A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Tuesday, May 14, 2019
National political leadership accountable for failure

Sri Lanka's Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake is reported to
have told the BBC "too much of freedom" had led to the Easter Sunday
suicide bombings, which killed over 250 people. "Too much of freedom,
too much of peace for the last 10 years. People forget what happened for
30 years. People are enjoying peace and they neglected security," he
said, when asked why Sri Lanka was targeted.
The past ten years most Sri Lankans enjoyed a great deal of freedom
compared to those in neigbouring countries in the region and even
internationally. The end of the thirty year war was interpreted by
leaders of government and the general public as a restoration of peace
and normalcy. People could move throughout the country in their vehicles
without being checked at security checkpoints and could enter any
government building or hotel without being subjected to body checks.
Security experts have given this as a primary reason for Sri Lanka being
selected as a target for attack. It was a soft target. This enabled the
suicide bombers to walk freely into their targeted churches and hotels
to explode themselves.
It
has now become evident that the freedom from security checks that Sri
Lankan enjoyed enabled Islamic State trained groups to penetrate and
spread their tentacles through a significant segment of Sri Lankan
society. The extent of this penetration is becoming more evident by the
day as more and more arrests of suspects take place. There has no doubt
been a failure of intelligence gathering of serious proportions. On the
other hand, mainstream Muslim organisations have said that they
repeatedly informed the government authorities at the highest levels
going back to 2014 that infiltration by Islamic radicals was taking
place but to no avail.
There is no reason to doubt that there was awareness at the highest
levels of the polity, under both the previous government and the present
one, that extremist Islamic tentacles were spreading. The failure was
not so much in intelligence gathering than a failure of those in
positions of decision making power to act. In the post-graduate classes I
have taught at Colombo university on peacebuilding, the military
personnel who were students often brought up the issue of radicalization
of Muslims in the east. The fact that the government was not taking
visible action made me believe that the problem was being dealt with
politically. But now it is clear it was not.
BEYOND BELIEF
President Maithripala Sirisena has sought to give the impression that
the process of accountability has already started. The President’s
dismissal of Defense Secretary Hemasiri Fernando shortly after the
Easter bombing and the President’s demand that IGP Pujitha Jayasundera
should resign as head of the police has been part of that process. Both
of them are public officers with long records of competent service, even
if they have been seen as closer to one political side than to another.
It is no secret that in Sri Lanka, it is the political masters who call
the shots especially where decision making on highly sensitive issues
are concerned. IGP Jayasundera has refused to be scapegoated. He has
refused to resign and therefore been sent on compulsory leave.
President Maithripala Sirisena is constitutionally the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the state and Minister of
Defence. During the 52 day period of the failed attempt to sack Prime
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and dissolve parliament, President
Sirisena appointed the present Leader of the Opposition Mahinda
Rajapaksa as the prime minister. It was during this period of the failed
government that President Sirisena appointed Hemasiri Fernando as
Defense Secretary. President Sirisena also took control over the Police
Department and the Ministry of Law and Order under which the police had
been placed. It is beyond belief that the Defense Secretary and IGP did
not keep the President briefed about the developments in the country.
The President also chairs the meeting of the National Security Council
in which the Defense Secretary, heads of the armed forces and police,
and the intelligence services are also members. It has been publicly
reported that the Indian government and its intelligence agencies gave
repeated warnings to their Sri Lankan counterparts about the potential
attacks, the names of the assailants, their targets and even the dates.
If the leaders of government did know and did not act on the information
at their disposal, they need to be held accountable. If they did not
know, as they all claim, they are not worthy to hold the positions of
responsibility they currently hold.
INTROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT
The failure of the government leadership to take action against those
were creating Islamic extremist cells needs to be assessed in the
context of allegations made against the opposition of having been part
of a process of supporting Islamic extremists to divide the Muslim
community for political reasons.
There was a failure of the previous government leadership to act on the
information made available to it in 2014 when they were in power. It
appears that the vast international financial resources at the disposal
of the Islamic extremists, and their potential for weakening the Muslim
moderate politicians, were a too powerful a combination in the eyes of
political leaders seeking to be in power.
The causes of disaffection within the larger Muslim community also needs
to be assessed. Since 2014, the Muslims of Sri Lanka have been under
siege. They were attacked in Aluthgama, Ampara, Digana to mention some
of the worst incidents. The reaction of the governments, both previous
and present, were tardy. The police failed to act immediately. The
wrongdoers acted with impunity in some cases. The alienation within the
Muslim community would set in and get worse especially amongst the less
stable and more volatile members of the younger generation. There needs
to be introspection on the part of mainstream society, both Muslim and
non-Muslim.
In the immediate and short terms, the responses to the crisis will be
primarily led by the security forces. They have got to neutralize the
threat of terror bombings and killings. The ruthlessness of the
simultaneous suicide bombings on Easter Sunday, and the demonstrated
willingness of the bombers to sacrifice their wives and little children
has terrified the rest of society who love their children and do not
wish to expose them to danger. Therefore, more than three weeks after
the bombings, the schools remain largely empty.
NECESSARY RESPONSES
In an ominous development, reflecting the gravity of the present crisis,
there is a media report quoting the Army Commander to the effect that
"The main suspect in the abduction of journalist Keith Noyahr in May
2008, who also led the shadowy military intelligence unit suspected to
have been behind the 2009 murder of The Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha
Wickrematunge, has been restored to active service." Given the dire
situation in the country most people might agree with the army
commander. But the danger of further increase of alienation and
polarisation in society is manifest.
Fear breeds hatred, and the manifestations of mass alienation is already
visible in the eruptions of small scale violence at the community level
in a number of locations. In this context it is important that the
leaders of government and opposition should jointly address the people
and strictly forbid any section of people from taking the law into their
own hands. With presidential elections due in less than six months, it
is too late for another attempt at a national government, but it is not
too late for the political leaders of all parties to work together in a
spirit of repentance and find the best solutions in the circumstances.

