A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, June 5, 2016
Overstepping boundaries: Nazeer or Navy?


REHANA MOHAMMED on 06/03/2016
Eastern Province Chief Minister Nazeer Ahamed’s recent row with a Navy Officer has now become infamous. In response, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) evidently jumped the gun, ordering (and later withdrawing) a military-wide boycott of the Chief Minister. The incident and its aftermath raise two concerns. It points to the ability of the state security apparatus to operate with little democratic accountability. It also reveals the government’s deeper failure to ensure the post-war reorientation of the security sector.
The Chief Minister’s conduct has been framed an unjustifiable attack on
the particular Navy officer involved, Captain I.R. Premaratne, and on
the military as a whole. The MOD’s directive attempted to rectify this
perceived injustice by preventing the Chief Minister’s entry into any
military camp and military’s participation in events attended by him.
Military virtue and democratic legitimacy
The MOD’s impulsive action raised eyebrows, including within government. It essentially designated the Chief Minister persona non grata on
request of the security forces. Yet the Chief Minister is neither a
common delinquent nor an enemy of the state; he is an elected
representative of the Eastern Province. It would be unrealistic to
presume that he presented a security threat of any significance by
virtue of being present at a military camp. Viewed in this light, the
MOD’s actions gave the impression of irresponsible one-upmanship, a
pointedly political response to public anger.
Meanwhile, discussions surrounding the issue resurfaced a narrative of
irreproachable military virtue, contrasted with the unscrupulous
politician. Recent allegations of ‘forcible’ entry into a military camp
by Opposition Leader R. Sampanthan unfolded in a similar vein: both
Sampanthan and Ahamed were cast as miscreants seeking to undermine Sri
Lanka’s national heroes. The military currently enjoys a high moral
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, particularly in the Sinhala south,
where the dominant mind-set struggles to imagine the military’s
capability for illegitimate action and is quick to defend it against
perceived slight.
As such, public understanding of military legitimacy has become
extricated from ideas of democratic accountability and legitimacy. In
this context, the MOD’s swift decision gained widespread approval as
satisfactory redress for perceived injustice. Yet this decision was
taken with little democratic oversight: there was no evidence of the
MOD’s consultation with or referral to Parliament, the Cabinet or the
judiciary. The suspension of the directive suggests it caused sufficient
unease within the political establishment to effect its reversal. Yet,
the legitimacy initially attached to the directive reveals the challenge
at hand: the military’s high moral legitimacy enables it to circumvent
democratic oversight unchecked. The incident also indicates that
democratic control of the military remains discretionary rather than
institutionalised.
Security reform is imperative
In the popular imagination, the military unquestionably aids the
interests of peace and reconciliation. Thus its oversized presence in
non-military spheres of life is perceived as intrinsic rather than
inimical to peace. The statement issued by the State Minister of Defence
after the incident demonstrates this sentiment. It expresses dismay
over Ahamed’s failure to recognize the Navy’s ‘admirable role in
rebuilding the lives of the Sampoor area’, and chastises his
‘unacceptable’ behaviour.[1] Absent
from this narrative is the fact that vast swaths of military-occupied
land in Sampur legally belong to private citizens. As such, return and
resettlement are citizens’ rights that the state is legally bound to
fulfil; they are not gifts of goodwill from the military to which people
must be beholden. The Sampur Maha Vidyalayam, where the altercation
occurred, incidentally sits on land the Navy released only in March
2016, almost seven years since the war ended, and around ten years since
the recapture of the East.
The military currently maintains an abnormally high level of peacetime
deployment in the former warzones. Land release in Sampur has been
accompanied by assurances that overall deployment in the area will
remain unchanged. While recent progress in demilitarisation was
welcomed, the fact that it stemmed from the 2015 government transition
is concerning; it indicates that the military’s high concentration in
the North and East and continued occupation of private land is
maintained by political inclination rather than a rigorous assessment of
security threats and interests. Such an assessment would be integral to
developing a coherent and effective national security policy. The
question of what security interests were served by the military’s
occupation of schools, places of worship, homes and privately owned land
must now be answered.
Continued militarisation of the former warzones can be partly attributed
to the high political and material costs of reforming the security
sector, including the costs of demilitarisation and reintegration. Yet
maintaining current levels of deployment comes at the cost of the
peacetime imperatives of normalising civilian lives and strengthening
civilian institutions. Such imperatives necessitate extricating the
military from livelihood activities, such as tourism and agriculture,
and from local-level administration. Progress in demilitarisation will
certainly address the public’s economic, cultural and political
insecurities associated with high levels of militarization in the former
warzones. These goals are not at odds with the interests of national
security. Demilitarisation and broader security reorientation in fact
represent progression from ending the war towards securing peace. It
upholds rather than betrays the security gains made in May 2009.
While regrettable, the Chief Minister’s indiscretion is not ultimately
unforgivable. However, an indignant rush to defend Officer Premaratne
from the abuse of a politician has come at the expense of much-needed
introspection on how the state security forces interact with civilian
and democratic functions in post-war Sri Lanka. As such we have
continued to morally and politically excuse the state security
establishment for the daily injustices and indignities it inflicts upon
its citizens, by denying them their rights to return home, to access
their rightfully-owned property, and to an effective and accountable
state security force. Perhaps there is a greater injustice in these
lapses than what the much-maligned Chief Minister is guilty of.
