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Thursday, January 31, 2019
Palestinian girl fatally shot at Israeli checkpoint
Israeli forces killed a Palestinian girl at al-Zaayim checkpoint in the occupied West Bank east of Jerusalem on Wednesday.
Rights and Accountability 30 January 2019
Israeli police claimed that Samah Zuhair Mubarak attempted to stab a security guard at the checkpoint before she was fatally shot.
Israeli police claimed that Samah Zuhair Mubarak attempted to stab a security guard at the checkpoint before she was fatally shot.
The Palestinian Authority health ministry gave Mubarak’s age as 16, and media reported she was in the 11th grade.
No Israeli soldiers were injured during the incident, as in many
previous cases in which an alleged Palestinian attacker was killed.
An Israeli police spokesperson tweeted a photo of the knife he claimed Mubarak had carried:
Female terrorist armed with knife attempted to stab security personal at security crossing azaim, Jerusalem. Terrorist shot. Units at scene.
Israeli police also released an edited video said to show parts of the incident.
The video shows a person wearing all black and carrying a backpack approaching the checkpoint.
It then shows an altercation from a distance in which a person appears to stumble or lunge forward, and then fall backwards onto the ground as if shot.
It then shows an altercation from a distance in which a person appears to stumble or lunge forward, and then fall backwards onto the ground as if shot.
The video is edited such that it does not show what happened in the seconds prior to the altercation and shooting.
It also shows a soldier handcuffing the clearly incapacitated Mubarak
who is lying on the ground while another soldier points a rifle at her.
Medical aid denied
In many cases of alleged or actual attacks by Palestinians against
Israeli soldiers, occupation forces have habitually used unnecessary
lethal force – extrajudicial executions – against persons who presented no imminent threat or had ceased to present a danger.
“In some cases, Israeli officials have said Palestinians appeared to
have carried out attacks or attempted to do so in order to be shot dead
by Israeli security forces, as a form of ‘suicide by cop,’” the Times of Israel statedafter Wednesday’s shooting.
Local media reported that Israeli forces prevented first responders from providing first aid to Mubarak after she was shot.
None of the images released by Israeli police or those circulating on
social media and seen by The Electronic Intifada appear to show any
examination of Mubarak by medical personnel or life-saving efforts
taking place.
Medical care is habitually denied or actively prevented for Palestinians shot by Israeli occupation forces.
In reference to such incidents in the past, Amnesty International has stated that
it is “a basic duty under international law to provide medical aid to
the wounded, and failure to do so – especially intentional failure –
violates the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment.”
This video shows soldiers looking through Mubarak’s school bag after she was shot and finding only school books:
Family shocked
A family member told Palestinian media that following the killing of Mubarak, Israel detained her father Zuhair Mubarak after summoning him for interrogation at Ofer military prison.
“We knew that Samah was going to school, and we were surprised by the
news of her death. We do not know any other details about what had
happened at the checkpoint.” the family member added.
Mubarak’s family is originally from the Gaza Strip, but lives in the
occupied West Bank town of al-Ram, north of Jerusalem, where her father
moved at the age of 18.
She is the third Palestinian child to be killed by Israeli forces since the beginning of 2019.
“Samah has a childish personality, she has no extremist thought or
ideology, she comes from a religious family, we are all religious, and
she would not do what Israel claims,” Samah’s uncle, Fathi al-Khalidi, told the publication Donia al-Watan.
Fatal tear gas canister
Meanwhile in Gaza on Tuesday, 47-year-old Samir Ghazi al-Nabbahin died from injuries he suffered during Great March of Return protests last Friday.
The Palestinian health ministry in Gaza said that al-Nabbahin was hit in the face with a tear gas canister fired by Israeli occupation forces.
On 14 January, another Palestinian in Gaza, 13-year-old Abd al-Raouf Ismail Salha, died from injuriessustained when he was shot in the head by an Israeli tear gas canister days earlier.
Al-Nabbahin was buried on Wednesday amid scenes of anguish:
قطاع #غزة يودع الشهيد سمير النباهين (47) عاماً والذي ارتقى بعد إصابته بقنبلة غاز بالرأس أطلقها الاحتلال شرق البريج.
At least five more Palestinians were injured by
Israeli gunfire on Tuesday as they participated in a weekly march in
the north of Gaza against Israel’s maritime blockade of the territory.
Tamara Nassar contributed research.
