The Post-War Opposition: A Strategic Perspective

By Dayan Jayatilleka -April 4, 2014

Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka

Isn’t it amazing just how many people don’t connect up the dots? Take this chap Gobi for instance. What if he (or a clone) were to pop up from under a bed and pop a cop just before the presidential or parliamentary election? Would it not warrant the imposition of a massive security blanket? Would that not generate the ‘Dec 2005 effect’ of an enforced boycott of the electoral process by the contented citizenry of that region?

Now this is where the lack of foresight of the opposition’s strategists, tacticians and ideologues comes in. Since one can never know when and where Gobi or one of his pals from the LTTE (or the GTF or BTF) will show up, and one cannot control the response of the state to such a fiendish manifestation, it would be singularly stupid to base an electoral strategy on the Northern or Eastern Tamil vote, especially since that was the stupidity committed not once but twice by the Opposition’s planners. The second time was in 2005, when the UNP counted on the Northern vote. The first was in 1999, when the UNP candidate actually got the Northern Tamil vote, courtesy of the Tigers. On both occasions, the UNP candidate—Ranil the Reclusive Recalcitrant—lost.

In 1999 and 2005, Chandrika and Mahinda won, because neither of them made the mistake Ranil did and bothof them aimed at the same goal. Neither CBK nor Mahinda Rajapaksa based their game plan on the Tamil vote in 1999 and 2005, which is what Ranil did. In 1999 he obtained it —and lost; in 2005 he was denied it— and lost. In 1999 and 2005, Chandrika and Mahinda aimed at and obtained a majority of the majority, which is the only viable electoral strategy in the Sri Lankan context.

The Opposition today has forgotten that fundamental fact. It is, incredibly, basing itself on the same minoritarian strategy (and minoritarian candidate) that failed twice. Even the Sarath Fonseka campaign saw a swing of the undecided patriotic Sinhala voter to President Rajapaksa the moment the TNA gave the general the electoral kiss of death, thereby compounding the confusion caused by the ‘white flag’ issue.

If the opposition is serious about giving the President a bit of a hurry up, then its strategists should be looking at someone whose record shows a halfway decent chance of bidding for the majority of the majority.

                                                                    Read More