A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Thursday, August 3, 2017
Of Locking and Unlocking India-China Stand-Off
( August 2, 2017, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) By
encroaching upon Bhutanese territory, the PLA was the first one to tie
the knot. If argued with Chinese characteristics, it must be the first
to untie. This can lead to a sequenced or simultaneous withdrawal
Last Friday, senior Colonel Zhou Bo and this writer were together on the
China Global Television Network (CGTN) (CCTV-NEWS) The Point programme
titled ‘Doklam and India-China relations’. It was competently and
impartially anchored by the vastly experienced Geneva-returned Liu Xin.
Some of our nationalistic anchors and their sidekicks, who commandeer
the debate, could learn a lesson from the cool and relaxed Bo-Xin duo.
Bo’s central point was: How did India have the ‘courage’ to enter
Chinese/Bhutanese territory, emphasising that “you had no right to do
that…you were not invited by Bhutan”. This is the familiar party line.
He referred to the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007, stressing
that it gave “you no right to jump in when we (China and Bhutan) are
having talks’”. This discussion took place while National Security
Advisor Ajit Doval was in Beijing, trying to defuse the stand-off.
It is clear that despite Royal Government of Bhutan’s (RGB) demarche of
June 20, and a Press release of June 29, read together with the Indian
External Affairs Ministry’s (MEA) Press release of June30, and linked
with External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s statement in Parliament
on July 20, no reference is made about RGB or the Royal Bhutan Army
requisitioning help of Indian personnel to stop the People’s Liberation
Army from its road construction work. Instead, the July 30 Press release
stated “in coordination with RGB, Indian personnel, who were present at
Doklam, urged the PLA construction party to desist from changing status
quo.’ The MEA spokesperson ducked a question on this from a reporter as
it is not relevant in the current context.
Bo’s objection was to India meddling in China-Bhutan relations. Neither
the Indian nor the Bhutanese Press release mentions the India-Bhutan
treaty. This has allowed multiple Chinese interpretations of the alleged
Indian troops overreach. Article 2 of the revised India-Bhutan Treaty
2007 states that both countries shall cooperate closely with each other
on issues of national security and interest. Neither Government shall
allow use of its territory for activities harmful to the other. The
operative part is ‘use of territory harmful to national security’.
What is not incorporated in the Treaty is a Memorandum of Understanding
dating back to the 1950s that India will be responsible for the defence
of Bhutan. After the 1962 war against China, in a revamp of its overall
defence preparedness, an Indian military training team was deployed in
Haa valley, Bhutan, with joint Indian-Bhutanese check posts located near
the Bhutan-Tibet border like it was done in Nepal. While in Nepal the
training support missions and JCPs were wound down, in Bhutan, the
training team was enlarged under a two-star General with direct access
to the King. In addition, formations of the Eastern Army Command at
Kolkata were earmarked for the defence of Bhutan and Special Forces
stationed at Thimpu for the protection of the King. Battalions of the
Army and Squadrons of Eastern Air Command at Shillong have trained
regularly in the campaign season to deter and destroy Chinese ground
offensive in west Bhutan. The primary restriction by RGB was that Indian
troops keep a low profile. Then, as now, the presence of Indian troops
is a sensitive political issue but it worked well till the King reigned
and ruled.
In post-democratic Bhutan, some wrinkles may have appeared in this
arrangement, which require to be straightened out. Not just the
visibility of Indian soldiers, other political irritants have delayed
the passage of the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal regional
connectivity network.
In a country of less than 800,000 people, with the majority living
outside Thimpu, there is substantial goodwill for India though pockets
of resentment exist. Bhutanese have not forgotten that India turned a
Nelson’s eye when RGB systematically expelled 100,000 Bhupalese
(Bhutanese of Nepalese origin) in September 1990 to avoid Sikkimisation
and maintaining Drukpa majority. According to a 1981 census, 53 per cent
of the population was Nepali and Drukpas in minority. All this happened
after the movement for democracy had taken root in south Bhutan,
inspired by easterly winds from Nepal for democratisation.
The ethnic cleansing is perhaps forgotten but scars remain as Nepalese
had turned against Nepalese. On a happier note, RGB cooperated
enthusiastically to dismantle sanctuaries of Bodo, United Liberation
Front of Asom and Kamtapuri militants in 2003 in Operation All Clear and
in 2008 RBA busted two India Maoist camps inside Bhutan.
The fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who in 2006 abdicated in favour
of his son, present King Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck, used to say: “I have
put all my eggs in India’s basket. It is a full embrace accepting to be
part of the India security system.” Further, he triggered off the
democratic process in 2007-08 while compressing the transformation of
Bhutan from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in just five
years. Although changes in Bhutan have been controlled, they are
substantial: From one newspaper Kuensel, to more than 10 newspapers,
magazines and TV channels.
The MEA has done well in Bhutan, in spite of itself creating an
impressive amount of goodwill. Bhutan is the single largest budget head,
biggest recipient of aid running into billions of dollars. Thanks to
Bhutan’s hydropower wealth it enjoys, the highest per capita income in
south Asia, having rocketed from $662 in 2005 to $2,750 in 2016,
accounting for its supreme bliss of Gross National Happiness and
contentment. For India, Bhutan is the most important country, making it
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first port of call on assumption of
office.
The stand-off in Doklam is drawing Bhutan directly into China’s new
strategy of segregating Bhutan from India and creating fissures in their
relationship. Bo said that the Chinese are adamant about the
precondition that Indian troops must withdraw first before any
meaningful conversation. India may keep harping on diplomatic channels
being open at various levels but there will be no dialogue as NSA Ajit
Doval’s failed mission showed.
Instead, New Delhi has to remind the Chinese of their own saying about
those who tie the knot must be the first to untie it. By encroaching on
Bhutanese territory, the PLA were the first to tie the knot. If argued
cogently and with Chinese charecteristics, this could lead to a
sequenced or simultaneous withdrawal. Otherwise a long winter awaits
Indian and Chinese soldiers at Doklam as Beijing keeps chipping away at
Thimpu and creating new pressure points across the 3,488 km Line of
Actual Control (as seen at Barahoti last week) where it has manifest
tactical advantages. But Bo and his colleagues have to be informed that
at Doklam, New Delhi will not let Thimpu down.
(The writer is a retired Major General of the Indian Army and strategic affairs expert)