U.S. Intervention Could Be Maduro’s Lifeline
Attempts at regime change have backfired on Washington before.
Members
of the Bolivarian National Police (PNB) line up to guard the entrance
of Venezuela's Central University (UCV) in Caracas, during a protest
against the government of President Nicolas Maduro on January 30, 2019.
(LUIS ROBAYO/AFP/Getty Images)
BY LINDSEY A. O'ROURKE |
Once one of Latin America’s longest-running democracies and the country
with the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, Venezuela has
been driven to the brink of collapse by years of economic mismanagement,
rampant corruption, and mounting authoritarianism by President Nicolás
Maduro’s government.
Starvation and malnutrition are now widespread. Years of recklessly printing money have rendered Venezuela’s currency practically worthless. Hyperinflation reached 1.3 million percent last year and could reach 10 million percent this year, according to the International Monetary Fund. More than 3 million Venezuelans have already fled the country in Latin America’s largest-ever refugee exodus, sparking humanitarian crises in neighboring states. On Jan. 23, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “all options are on the table” if Maduro used force to put down the protests that have swept the country in the last few weeks.
But the prospects for a change of regime in Venezuela look dicey, especially one driven from D.C. While two dozen countries have followed the United States’ lead and recognized the opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, there are good reasons to be wary of Washington’s latest moves. The U.S. history of attempted regime change in the region and Trump’s loose language are both working against an opposition that faces a still formidable foe in Maduro’s regime.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Guaidó coordinated his announcement with the United States beforehand as part of a concerted effort by the United States and its Latin American allies to force Maduro out. The Trump administration appears to have been debating regime change in Caracas for some time. In August 2017, Trump surprised the Pentagon by announcing that a “military option” was on the table for Venezuela—a claim he allegedly repeated to several alarmed South American leaders a few weeks later. In September 2018, the New York Times reported that Trump administration officials had met with disgruntled Venezuelan military officers multiple times to discuss the possibility of a coup. Although Washington ultimately decided not to support the coup plotters, Maduro jumped on the story and continues to blame the United States for his country’s political upheaval.
This highlights the dangers of the Trump administration’s loose language when it comes to regime change. While administration officials may see regime change as a morally sound response to the humanitarian crisis unfolding within Venezuela, many in the region are skeptical of Washington’s intentions—for understandable reasons.
When Maduro warned his supporters last week “don’t trust the gringos,” he evoked a long history of U.S. meddling in Latin America dating back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Gunboat diplomacy drove U.S. policy in the early 20th century. Indeed, as the historian Greg Grandin once summarized, “by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times, invaded Cuba, Mexico (again), Guatemala, and Honduras, fought protracted guerilla wars in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, annexed Puerto Rico, and taken a piece of Colombia to create both the Panamanian nation and the Panama Canal.”
The academic literature on regime changes paints an overwhelmingly negative picture of the prospects of success: Studies have shown that foreign-imposed regime changes do not improve political or economic relations between the intervening and target states. They rarely lead to democracy, and, regardless of whether they are conducted covertly or overtly, they increase the likelihood that the target state will experience a civil war.
Yet however ineffective a tool regime change has been, it’s one that the United States has often resorted to. Following World War II, covert action replaced gunboat diplomacy as its preferred form of intervention in the hemisphere. For instance, my recently released book, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War, documents 18 U.S.-backed covert regime change attempts in Latin America during the Cold War—10 of which saw U.S.-backed forces assume power. Because Washington’s role in most of these missions was quickly exposed, many of these covert operations have become lasting symbols of U.S. imperialism in the region: the 1954 Guatemalan coup that ousted the democratically elected leader Jacobo Árbenz, the 1961 failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1964 Brazilian military coup, the 1973 Chilean coup that gave rise to Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, and the Reagan administration’s support for anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.
In April 2002, Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chávez, was ousted for two days in a military coup before regaining power. Afterward, Chávez accused the United States of playing a role in the coup and later claimed that the United States was trying to assassinate him. (Declassified U.S. government documents later revealed that while the CIA was aware of the 2002 coup beforehand, Washington did not back the coup and instead issued “repeated warnings that the United States will not support any extraconstitutional moves to oust Chávez.”) Nevertheless, Chávez continued to use the allegations of U.S. meddling as to paint himself a socialist folk hero and undermine his political opponents for the rest of his presidency.
