Do Not Fill ‘Grama Rajya’ With The Poison Of Ethnicity

By Dinesh Dodamgoda –November 21, 2016

Dinesh Dodamgoda

The report of the Sub-Committee on Centre-Periphery Relations of the Steering Committee of the Constitutional Assembly has recommended to fill ‘Local Authorities’ and the proposed model of ‘Grama Rajya’ with the poison of ethnicity. Let us, therefore, the nation be warned!

The Report

The Sub-Committee on Centre-Periphery Relations submitted its report to the Constitutional Assembly last Saturday. The report endorsed ‘Local Authorities’ as a third tier of governance and recommended that local authorities should receive public consultation and engagement through a model called ‘Grama Rajya’. Although the Local Authorities as a third tier of government and the proposed model of Grama Rajya are encouraging developments, the Sub-Committee’s aim to utilise the said institutions in a manner that would provide opportunities for ethnic majorities and minorities to claim their control on the basis of ethnicity is discouraging.

The report stated that in some of the Local Authorities such as Mussali, Beruwala, and Akurana, the Muslims are the majority; the Malayaha Tamils in Lahugala and Panwila, there is a Sinhala majority in Pradeshiya Sabha in Pottuvil; a Tamil majority Pradeshiya Sabha in Kalmunai and a Sinhala majority Pradeshiya Sabha in Vavuniya. Therefore, the Committee is in the opinion that smaller units of political authorities should provide opportunities for minority communities living in enclaves to administer their own affairs. Hence the committee’s suggestion is to politically recognise and privilege the concept of ethnicity even in smaller units of political authorities.

The conviction to politically recognise and privilege the most divisive issue in Sri Lanka, ethnicity (and religion), is derived from the belief that ‘empowering the chief troublemakers with a piece of government’ would mitigate threats to the constitutional order if not the state. Therefore, proponents of the power-sharing strategy who believe in such presumptions try to convince others that in managing cultural conflict in independent and ethnically divided countries, one has to identify representatives belong to the most divisive issue and privilege and share political powers with them.

A Failed Approach

In order to strengthen their claim, proponents of the power-sharing strategy come up with empirical evidence! For example, in 2002, Arend Lijphart listed 16 consociational (or power-sharing) regimes (Lijphart claimed them as independent and ethnically divided countries) that managed conflict successfully in the 20th century. However, Philip G. Roeder, the main theorist of an alternative strategy, the power-dividing or the multiple-majorities approach, challenged Lijphart’s claim and stated, “Three of these cases listed by Lijphart (Suriname 1958-1973, Netherlands Antilles 1950-1985, and Northern Ireland 1999-1999) were not independent states. Four more countries (Austria 1945-1966, Netherlands 1917-1967, Luxembourg 1917-1967, and Colombia 1958-1974) were not ethnically divided states. Furthermore, six out of the listed 16 cases failed. Czechoslovakia’s power sharing experiment (1989-1993) ended in partition of the country. Cyprus’s (1960-1963) and Lebanon’s (1945-1975) experiments ended in civil wars. Malaysia’s (1955-1969) experiment with power-sharing saw secession (or expulsion) of one ethnically distinct region (Singapore) and only strong-arm tactics prevented secession of the ethnically distinct Sabah state. Malaysia’s consociational government ended in widespread ethnic violence. Fiji’s one-year experiment (1999-2000) ended in a military coup. And South Africa’s (1994-1996) ended in a peaceful slide into Majoritarianism.”

As Philip G. Roeder further argues, the only three consociational regime that survived (Switzerland (1943- ), Belgium (1970- ), and India (1947- ) have been successful to the extent that they have submerged any ethnic power-sharing arrangements within a larger array of power-diving (or multiple-majorities approach) institutions.

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