture and
rape have persisted. Sri Lanka comes second in the world in the number of
disappearances – after Iraq.
A
UN panel of experts recommended a review of the UN’s actions during the war, and
that it should hold its own investigation into war crimes in Sri Lanka. It has
done neither. Major-general Shavendra Silva, a brigade commander in the final
offensive, has been made deputy ambassador to the UN. This gives him immunity
from prosecution. The UN deploys Sri Lankan troops around the world as
peacekeepers. In other words, the UN has effectively endorsed Rajapaksa’s
genocidal policies, and backs his corrupt, nepotistic regime. It is an utter
betrayal of Tamil-speaking people the world over.
Meanwhile,
the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka has worsened. In fact, the conditions which
have fuelled their despair, bitterness and anger – and which led to the failed
strategy of guerrilla warfare in the past – remain.