Given this history, many Venezuelans remain suspicious of Washington’s motives, and only 36 percent hold a favorable view of the United States. Consequently, the Trump administration’s recognition of Guaidó is likely a double-edged sword: While it may increase his stature in the eyes of U.S. allies, it is also likely to undermine his legitimacy among Venezuelans wary of U.S. meddling.
There are other practical obstacles in the way of Washington’s hopes. To begin with, recognizing Guaidó is unlikely to bring meaningful change on its own. It is hardly news that the United States wants Maduro out, so backing Guaidó is unlikely to change the existing balance-of-power calculations of Venezuela’s key domestic players.
The same holds true internationally. Maduro retains support from his foreign backers, most importantly Russia and China, which have not only provided his regime with billions in foreign investment but can also effectively block any U.N. Security Council resolutions against Venezuela.
History also suggests little reason for optimism. This is not the first time that the United States has sought to undermine a foreign regime by diplomatically recognizing its domestic opponents.
Washington refused to recognize Manuel Noriega’s handpicked president in Panama following disputed elections in 1989. Throughout the 1990s, Washington did not recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 2011, then-President Barack Obama recognized Libyan opposition forces while Muammar al-Qaddafi was still in power. The following year, he recognized the Syrian opposition coalition as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. In each of these cases, however, Washington’s withholding of diplomatic recognition on its own did little to weaken the foreign government’s de facto control over its territory, and the United States later escalated to covert or overt attempts at regime change.
In the case of Venezuela, Guaidó has said he needs the backing of three groups to succeed: the people, the international community, and the military. Of the three, the allegiance of the armed forces is arguably the most important, and, unfortunately for Guaidó, also the most difficult to acquire. High-ranking Venezuelan military officials see their survival as tied to the government. For years, Maduro has bought their loyalty through lucrative government contracts, and they risk charges of corruption, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking should his regime fall. While rank-and-file military officials may be more sympathetic to Guaidó, they face serious logistical obstacles to organizing an effective resistance. On Jan. 20, for example, Maduro easily quashed a small soldiers’ rebellion.
At the heart of the Trump administration’s policy lies a gamble: If Maduro falls and democracy flourishes in his place, relations with Caracas are likely to improve, and Washington can claim to have been on the right side of history. If Maduro stays in power, however, the United States risks appearing complicit in what Maduro and his supporters have described as a “coup attempt.” Maduro will also have scored a propaganda victory against the United States, and he can continue to deride Guaidó as one of America’s “political puppets.” Worse still, having staked their reputation against Maduro, U.S. policymakers may feel compelled to escalate their actions to covert or overt attempts at regime change to force Maduro out.
If diplomacy fails and U.S. policymakers escalate their attempts at regime change, they may be setting themselves up for disaster. Within Venezuela, there is little domestic support for foreign intervention. A November 2018 poll, for instance, found that only 35 percent of Venezuelans would support “a foreign military intervention to remove President Maduro from his position.”
The president of the Mexican Senate’s foreign relations committee, Héctor Vasconcelos, put Washington’s dilemma well: “Nothing will contribute more to the questioning of the legitimacy and credibility of Juan Guaidó than the support he is receiving from the United States. We are in Latin America and this should be understood by the White House. … Learn something from history.”
Starvation and malnutrition are now widespread. Years of recklessly printing money have rendered Venezuela’s currency practically worthless. Hyperinflation reached 1.3 million percent last year and could reach 10 million percent this year, according to the International Monetary Fund. More than 3 million Venezuelans have already fled the country in Latin America’s largest-ever refugee exodus, sparking humanitarian crises in neighboring states. On Jan. 23, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “all options are on the table” if Maduro used force to put down the protests that have swept the country in the last few weeks.
But the prospects for a change of regime in Venezuela look dicey, especially one driven from D.C. While two dozen countries have followed the United States’ lead and recognized the opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, there are good reasons to be wary of Washington’s latest moves. The U.S. history of attempted regime change in the region and Trump’s loose language are both working against an opposition that faces a still formidable foe in Maduro’s regime.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Guaidó coordinated his announcement with the United States beforehand as part of a concerted effort by the United States and its Latin American allies to force Maduro out. The Trump administration appears to have been debating regime change in Caracas for some time. In August 2017, Trump surprised the Pentagon by announcing that a “military option” was on the table for Venezuela—a claim he allegedly repeated to several alarmed South American leaders a few weeks later. In September 2018, the New York Times reported that Trump administration officials had met with disgruntled Venezuelan military officers multiple times to discuss the possibility of a coup. Although Washington ultimately decided not to support the coup plotters, Maduro jumped on the story and continues to blame the United States for his country’s political upheaval.
