The Day After

By Chamindra Weerawardhana –APRIL 22, 2019

Dr. Chamindra Weerawardhana

On a day after tragedy of unprecedented proportions has hit one’s people, plunging one’s country into a state of tremendous vulnerability and chaos, it is not easy to pen a word. However, it is crucial to highlight a few key factors that surround the Easter Sunday terror attacks and their aftermath. 

1. National security negligence?

In the admission of the Prime Minister himself, there have been prior Intelligence warnings about a terror incident in the brewing. No significant action was taken. The blame for this squarely lands on the individuals providing political leadership to the state defence apparatus, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards. Sri Lankan security forces and intelligence structures are highly sophisticated, having faced their share of challenges fighting against a secessionist foe in a 30-year civil war. Intelligence officials who flagged the threat must be commended for the diligent warnings issued. 

The political leadership, for its part, resorted to inaction. Why so? 

The logical conclusion one cannot but afford to reach is that the political class, the Executive in particular [as the security forces come under the direct purview of the Executive], did not take action in a ‘deliberate’ move. 

Firstly, Sri Lanka is heading towards national elections, and the political class has a long tradition of seeking to sustain itself from ethnonational tensions, threats to national security, a climate of high insecurity and uncertainty, and of heavy distrust among the different ethnonational communities, in order to sustain their political agendas. It is as if the political class were simply unable to engage in a mature brand of democratic politics in the absence of a threat to national security, coupled with ethnonational tensions. 

If indeed the political class were in dire need for an ‘enemy’ for political reasons, it has now found one, in no uncertain terms. 

Secondly, to reiterate the obvious, no national-level political developments in Sri Lanka take place without direct behind-the-scenes interventions of certain external ‘powers that be’. It is very clear that this attack has been ‘allowed to happen’, in order to create a climate of unprecedented tensions, which would: 

a) Benefit the external powers, as in, the instability of a country facilitates their inroads into that country and its systems, and to strengthen their strategic strongholds in a geo-strategically crucial location in the Indian Ocean.

b) Benefit the local power-wielders, as it would enable them to play the ‘terrorist threat’ card once again, and call for ‘strong leadership’ [read ‘Sinhala majoritarian-nationalist alpha-male-image-presenting leadership]. 

2. The “weak government” narrative 

In the aftermath of this tragedy, there is absolutely no running away whatsoever from the reality that the UNP-led government is a weak government, in terms of national security. True, the defence portfolio comes under their ‘cohabiting political opponent’ the Commander-in-Chief, the President [as a mark of respect to the innocent victims these ruthless attacks, this writer refuses to write the name of Sri Lanka’s current head of state]. However, the UNP has a clear foothold, with a close relative of the Prime Minister holding office as state minister of defence. If the government had a more effective approach of managing the national security brief, these attacks could have been contained, if not averted. 

Public pronouncements of senior government ministers in the aftermath of the attacks are brimming with nothing but hopelessness, a fine dose of cowardice, and the lack of a consistent vision for the country. 

Not only the present government? 

In admitting the above reality, however, we must never lose sight of the fact that threats to national security also occurred under the post-war Rajapaksa administration. Suffice to recall the 2014 Aluthgama incident, and the rise of Bodu Bala Sena. If there were a growing threat of Islamic radicalising, the security forces and Intelligence were well-placed to pursue a nip-in-the-bud approach. 

Instead, the state looked on, as a Sinhala-Buddhist extremist discourse took shape freely, flouting casual islamophobia [the accusation, levelled by some, that Bodu Bala Sena, and other groups such as Ravana Balakaya, were fuelled under the auspices of the defence apparatus, is a factor that requires clarification at some stage]. What can be noted with full certainty is that under the post-war Rajapaksa regime, no outfit of that nature could have raised its head without the knowledge and [implicit or explicit] approbation of those in power.

The result was the growth of ethnoreligious, ethnonational and xenophobic hatred along a  Sinhala-Buddhist vs. Muslim axis, leading to the unfortunate incidents of Aluthgama. In hindsight, Aluthgama 2014 can also be considered as an early sign of the eventual fall of the Rajapaksa administration. Aluthgama was an indication that the tremendous national security prowess achieved by ending the war, and the consequent consolidation of the Rajapaksa power base, were not sufficiently ‘re-oriented’ to suit, and be effective in, a post-war context within a small South Asian island state that is always volatile to external interferences. 

This writer, however, does not blame the Rajapaksa administration. 

Managing national security and external affairs of a small country with tremendous geo-strategic significance in the Indian Ocean region is no easy task. It becomes even more challenging when the strategies, structures, approaches, principles and objectives all require a fulsome overhaul, after three long decades of civil war and national security uncertainties. The Rajapaksa administration failed in this test, which is why it could be ousted, through a cautiously crafted regime change operation, in January 2015. 

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