Plural marriage, bred of inequality, begets violence
CAIRO, LAHORE AND WAU-Dec 19th 2017
IT IS a truth universally acknowledged, or at least widely accepted in
South Sudan, that a man in possession of a good fortune must be in want
of many wives. Paul Malong, South Sudan’s former army chief of staff,
has more than 100—no one knows the exact number. A news website put it
at 112 in February, after one of the youngest of them ran off to marry a
teacher. The couple were said to be in hiding. To adapt Jane Austen
again, we are all fools in love, but especially so if we cuckold a
warlord in one of the world’s most violent countries.
Men in South Sudan typically marry as often as their wealth—often
measured in cattle—will allow. Perhaps 40% of marriages are polygamous.
“In [our] culture, the more family you have, the more people respect
you,” says William, a young IT specialist in search of his second wife
(his name, like some others in this article, has been changed). Having
studied in America and come back to his home village, he finds that he
is wealthy by local standards. So why be content with just one bride?
Few South Sudanese see the connection between these matrimonial customs
and the country’s horrific civil war. If you ask them the reason for the
violence, locals will blame tribalism, greedy politicians, weak
institutions and perhaps the oil wealth which gives warlords something
to fight over. All true, but not the whole story.
Wherever it is widely practised, polygamy (specifically polygyny, the
taking of multiple wives) destabilises society, largely because it is a
form of inequality which creates an urgent distress in the hearts, and
loins, of young men. If a rich man has a Lamborghini, that does not mean
that a poor man has to walk, for the supply of cars is not fixed. By
contrast, every time a rich man takes an extra wife, another poor man
must remain single. If the richest and most powerful 10% of men have,
say, four wives each, the bottom 30% of men cannot marry. Young men will
take desperate measures to avoid this state.
This is one of the reasons why the Arab Spring erupted, why the
jihadists of Boko Haram and Islamic State were able to conquer swathes
of Nigeria, Iraq and Syria, and why the polygamous parts of Indonesia
and Haiti are so turbulent. Polygamous societies are bloodier, more
likely to invade their neighbours and more prone to collapse than others
are. The taking of multiple wives is a feature of life in all of the 20
most unstable countries on the Fragile States Index compiled by the
Fund for Peace, an NGO (see chart).
Because
polygamy is illegal in most rich countries, many Westerners
underestimate how common it is. More than a third of women in West
Africa are married to a man who has more than one wife. Plural marriages
are plentiful in the Arab world, and fairly common in South-East Asia
and a few parts of the Caribbean. The cultures involved are usually
patrilineal: ie, the family is defined by the male bloodline. And they
are patrilocal: wives join the husband’s family and leave their own
behind. Marriages are often sealed by the payment of a brideprice from
the groom’s family to the bride’s. This is supposed to compensate the
bride’s family for the cost of raising her.
A few men attract multiple wives by being exceptionally charismatic, or
by persuading others that they are holy. “There may be examples of
[male] cult leaders who did not make use of their position to further
their personal polygyny, but I cannot think of any,” notes David Barash
of the University of Washington in “Out of Eden: The Surprising
Consequences of Polygamy”. However, the most important enabler of the
practice is not the unequal distribution of charm but the unequal
distribution of wealth. Brideprice societies where wealth is unevenly
distributed lend themselves to polygamy—which in turn inflates the price
of brides, often to ruinous heights. In wretchedly poor Afghanistan,
the cost of a wedding for a young man averages $12,000-$20,000.
By increasing the bride price, polygamy tends to raise the age at which
young men get married; it takes a long time to save enough money. At the
same time, it lowers the age at which women get married. All but the
wealthiest families need to “sell” their daughters before they can
afford to “buy” wives for their sons; they also want the wives they
shell out for to be young and fertile. In South Sudan “a girl is called
an old lady at age 20 because she cannot bear many children after that,”
a local man told Marc Sommers of Boston University and Stephanie
Schwartz of Columbia University. A tribal elder spelled out the maths of
the situation. “When you have 10 daughters, each one will give you 30
cows, and they are all for [the father]. So then you have 300 cows.” If a
patriarch sells his daughters at 15 and does not let his sons marry
until they are 30, he has 15 years to enjoy the returns on the assets he
gained from brideprice. That’s a lot of milk.