This highlights the dangers of the Trump administration’s loose language when it comes to regime change. While administration officials may see regime change as a morally sound response to the humanitarian crisis unfolding within Venezuela, many in the region are skeptical of Washington’s intentions—for understandable reasons.
When Maduro warned his supporters last week “don’t trust the gringos,” he evoked a long history of U.S. meddling in Latin America dating back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Gunboat diplomacy drove U.S. policy in the early 20th century. Indeed, as the historian Greg Grandin once summarized, “by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times, invaded Cuba, Mexico (again), Guatemala, and Honduras, fought protracted guerilla wars in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, annexed Puerto Rico, and taken a piece of Colombia to create both the Panamanian nation and the Panama Canal.”
The academic literature on regime changes paints an overwhelmingly negative picture of the prospects of success: Studies have shown that foreign-imposed regime changes do not improve political or economic relations between the intervening and target states. They rarely lead to democracy, and, regardless of whether they are conducted covertly or overtly, they increase the likelihood that the target state will experience a civil war.
Yet however ineffective a tool regime change has been, it’s one that the United States has often resorted to. Following World War II, covert action replaced gunboat diplomacy as its preferred form of intervention in the hemisphere. For instance, my recently released book, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War, documents 18 U.S.-backed covert regime change attempts in Latin America during the Cold War—10 of which saw U.S.-backed forces assume power. Because Washington’s role in most of these missions was quickly exposed, many of these covert operations have become lasting symbols of U.S. imperialism in the region: the 1954 Guatemalan coup that ousted the democratically elected leader Jacobo Árbenz, the 1961 failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1964 Brazilian military coup, the 1973 Chilean coup that gave rise to Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, and the Reagan administration’s support for anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.
In April 2002, Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chávez, was ousted for two days in a military coup before regaining power. Afterward, Chávez accused the United States of playing a role in the coup and later claimed that the United States was trying to assassinate him. (Declassified U.S. government documents later revealed that while the CIA was aware of the 2002 coup beforehand, Washington did not back the coup and instead issued “repeated warnings that the United States will not support any extraconstitutional moves to oust Chávez.”) Nevertheless, Chávez continued to use the allegations of U.S. meddling as to paint himself a socialist folk hero and undermine his political opponents for the rest of his presidency.
Given this history, many Venezuelans remain suspicious of Washington’s motives, and only 36 percent hold a favorable view of the United States. Consequently, the Trump administration’s recognition of Guaidó is likely a double-edged sword: While it may increase his stature in the eyes of U.S. allies, it is also likely to undermine his legitimacy among Venezuelans wary of U.S. meddling.
There are other practical obstacles in the way of Washington’s hopes. To begin with, recognizing Guaidó is unlikely to bring meaningful change on its own. It is hardly news that the United States wants Maduro out, so backing Guaidó is unlikely to change the existing balance-of-power calculations of Venezuela’s key domestic players.
The same holds true internationally. Maduro retains support from his foreign backers, most importantly Russia and China, which have not only provided his regime with billions in foreign investment but can also effectively block any U.N. Security Council resolutions against Venezuela.
History also suggests little reason for optimism. This is not the first time that the United States has sought to undermine a foreign regime by diplomatically recognizing its domestic opponents.
Washington refused to recognize Manuel Noriega’s handpicked president in Panama following disputed elections in 1989. Throughout the 1990s, Washington did not recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 2011, then-President Barack Obama recognized Libyan opposition forces while Muammar al-Qaddafi was still in power. The following year, he recognized the Syrian opposition coalition as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. In each of these cases, however, Washington’s withholding of diplomatic recognition on its own did little to weaken the foreign government’s de facto control over its territory, and the United States later escalated to covert or overt attempts at regime change.
In the case of Venezuela, Guaidó has said he needs the backing of three groups to succeed: the people, the international community, and the military. Of the three, the allegiance of the armed forces is arguably the most important, and, unfortunately for Guaidó, also the most difficult to acquire. High-ranking Venezuelan military officials see their survival as tied to the government. For years, Maduro has bought their loyalty through lucrative government contracts, and they risk charges of corruption, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking should his regime fall. While rank-and-file military officials may be more sympathetic to Guaidó, they face serious logistical obstacles to organizing an effective resistance. On Jan. 20, for example, Maduro easily quashed a small soldiers’ rebellion.
