A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Back to 500BC.
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, August 21, 2016
On Track or Straying?
One year later
"If the ‘development’ of a country goes hand in hand with the worsening
of the living conditions of the people, for whom or for what is that
development? A developed country for a malnourished people – is this not
an insanity? Must the people of the country gaze at highways like a
child looking yearningly at an empty ice cream cup?
i A student-participant of the 2007 essay competition to commemorate President Premadasa
In 1994, when South Africa was readying for its first democratic
election, Nelson Mandela came up with an unusual idea – to lower the
voting age to fourteen. Despite his iconic status, part-hero,
part-saint, the proposal didn’t go far. It was abandoned due to
strenuous opposition from the ANC’s National Executive Committee.
In making such a drastic proposal, Mr. Mandela might have been motivated
by the critical role played by school-age children in the
anti-Apartheid struggle, especially the legendary Sweto Uprising.
Whatever his reasons, the proposal was not a sensible one, as Mr.
Mandela himself realised - admitted. While the ANC’s top decision-making
body was flaying his proposal, he jotted down every criticism in a
notebook, and wrote at the end that his proposal was ‘a grave error of
judgement’
ii. That was democracy, at its best and most effective.
Had Nelson Mandela’s neighbour Robert Mugabe come up with a similar
idea, it would have probably become law, amidst a cacophony of praise by
an unending string of acolytes.
In governance, speed is a virtue, only if the path is the right one.
Non-democracies might move faster than democracies, but more often than
not the movement is in an erroneous direction. Democratic leaders are
not infallible, not even leaders of Nelson Mandela’s calibre, but the
checks and balances present in democracies often prevent countries from
hurling themselves down precipices.
The less space there is for dissent, the more room there is for bad decisions.
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration’s VAT imbroglio is symbolic both
of what is right and what is wrong in today’s Sri Lanka. The country has
made considerable progress politically, towards re-democratisation. The
current administration is not immune to the lure of non-sense and
insensibility; but the presence of such democratic basics as the right
to protest and a non-cowed judiciary act as antidotes, impeding bad
policies and diluting their ill effects.
Had the Rajapaksas been in power, the VAT increase would have gone
through. The traders would not have protested, the courts would not have
intervened and government ministers and parliamentarians would not have
made their objections known.
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration tried to sneak in the VAT
proposals and failed, not only because Sri Lanka has become
re-democratised but also because the two components of the hybrid
government often counter each other’s destructive and self-destructive
excesses. According to media reports, PM Wickremesinghe wanted to
resuscitate the VAT proposals, but abandoned this piece of unintelligent
governance when some of the SLFP ministers refused to play ball.
Political Rights;
Economic Wrongs
One year after winning the parliamentary election of August 2015, the government is on track politically.
One year after winning the parliamentary election of August 2015, the government is straying economically.
The UNP’s VAT proposals would have been a perfect fit for the Rajapaksa
economic playbook. The former regime followed a strategy of
taxing-borrowing-and-spending, albeit with a difference. Rajapaksa
taxing was of the indirect variety, targeting essential goods and
services, placing a disproportionate share of the burden not on the rich
but on those clinging to the bottom half of the income-totem pole.
Rajapaksa spending was mostly military-related or on physical
infrastructure projects with little forward or backward linkages and
extremely limited employment and income generation.
The UNP was critical of Rajapaksa economics while in opposition. The
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration won two elections promising to
tread a different economic path. Increasingly that promise is being
honoured in the breach. Not only does the government continue to spend
lavishly on political elites (members of the Rajapaksa-led Joint
Opposition have no hesitation in enjoying this largesse); it also
displays a disconcerting inability to imagine a different developmental
model and a tendency to impose more and more financial burdens on
ordinary people.
The high growth rates of the Rajapaksa years acted as a facade for an
economy which was structurally weak and dangerously flawed. These
included the mushrooming of debt, growing economic inequality, high
levels of youth unemployment (20.1% in 2014) and the absence of quality
jobs (most job creation was in the informal sector). Though Sri Lanka
continue to have a high human development index, the value dropped
significantly when adjusted to inequality – from 0.757 to 0.669 in 2014
(a loss of 11.6%, which stemmed mainly from inequalities in income and
education levels). Of the employed, 20.4% constituted working poor while
vulnerable employment was as high as 43.1%iii. Sri Lanka also ranked as
a country with serious risk of hunger, even in 2014, according to the
World Hunger Index.
These were not abstract problems, but politico-electoral time bombs. The
Rajapaksas thought they could neutralise these problems with glitzy
propaganda-hypes and daily doses of minority-phobia. They were wrong. As
the Top Line Survey by the IPS revealed, by December 2014, cost of
living was the number one problem affecting the electorate, a
prioritisation which cut across ethno-religious lines and administrative
boundaries.
