A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Monday, May 20, 2019
Anti-Muslim riots and anatomy of the second security failure

Sri Lanka has encountered a second security failure by allowing the
unruly violent mobs to attack Muslim mosques and ordinary Muslim
citizens particularly in the North Western Province and Gampaha
District. This should have been an ‘anticipated backlash’ to the Easter
Carnage inflicted by the IS terrorists three weeks before. However
neither the law enforcement agencies nor the political authorities have
taken necessary precautions in preventing such an eventuality.
As a result, at least one person has been killed, over 20 others
severely injured and many families have been displaced. The number of
attacked and damaged mosques and houses/shops reported to be nearly 100.
The most damaged undoubtedly is the country’s image; and the
inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations/harmony of the society.
It appears that still there is no proper coordination between the
political authorities and the law enforcement agencies. This is apart
from the apparent lack of coordination between various security and law
enforcement agencies themselves - the CID, police, armed forces etc.
From First to the Second
It is just within three weeks that the second security failure has taken place.
The first security failure was most horrendous when nine suicide bombers
of extremist Islamic organizationsin the country (National Thowheeth
Jamath or NTJ etc.), supported and instigated by the Islamic State (IS)
and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, were easily allowed to attack
three Christian Churches and threeTourist Hotels on the Easter Sunday
(4/21), irrespective of relevant authorities having all necessary
information.
That was an unprovoked terrorist attack without recent connected incidents.
‘Neglect of security of the ordinary citizens’ does appear to be the
main cause for that security failure. Otherwise, the police had made all
necessary arrangements to safeguard the security of all political VIPs
from the government to the opposition.
Three weeks ago the main targets were the Christian Churches and their
congregations. As a result, 258 persons were killed and nearly 500 of
innocent people were injured. Out of the dead, there were 41 foreign
tourists. It appears that the Christian Churches were particularly
targeted on the instructions from the leaders of the Islamic State (IS),
as part of their counter offensive to the real or imagined ‘Crusaders’
or as a revenge for the Christchurch massacre in New Zealand.
‘The general failure of security and defence’ of course was another
underlying reason as revealed by the failure of the police or the
defence authorities to take appropriate action to protect or warn the
Tourist Hotels about the terrorist threat. This is irrespective of the
primary importance of tourism to the economy of the country. Even
without the help of the police the hotels could have thwarted the
terrorist attacks or protected their guests, if they were informed.
There are questions whether particularly the general failure of security
had emerged as a result of too much of liberalization in the country.
The general atmosphere of this neoliberalism undoubtedly allowed the
security personnel and the police to relax and consider everything
hunky-dory. Then there were other concerns that if they had acted
against people of a particular community, whether that could go against
them politically under the present government.
Delay in Taking Action
However, what links the first failure to the second fiasco probably is
the general degeneration of security arrangements in the country, the
prevalent prejudices among particularly the police against minority
communities, and still lack of coordination between the police and the
military even under the present emergency regulations.
The initial incident this time in Chilaw on 12 May (Sunday morning)was
good enough for the police and the security agencies to take firm
action, if they wanted, in preventing what happened thereafter in the
whole area and beyond in the North Western (Wayamba) Province, by Monday
(13 May).
That Sunday was undoubtedly a reminder of what happened especially in
Negombo three weeks before on the Easter Sunday. Communities in Negombo
and Chilaw are largely connected through religion and family
affiliations. The trigger was a Facebook post by a Muslim businessman in
Chilaw saying "1 day u will cry,"against a posting by a Sinhala
businessman, apparently criticising the Muslim community.
This was taken as a threat by the Sinhala businessman and along with
others, the Muslim business premises was surrounded violently. The
business competitions, apart from other reasons, have always played a
prominent role in communal violence in the country for a long period.
The police did intervene. But the intervention undoubtedly was not even.
The Muslim businessman was arrested although the posting was a minor or
ambiguous threat. Both of the culprits to the Facebook confrontation
should have been arrested. But that was not the case for obvious police
biases or fear of political victimization.
A police curfew was declared in the Chilaw municipal area immediately in
the afternoon which was lifted the following morning. It is alleged
that it was during the curfew hours that a mosque and some shops were
attacked in the Chilaw town.
Considering the possible eruption of violence in potential other areas
like Kurunegala, the curfew should have been imposed in those areas as
well. Immediately after the Chilaw incidents, there had been clear
movements and rallying of gangs in the Kurunegala town in motor bikesand
vans. The army should have been deployed immediately without the
incompetent and largely biased police trying to handle the situation
themselves.
The Failures
When curfew was imposed in Kurunegala and five other police areas, it
was almost early Monday morning. It is alleged that it was during the
curfew hours again that most of the mosques and Muslim houses in
Kuliyapitiya, Bingiriya, Hettipola and Dummalasuriya were attacked and
damaged. Apparently the security was tight in the Kurunegala town, but
not in the localities.
When three suspects who were involved or planning attacks were arrested
in Kurunegala on Sunday afternoon, the police had come under immense
pressure. It is not clear how far those were political. However the
culprits were released giving some ease for those who were further
intending trouble making and hate attacks. That is what actually
happened on Monday.
A single day security lapses are good enough for the organized
extremists to overturn a total security situation in a country. This is
also what exactly happened on the Easter Sunday.
It was only by Monday evening that island wide curfew was declared and
the army was effectively brought into curtail the situation. The island
wide curfew was imposed again on Tuesday and Wednesday nights and
hopefully the situation is now under control. There is evidence however
that the army, like the police, also were lenient on the mobs.
It is reported that nearly 100 culprits have now been arrested including
the leader of the Mahason Balakaya Amith Weerasinghe, and the leader of
the Sinhale Api (‘We of the Sinhala Land’), Dan Priyasad. These
organizations should have been banned a long time ago. Those Sinhala
extremist organizations were involved in previous attacks against the
Muslim community.
It is also unfortunate that the government took over three weeks to ban
those terror related extremist Islamic organizations who were
responsible for the Easter Carnage. The relevant gazette was issued only
on 13May.Of course there are certain procedures to follow, but the
steps should have been quicker. These are some reasons why the people
were restless and angry, allowing the extremists to capitalize.
Conclusion
Even if the initial Chilaw incidents were unavoidable, there was no room
for the escalation of such events in other areas, if proper security
measures were taken promptly. The army should have been called into
service immediately. There can be risks if the army is involved
continuously, but theimmediate risks may be minimal compared to what can
happen without their intervention and the country going into continuous
violence and chaos.
The reported incidents of at least one or two army personnel assisting
the mobs in Thummodera should be fully investigated and otherwise the
projected credibility of the present Army Commander would be
diminished/destroyed.
Ensuring ‘security of civilians’and the ‘enforcement of law and
order’should be blindfolded irrespective of religion, ethnicity, class,
political affiliation or any other distinction. These should be the
future goals in recruiting and training of the police and army
personnel.
Apart from what I have said about (1) the degeneration of security
arrangements under neo-liberalization, (2) the apparent prejudices among
the police/army officers against the minority (Tamil, Muslim and
Christian) communities, and (3) the general failure of security
coordination between the political authorities and the security
authorities, there are various other political interpretations given to
the events and lapses. Those are not discussed here.
Most alarming however are the accusations and counter-accusations traded
against each other by the government and the opposition politicians.
Apart from the said accusations, what appears alarming are the unbridled
emotions, sensationalism, prejudices, reliance on rumours and expressed
hatred. It is apparent that there is something fundamentally wrong with
the political culture and psyche of the people and the politicians
alike in the country.