At the heart of the Trump administration’s policy lies a gamble: If Maduro falls and democracy flourishes in his place, relations with Caracas are likely to improve, and Washington can claim to have been on the right side of history. If Maduro stays in power, however, the United States risks appearing complicit in what Maduro and his supporters have described as a “coup attempt.” Maduro will also have scored a propaganda victory against the United States, and he can continue to deride Guaidó as one of America’s “political puppets.” Worse still, having staked their reputation against Maduro, U.S. policymakers may feel compelled to escalate their actions to covert or overt attempts at regime change to force Maduro out.
If diplomacy fails and U.S. policymakers escalate their attempts at regime change, they may be setting themselves up for disaster. Within Venezuela, there is little domestic support for foreign intervention. A November 2018 poll, for instance, found that only 35 percent of Venezuelans would support “a foreign military intervention to remove President Maduro from his position.”
The president of the Mexican Senate’s foreign relations committee, Héctor Vasconcelos, put Washington’s dilemma well: “Nothing will contribute more to the questioning of the legitimacy and credibility of Juan Guaidó than the support he is receiving from the United States. We are in Latin America and this should be understood by the White House. … Learn something from history.”
US Congressman behind bill opposing hard Irish border: ‘It would likely bring back bad old days’
A US Congressman has put forward a bill opposing the return of
a hard Irish border. Brendan Boyle, who has Irish ancestry, said he was
concerned that a hard border could threaten the Good Friday Agreement.
It’s not all doom and gloom for China’s economy
Workers prepare to load pipes onto a ship at the port in Lianyungang,
China's eastern Jiangsu province, on January 14, 2019. China's global
trade volume rose last year but its surplus fell again as its imports
outpaced its exports, official data released on January 14 showed amid a
bruising trade war with the United States. Source: STR/AFP
By
CHINA’S economy had an unexpected downturn in 2018. Industrial
upgrading, economic policy battles and trade friction with the United
States all contributed to the slowdown. The government is implementing
policy measures aimed at stabilising economic momentum, but downward
pressure on the economy will likely continue in 2019.
If the government is able to fine-tune its economic policies and adopt
counter-cyclical measures, China can still achieve a robust pace of
economic growth this year — as long as trade friction risks remain under
control.
The so-called “middle-income trap challenge” led to a slowdown in
China’s growth after 2010. GDP per capita rose from US$3,600 in 2007 to
almost US$10,000 in 2018.
Having lost the low-cost advantage, China must build new industries
through innovation and industrial upgrading to support the next phase of
its economic development. Moderation of growth will likely continue
until this battle between old and new industries ends.
The sudden weakening of growth momentum in 2018 is mainly attributable
to two new developments. One is the government’s three economic policy
battles — cleaning up the environment, controlling systemic financial
risks, and alleviating poverty — that were launched in early 2018. All
are necessary to improve the quality of economic growth. But the first
two slowed growth down directly.
To clean up the environment the government abruptly shut down many high
pollution production facilities, especially in northern China. To reduce
financial risks, regulatory authorities took measures to control shadow
banking transactions. This led to a reduction of total social financing
and economic activities cooled quickly.
Unexpectedly, these policies hit the private sector hard. Although
policymakers did not specifically target private enterprises, they
typically have lower environmental standards and receive more funding
through shadow banking. This created disproportionate difficulties for
the private sector, prompting nation-wide debate about its position in
the Chinese economy.
Workers prepare a container at the port in Qingdao, China’s eastern
Shandong province, on January 14, 2019. China’s global trade volume rose
last year but its surplus fell again as its imports outpaced its
exports, official data released on January 14 showed amid a bruising
trade war with the United States. Source: STR/AFP
The government responded by reversing policy towards the private sector
and reiterating its importance in the Chinese economy. Some officials
also spoke about “competitive neutrality”, but it remains uncertain how
this could be implemented effectively.
The trade friction with the United States is as yet having limited
direct impact on China’s trade activities. But it is affecting investor
confidence and probably delaying planned business investment. Whether
the trade war’s full effect — estimated at 0.5–1.5 percent of GDP — will
materialise depends on how long it drags on and how serious it becomes.
The economy weakened visibly during the fourth quarter of 2018. But the
Keqiang Index (a composite measure of freight, credit and power
consumption) still indicated decent economic growth — albeit slower,
though not significantly, than that officially reported.