Valerie Hudson of Texas A&M University and Hilary Matfess of Yale
have found that an inflated brideprice is a “critical” factor
“predisposing young men to become involved in organised group violence
for political purposes”. Terrorist groups know this, too. Muhammad
Kasab, a Pakistani terrorist hanged for his role in the Mumbai attacks
of 2008, said he joined Lashkar-e-Taiba, the jihadist aggressor, because
it promised to pay for his siblings to get married. In Nigeria, Boko
Haram arranges marriages for its recruits. The so-called Islamic State
used to offer foreign recruits $1,500 towards a starter home and a free
honeymoon in Raqqa. Radical Islamist groups in Egypt have also organised
cheap marriages for members. It is not just in the next life that
jihadists are promised virgins.
The deepest deprivation
In South Sudan, brideprices may be anything from 30 to 300 cows. “For
young men, the acquisition of so many cattle through legitimate means is
nearly impossible,” write Ms Hudson and Ms Matfess. The alternative is
to steal a herd from the tribe next door. In a country awash with arms,
such cattle raids are as bloody as they are frequent. “7 killed, 10
others wounded in cattle raid in Eastern Lakes,” reads a typical
headline in This Day, a South Sudanese paper.
The article describes how “armed youths from neighbouring communities”
stole 58 cows, leaving seven people—and 38 cows—shot dead “in tragic
crossfire”.
Thousands of South Sudanese are killed in cattle raids every year. “When
you have cows, the first thing you must do is get a gun. If you don’t
have a gun, people will take your cows,” says Jok, a 30-year-old cattle
herder in Wau, a South Sudanese city. He is only carrying a machete, but
he says his brothers have guns.
Jok loves cows. “They give you milk, and you can marry with them,” he
smiles. He says he will get married this year, though he does not yet
have enough cows and, judging by his ragged clothes, he does not have
the money to buy them, either. He is vague as to how he will acquire the
necessary ruminants. But one can’t help noticing that he is grazing his
herd on land that has recently been ethnically cleansed. Dinkas like
Jok walk around freely in Wau. Members of other tribes who used to live
in the area huddle in camps for displaced people, guarded by UN
peacekeepers.
The people in the camps all tell similar stories. The Dinkas came,
dressed in blue, and attacked their homes, killing the men and stealing
whatever they could carry away, including livestock and young women.
“Many of my family were killed or raped,” says Saida, a village trader.
“The attackers cut people’s heads off. All the young men have gone from
our village now. Some have joined the rebels. Some fled to Sudan.”
Saida’s husband escaped and is now with his other wife in Khartoum, the
Sudanese capital. Saida is left tending five children. Asked why all
this is happening, she bursts into tears.
“If you have a gun, you can get anything you want,” says Abdullah, a
farmer who was driven off his land so that Dinka marauders could graze
their cattle on it. “If a man with a gun says ‘I want to marry you’, you
can’t say no,” says Akech, an aid worker. This is why adolescent boys
hover on the edge of battles in South Sudan. When a fighter is killed,
they rush over and steal his weapon so that they can become fighters,
too.
Overall, polygamy is in retreat. However, its supporters are fighting to
preserve or even extend it. Two-fifths of Kazakhstanis want to
re-legalise the practice (it was banned by the Bolsheviks). In 2008 they
were thwarted, at least temporarily, when a female MP amended a
pro-polygamy bill to say that polyandry—the taking of multiple
hubands—would be allowed as well; Muslim greybeards balked at that.
In the West polygamy is too rare to be socially destabilising. To some
extent this is because it is serialised. Rich and powerful men regularly
swap older wives for younger ones, thus monopolising the prime
reproductive years of several women. But that allows a few wives, not a
few dozen. The polygamous enclaves in America run by breakaway Mormon
sects are highly unstable—the old men in charge expel large numbers of
young men for trivial offences so they can marry lots of young women
themselves. Nevertheless, some American campaigners argue that
parallelised polygamy should be made legal. If the constitution demands
that gay marriage be allowed (as the Supreme Court ruled in 2015), then
surely it is unconstitutional to disallow plural marriage, they argue.
“Group marriage is the next horizon of social liberalism,” writes
Fredrik deBoer, an academic, in Politico, on the basis that long-term polyamorous relationships deserve as much legal protection as any others freely entered into.
Proponents of polygamy offer two main arguments beyond personal
preference. One is that it is blessed in the Koran, which is true. The
other is that it gives women a better chance of avoiding spinsterhood.
Rania Hashem, a pro-polygamy campaigner in Egypt, claims that there is a
shortage of men in her country. (There is not, but this is a common
misconception among polygamists.) If more rich, educated Egyptian men
take multiple wives, she says, this will make it easier for women to
exercise their “right to have a husband”. Mona Abu Shanab, another
Egyptian polygamy advocate, argues that polygamy is a sensible way to
assuage male sexual frustration, a common cause of divorce. “Women after
marriage just disregard their men [and] focus on their kids.
