Sri Lanka: National Security — Rhetoric or State Policy

The vesting of lands and assets for long periods of time as is now in vogue has been an entirely political decision. This is a subject closely linked to national security, for the agreements being with superpowers offers scope to interfere with national security interests.

by Merril Gunaratne-Aug 12, 2018

( August 12, 2018, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) National security in a simple and straightforward sense can be understood as the protection of the nation against illegal or unconstitutional inroads of internal and external forces. The goals of the perpetrators would be to undermine the unity, sovereignty of the nation, or to overpower and alter the democratically elected government.

I had been closely associated with national security between 1983 and 1989, and also had the opportunity to observe the decisions of policy makers thereafter till 2000, though from a distance. The matter under discussion is how policy making and political decisions of governments have suffered with considerable frequency where national security interests had impinged on such subjects, the reason being the failure or reluctance of policy makers to tap the expertise of those versed in national security. Our history, at least from 1983, has sadly not been a very laudable saga in this respect. A few instances which come to mind from memory are recounted here to illustrate the point, and unfortunately, with rather unfavourable implications.

The Indo – Sri Lanka agreement of 1987, more prominently called the Peace Accord, was signed by the policy makers without consultation with military and national security minds. The Accord though controversial, had benefits as well, but a far reaching step to induct foreign troops should necessarily have been discussed with security officials before arriving at a decision. 1987 can be considered as the beginning of the rupture of Delhi – LTTE cordiality, eventually culminating in the LTTE standing isolated amidst the relentless war launched by the Rajapaksa government. Whatever the benefits, the momentous step of induction should have been discussed with national security experts ahead of the decision.

Even the IPKF departure decreed by President Premadasa, was a unilateral political decision. The defence minister Ranjan Wijeratne was in the dark, prompting him to say, ‘ It was like giving oxygen to a dying patient’. The government of the time also adopted the ill-fated steps of commencing peace talks with the LTTE and supplying them funds, arms and munitions. The LTTE also deceived and won the confidence of the government, even influencing them to order the departure of the IPKF. The LTTE succeeded in these preliminaries by expedience in order to engage in a ruthless and brutal offensive. Even President Premadasa became their unfortunate victim.

Many military, intelligence and security officials including secretary of defence of the time had subsequently stated that when they were belatedly consulted, had advocated caution and restraint, but their advice had been disregarded. It would have been far better if they left proof that they gave such advice, by confirmation with reports they had submitted to the president. I had dealt with this failure of lack of proof to back their advice with written documents, in my book ‘Dilemma of an Island’.

I also recount the minister of national security in 1988 entering into a fake ceasefire agreement with the JVP produced before him with the false signature of Rohana Wijeweera by a pseudo JVPer masquerading as a close associate of the JVP leader. This was one instance where intelligence was consulted. However, the minister refused to agree with intelligence officials that the document was a forgery, and proceeded to be the victim of deception.

The government of President Kumaratunga repeated the same error committed by President Premadasa of inviting the LTTE for peace talks despite the latter’s chronic history of deception and expedience. Evidently, the decision had been taken without consultation with specialists who were conversant with the history of the LTTE. Once again, the military suffered setbacks in addition to large numbers of civilian casualties. This was another instance of the failure to achieve a marriage of political and security minds.

The ceasefire of 2002 with the LTTE was entirely a political decision. Security officials had not been consulted. I served as advisor in the defence ministry, and ascertained that the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency had already been repealed before my appointment without consulting defence and security officials. Intelligence officials were not summoned for any security conferences, nor those with the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) . The security components worked in water tight compartments. Scope for offering dispassionate assessments was limited to a mere submission of reports which were invariably not even deliberated.

The vesting of lands and assets for long periods of time as is now in vogue has been an entirely political decision. This is a subject closely linked to national security, for the agreements being with superpowers offers scope to interfere with national security interests. There is also the need to be conscious of the difficulties that could arise concerning enforcement of terms of agreement in respect of time frames of the long leases, since the weight of the super powers could make a tiny country like Sri Lanka uncomfortable.The national interest may therefore have been served better if the advice of security officials had first been solicited. I think this is a requirement at least for future enterprises.

The National Security Council (NSC) is the highest point in the security apparatus of the country. It comprises of service chiefs, secretaries of related ministries, IGP and the intelligence coordinator amongst others. As a body, it meets periodically. Subjects coming up for discussion would require a study of total aspects connected with them, so that the decisions taken can profit national security in the best possible manner. Since the NSC members assemble as a body only periodically, a full understanding of matters for discussion may be inhibited because of limited room for study. I had the benefit of discussions with a knowledgeable foreign official whom the government invited in 2002. We agreed that a proper study of subjects would benefit better if two or three analysts constitute a committee linking the president with the NSC. Subjects arising for discussion would be studied in totality, if necessary with related members of the NSC, position papers prepared and circularised amongst NSC members , so that when the NSC meets, deliberations could be meaningful. This arrangement is practised in a neighbouring land with success. The foreign ministry also requires representation in the committee.

Judging from the omissions in the past, it may be appropriate for policy makers to make a conscious bid in the future to associate the NSC in discussing political subjects and matters which impinge on national security.