More importantly, while the manufacturing purchasing managers’ index
(PMI) dropped below 50 in December 2018, the non-manufacturing PMI
confirmed robust expansion. This is consistent with the general theme of
a battle between old and new industries.
With the government now fine-tuning its environmental and financial
policies, their drag on economic momentum is likely already easing. It
is also expected that China and the United States will reach some
partial agreement on trade friction during the second quarter of 2019 at
latest – although a full resolution is unlikely in the near future.
The two governments are probably making deals on balancing bilateral
trade imbalances, opening up China’s services sector and improving
protection of intellectual property rights.
After the global financial crisis, Chinese policymakers formed a
consensus that China should not rely on aggressive fiscal or monetary
policy expansions as it did in 2009. But when the economy suffers a
downturn the government should still take some counter-cyclical
measures, albeit of a more modest magnitude.
Workers making caps for export in a textile workshop in Lianyungang, in
China’s eastern Jiangsu province, January 12, 2019. Source: STR / AFP
Today the Chinese government has limited room to take counter-cyclical
policies. Expected policy hikes by the US Federal Reserve Bank in 2019
constrain the People’s Bank of China’s ability to adopt monetary policy
easing given limited exchange rate flexibility.
Large liabilities by local governments and affiliated local government
investment vehicles limit scope for further fiscal policy expansion. And
high leverage ratios cap credit and financing growth.
The government must create greater policy room. To strengthen monetary
policy independence, the People’s Bank of China should consider either
increasing exchange rate flexibility or tightening management of
cross-border capital flows.
Some policymakers are worried this could increase fiscal risks if the
fiscal deficit exceeds 3 percent of GDP. But in reality, consolidated
government debts are still about 50 percent of GDP — a 3 percent fiscal
deficit should not become a hard constraint for the government.
High leverage ratios are now perceived as the most serious financial
risk in China. But as most borrowing is done by state-owned enterprises
and local government investment vehicles, both of which are associated
with the government, it is unlikely China will experience a so-called
Minsky moment. The most effective way of deleveraging would be to shut
down zombie firms, but this is not easy given social and economic
constraints.
The government could consider setting up a special vehicle to take over
some of the borrowing to cut off inefficient financial flows and take
more time to deal with stocks. This would create room for both financial
institutions and the corporate sector to re-leverage and grow.
More than 20 years ago when Chinese banks had around 40 percent bad loan
ratios, the government established four asset management companies,
which purchased about CNY1.4 trillion (US$206 billion) worth of bad
loans from the banks at face value. This relieved the banks of their
debt burden and enabled the start of a new round of restructuring.
There’s a case for contemplating a return to these measures to ease the
burden of the structural adjustment that China has to undertake now.
Yiping Huang is Professor and Deputy Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University.
Roadblocks cast shadow over path to peace in Afghanistan
Greg Torode, Rupam Jain, Abdul Qadir Sediqi-JANUARY 30, 2019
KABUL
(Reuters) - U.S. diplomats and the Afghan Taliban have seen cause for
hope in talks to end the United States’ longest war, but the pivotal
issues of a ceasefire and the militants sitting down with the Afghan
government are far from being resolved.Areas in which both sides have hailed progress - plans for the withdrawal of foreign troops 17 years after the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban and assurances that Afghanistan won’t become a base for al Qaeda or Islamic State - still need detailed negotiation, sources on both sides said.
The withdrawal, for example, is contingent on a ceasefire that the Taliban have yet to discuss.
“We want to be absolutely sure that the U.S. is leaving before we call off the fight,” said a senior Taliban official on condition of anonymity.
But a senior U.S. official privy to the negotiations was clear a ceasefire had to come first: “How could we even do a withdrawal without a ceasefire?”
And the Taliban’s assurances on counter-terrorism also come with caveats.
They say they can guarantee the United States the security of the half of the country they now control, but they would have to be in an interim government to be sure of stopping al Qaeda or Islamic State from attacking anywhere else.
Left to watch the unlikely U.S. and Taliban tango as he eyes a second term, Western-backed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refuses to accept an interim government as part of any deal.
“We want peace, we want it quickly, but we want a proper plan ... so the mistakes of the past do not repeat,” Ghani said in a televised address on Monday, referring to a bloody history of failed governments, military coups and civil war.
Ghani mentioned the deaths of previous rulers, including former President Najibullah, who was hanged from a Kabul lamppost when Taliban guerrillas swept into the capital in 1996.