They…always have an excuse for not engaging in intimate relations; they
are always ‘tired’ or ‘sick’. This makes the men uncomfortable and
drives them to…have a girlfriend.”
Some men see polygamy as a pragmatic response to female infertility. “My
first wife was issueless,” says Gurmeet, a 65-year-old landlord in
Lahore, Pakistan. At one point “she said our inability to have a child
was because of my medical condition, not hers. I was enraged. I turned
to religion and was guided [by God] to take a second wife.” He had been
planning to try in-vitro fertilisation but God’s advice looked like a
sounder investment. Initially, his first wife was “unwilling to share my
affections with another woman”. But as time passed, she accepted the
situation, says Gurmeet. He divided the house into two parts, so his
wives could live separately. He divided his time equally between them.
“It worked,” he says. The second wife had six children. But Gurmeet
grumbles that she dressed less elegantly than his childless wife and did
not keep her rooms as tidy.
Polygyny is hard work for men but good for women, says Gurmeet, because
it is “undesirable” for a woman to be unmarried. Asked about polyandry,
Gurmeet says, “I strongly disapprove. It is against nature for a woman
to have multiple partners.” He elaborates: “As a young man I kept
chickens. The cock has many hens, but he does not allow the females to
mate with more than one partner. So it’s against natural law.”
Bad for brides
Polygamy “can work fine, provided you do justice to [all wives]
equally,” says Amar, a Pakistani judge with two wives. “If you do not
prefer any one over the others, no problem arises.” He admits that if
two wives live together in the same home, “a natural rivalry” arises.
Dividing property can also be complicated and leads to a lot of
litigation.
But Amar thinks he gets it right. “My routine is: I spend one night with
one wife and one night with the other. That way, nobody feels treated
badly. And I give them exactly the same amount of money to spend: they
get one credit card each. As a judge, it is [my] foremost duty to
deliver justice.” One of his wives enters the room and offers to give
her side of the story. Her husband banishes her, with visible
irritation, before your correspondent can ask her anything.
Although women in a polygamous society find it relatively easy to get
married, the quality of their marriages may not be high. Because such
brides are often much younger, not to mention ill-educated, they find it
hard to stand up to their husbands. And brideprice is not conducive to a
relationship of equals.
In South Sudan, nearly 80% of people think it acceptable for a husband
to beat his wife for such things as refusing sex, burning the dinner and
so on. Divorce requires that the bride’s family repay the brideprice;
they may thus insist that the abused woman stays with her husband no
matter how badly he treats her.
Polygamy is also bad for children. A study of 240,000 children in 29
African countries found that, after controlling for other factors, those
in polygamous families were more likely to die young. A study among the
Dogon of Mali found that a child in a polygynous family was seven to 11
times more likely to die early than a child in a monogamous one. The
father spends his time siring more children rather than looking after
the ones he already has, Mr Barash explains. Also, according to the
Dogon themselves, jealous co-wives sometimes poison each other’s
offspring so that their own will inherit more.
For Akech, the South Sudanese aid worker, growing up in a polygamous
family “wasn’t easy”. Her father, a former rebel commander, had eight
wives and numerous concubines. She has 41 siblings that she knows of.
When she was six, she used to fetch 20 litres of water each day for her
mother to use to make siko, a form of moonshine.
Sometimes her father would come round drunk, bang on the door and take
her mother’s money to spend on another woman. Akech remembers her
parents quarrelling a lot. That said, the extended family could pull
together in an emergency. When her father was shot in the leg, his wives
teamed up to bathe him, get him to hospital and pay his medical bills.
One day, when Akech was at university, her father asked her to come and
see him. “We had never had a father-daughter bond, so I was excited,”
she remembers. When she arrived, he introduced her to a fellow officer
and ordered her to marry him. She was horrified. Her father’s friend was
65. Akech was 19.
She pretended to accept the proposal and said she just wanted to pop
back to her college, which was in a neighbouring country, to collect her
things. Her father agreed. She went back to college and stayed there.
That was more than a decade ago. Akech went on to complete university
and find a good job. She recently bought her now-elderly father a house,
partly to show him the value of her education, but also out of a
residual sense of guilt at having once defied him. “In my culture, your
parents are your earthly gods. I tried not to disappoint him,” she says.
He has never said sorry for attempting to sell her.