Indo-Lanka relations and regional fence-mending

Sri Lankan President and Indian PM (R)

April 22, 2015, 8:17 pm 

The continuing and chronic uneasiness characterizing Sri Lanka’s ties with India, testifies strikingly to Sri Lanka’s inability to forge a satisfactory and enduring policy towards her major neighbour over the decades. Except briefly, over a couple or so of bilateral questions in the sixties and seventies, Sri Lanka has never managed to iron out her differences with India in an exceptionally amicable manner. This is glaring proof of a regional policy failure on the part of Sri Lanka which is being largely glossed over by this country’s decision-making and power elite, besides other important sections.

To begin with, influential quarters in Sri Lanka seem to be adamantly inclined to ignore some of the most fundamental realities in the regional politics context. One of these constitutes the conduct which should be expected of a major regional power. Given its regional preponderance, it ought not to come as a surprise to any of India’s smaller neighbours that India would be acutely vigilant to developments in South Asia, which would have security implications, for instance, for her. One could not expect a major power to stand idly by while its most vital interests are seen as being compromised as a result of the security policy decisions of any of its neighbours. Likewise, a big power cannot be expected to wink at any destabilizing tendencies within its borders, resulting from political developments in any of its neighbouring countries.

In other words, the observer of regional politics should consider it advisory to adopt a political realism point of view in assessing international political developments. Which major power would look the other way, while what it sees as its national interest is undermined by one of its neighbours? Indeed, no self-respecting state could afford to do so, whether categorized as major or minor.

It is plain to see that a country, big or small, needs to deal empathetically with its neighbours, for the purpose of ensuring a measure regional amity and unity. In this respect, the majority of South Asian states have failed badly. They have failed to see that unless they are motivated by the principle of empathy, their regional policies are doomed to failure.

In the case of Sri Lanka’s ties with India, the inference is inescapable that ad-hocism has been permitted to play too big a role in Lanka’s handling of her relations with her major neighbour. While empathy needed to be a prime and permanent characteristic of our policy towards India, this was not allowed to be the case, wittingly or unwittingly. However, in the sixties and seventies, as earlier alluded to, administrations under former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike managed to resolve some seemingly thorny issues with India, as a consequence of the exceptionally positive rapport which was maintained between the countries in those times. Two such issues were the Indian-origin plantation workers’ question and the Kachchathivu problem. It was plain that positively-oriented, sustained negotiations played a substantial role in sorting out these questions.

It was not only what was seen as the personal friendship between the countries’ Prime Ministers in those years which proved decisive in resolving the bilateral questions concerned; there was also the similarity in foreign policy orientation between India and Sri Lanka which acted as a veritable lubricant in ensuring that bilateral ties were relatively friction-free. The policy principle in question here is Non-alignment.

These elements were lacking in the foreign policy formulation process in the J.R. Jayewardene years, for instance. Besides the political leadership of Sri Lanka and India not relating to each other amicably, the J.R. administration deviated from the principle of Non-alignment by cultivating close security ties with the West in its fight against Tamil militant organizations. It was mainly this development which compelled India to seemingly ‘go soft’ on Tamil militant groups in Southern India. The consequence was a rapid deterioration in bilateral relations.

Thus, it could be seen that Sri Lanka’s deviation from the policy of cultivating mutual understanding with India in a sustained manner, led to an unprecedented souring of Indo-Lanka relations in the J.R. years. If it were a policy principle on the part of Sri Lanka that close relations between India and Sri Lanka should be maintained on the basis of empathetic understanding, Indo-Lanka ties would not have crumbled in those times. Short-sightedness on the part of Sri Lanka led to serious security concerns on India’s part, which in turn compelled her to a course of action, which she saw as meeting her interests at the time.

To be sure, these principles of good neighbourliness should be strongly adhered to by states both big and small in their relations with each other. That is, India should respect the sensitivities of her neighbours and the latter should be mindful of India’s concerns and national interest.

However, considering the huge asymmetries of power between India and her neighbours and the vast and numerous human and natural resources India is obliged to protect, in comparison to her neighbours, the latter should see it as specially incumbent on them to be consistently mindful of India’s sensitivities and concerns and to fashion their relations towards her accordingly. In other words, the rest of South Asia should put in a special effort to learn to live amicably with India. After all, nothing could be done about the smaller states’ geographical proximity to India. These states have no choice but to fashion regional policies on the basis of these unalterable geographical and physical realities.

Accordingly, the current Maithripala Sirisena administration in Sri Lanka is acting with foresight by expending some effort towards mending fences with India, while remaining on amicable terms with the rest of South Asia. It is Non-alignment which would serve South Asia’s interests best. In contrast, the former Mahinda Rajapaksa administration showed signs of succumbing to local populist sentiments as regards India. Foreign and regional policies founded on populist feelings and collective fears are, plainly, doomed to failure and our friction-filled ties with India during the MR years should not have surprised the discerning.

It must also be noted that India has bourgeoned into almost a First World power over the past couple of decades. Given her present stature, one cannot see India being indifferent to policy initiatives and manoeuvres by her neighbours which could be seen by her as threatening her vital interests, whether they be of a security nature or otherwise.

Observers and publics must expect of India, conduct that is usually in keeping with that of a major power. It would be naïve in the extreme to expect things to be otherwise. India would always carve out for itself a major role in the affairs of not only South Asia but in those outside it as well. And given the current global power balance, it would be difficult for the world to ignore India’s voice and interests.

It does not follow from the foregoing that India’s neighbours should be subservient to her. This should never be the case but they need to be sensitive to power realities and act in harmony with India, as long as the latter does right and acts fairly, in order to further and protect their legitimate interests.