Political unfreedom couldn’t prevent the regime from losing its
unpopularity. All it could do was to ensure that the regime had no idea
of its own unpopularity.
When national elections came, those voters who were affected by
Rajapaksa economics used their franchise to unseat the Rajapaksas.
Now those who succeeded the Rajapaksas, promising to alleviate the
economic suffering of the masses are imitating the Rajapaksas. They too
are trying to impose the superstructure of a prosperous, developed
nation on the base of an underdeveloped, cash-strapped economy. They are
too are trying to waste borrowed money on unnecessary military
hardware, such as the MIG purchases. They too are trying to force the
poor and the middle classes to foot a lion share of these bills.
A severe imbalance in the proportion of direct to indirect taxes was a
major flaw in Rajapaksa economics. The ideal balance is said to be 40%
in direct taxes and 60% in indirect taxes. By the time the Rajapaksas
were voted out of power, the Lankan ratio was 20% in direct taxes and
80% in indirect taxes. This meant a policy of imposing a severely
disproportionate share of the burden on the poor and the middle classes.
High living costs and increasing inequality were among some of the more
pernicious results of this tax imbalance.
The UNP was critical of this imbalance while in opposition. In the early
months of the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration, there was some
talk about redressing this situation. But those glimmers of
politico-economic sense seem to have evaporated, as this government too
becomes accustomed to power. The VAT proposals, if implemented, will
exacerbate the existing direct to indirect tax-imbalance to even more
precarious levels and cause further increases in living costs and income
inequality.
The Rajapaksas lived in their very own make-believe world. In that
imaginary world, Sri Lanka was a rapidly developing land - its debt
burden was not spiralling out of control; its poor were not been
deprived of their homes and livelihoods; its environment was not been
degraded; its health and education systems were in mint condition. In
the end, they didn’t succeed in hoodwinking the electorate; just
themselves.
Governance today is better than governance under the Rajapaksas, but
that is not saying anything very much. Every time the President prattles
about good governance while favouring the likes of the pistol-toting
former mayor of Hambantota, every time the Prime Minister prattles about
good governance while trying to impose more economic burdens on the
masses, they are reducing the distance between themselves and the
Rajapaksas.
Rendering Democracy Unsustainable
The Rajapaksa march to Colombo was not the roaring success its
organisers hoped for. Ironically, had the Supreme Court not struck down
the disastrous VAT regulations, the march would have been more
successful.
If the government re-imposes the same – or even similar – set of VAT
proposals, the main beneficiary of that politico-economic inanity will
be none other than the Joint Opposition.
The link between economic discontent and racism/populist
authoritarianism is almost an axiom. If the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe
administration continues along its current economic path, it will
jeopardize its own political achievements, especially in the areas of
democracy and reconciliation.
If the economic distress of the masses worsen, it will not be long
before the old myths of ‘rich’ Tamils preying on ‘poor’ Sinhalese will
be resuscitated, joined by newer myths of ‘wily Muslims’ standing in the
way of Sinhala prosperity.
The Rajapaksas are experienced creators of minority bogies. Their
efforts to incite Sinhala anger over such measures as singing the
national anthem in Tamil failed. But if the government continues to mess
up economically, the next time the Rajapaksas try to ignite minority
hatred, be it over a new constitution or an attempt to find a political
solution to the ethnic problem, they might succeed.
Both a new constitution and a political solution to the ethnic problem
would require public approval in a referendum. And winning a referendum
would be impossible, if the people, especially the Sinhala majority, are
not relieved of their economic burdens. If the government wants to
implement the rest of its political agenda, an economic policy of
rice-and-curry now – rather than one of Jam Tomorrow – is a necessary
precondition.
Stable societies are cohesive societies. Cohesion is impossible when a
society is racked by inequality. Inequality’s destabilising impact can
assume particularly deadly forms in countries beset with ethno-religious
divisions. If some people feel that development is something that
happens to others, disenchantment sets in and politico-psychological
fissures develop. Instead of the necessary ‘national’ perspective,
ethnic/religious/caste/class perspectives become predominant.
Instability breaks out, even in the midst of spectacular growth. As
history shows, ours and others, when masses are suffering economically,
it is very easy to bamboozle them into demonising the ethno-religious
‘Other’.
If the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration does not cease straying
into Rajapaksa territory economically, it will undermine its past
political gains, its future political plans and its own political
existence.
i quoted in ‘Ran Piyawara’
ii Mandela notes show ‘grave error’ – BBC – 14.10.2009
iii http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/LKA.pdf