Former U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker wrote in the Washington Post that by negotiating with a Taliban that refused to talk to the Afghan leadership “we have ourselves de-legitimized the government we claim to support”.
NEW NEGOTIATOR
The next round of talks will be held in Qatar on Feb. 25 when Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a former mujahideen fighter against the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, will head the Taliban side following his release last year from eight years in a Pakistani jail.U.S. officials told Reuters they hope he will have the authority to negotiate on the ceasefire and the need for discussions with the Afghan government. The Taliban have so far refused to talk to the government which they dismiss as a puppet of the United States.
Baradar, a co-founder of the movement and a former military commander in
western Afghanistan, will enter new talks from a position of relative
strength as its new political chief, Taliban officials said.
For years, the Taliban have fought to expel foreign forces and drive the government from power, so they can restore their version of hardline Islamic law across Afghanistan.
After intensifying attacks over the last two years, the Taliban are more powerful than any at other time since they were toppled by Western forces.
And senior Taliban officials say they know the United States and other foreign forces are tired and want out. While they, meanwhile, can sense victory and a future role in government.
“If the Afghan government and the Taliban have an agreement, it will involve altering government arrangements in some respect, creating a more inclusive government and consolidating the Afghan security forces and the Taliban in some new security architecture,” said James Dobbins, a former diplomat who is now senior fellow at the RAND Corporation think-tank.
Dobbins, who was the Obama administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2013, said it would take a long time to reach a deal that would be sustainable.
But however much time the talks took, the senior U.S. official privy to the talks, who did not want to be identified, insisted: “We will not leave Afghanistan without a deal. We want to leave a good legacy.”
U.S. officials told Reuters last month that Trump had issued verbal orders to plan for a withdrawal of about half of the 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. However, they said he could reverse course.
On Wednesday, Trump tweeted that talks “are proceeding well”. He did not address any possible pact with the Taliban or troop withdrawals.
The U.S. troops in Afghanistan are part of a NATO-led mission and a U.S. counterterrorism mission largely directed at groups such as Islamic State and al Qaeda.
Some 8,000 troops from 38 other countries are participating in the operation, known as Resolute Support.
Diplomats and military attaches from many of those countries describe an intense desire to leave. Italy is considering sending home its 900 troops within a year.
The period after any deal and withdrawal is also fraught with risks. Kabul-based Western envoys say little hard thought has been given to how aid plans and other support would have to be intensified and tailored to fit a new era of peace, and possible power sharing.
Some also warn of a spike in violence as fighters on both sides return to villages and start new lives.
Afghans and regional diplomats also fear a U.S. bid to cut a hasty deal with the Taliban could allow militia groups to exploit ethnic rivalries to usurp power.
Then there is the worry that the country’s nascent democracy and women’s rights could crumble in the absence of foreign forces.
Ghani made clear this week they are worries he shares, even if question marks remain over his ability to shape events ahead.
“I, as an elected leader in charge of 35 million Afghans, ... know what are the probable dangers and threats after the peace deal.”
For years, the Taliban have fought to expel foreign forces and drive the government from power, so they can restore their version of hardline Islamic law across Afghanistan.
After intensifying attacks over the last two years, the Taliban are more powerful than any at other time since they were toppled by Western forces.
And senior Taliban officials say they know the United States and other foreign forces are tired and want out. While they, meanwhile, can sense victory and a future role in government.
“If the Afghan government and the Taliban have an agreement, it will involve altering government arrangements in some respect, creating a more inclusive government and consolidating the Afghan security forces and the Taliban in some new security architecture,” said James Dobbins, a former diplomat who is now senior fellow at the RAND Corporation think-tank.
Dobbins, who was the Obama administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2013, said it would take a long time to reach a deal that would be sustainable.
But however much time the talks took, the senior U.S. official privy to the talks, who did not want to be identified, insisted: “We will not leave Afghanistan without a deal. We want to leave a good legacy.”
Slideshow (2 Images)
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Doubts have increased in recent weeks whether U.S. President Donald Trump would stomach a protracted presence in Afghanistan amid mixed signals from Washington.U.S. officials told Reuters last month that Trump had issued verbal orders to plan for a withdrawal of about half of the 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. However, they said he could reverse course.
On Wednesday, Trump tweeted that talks “are proceeding well”. He did not address any possible pact with the Taliban or troop withdrawals.
The U.S. troops in Afghanistan are part of a NATO-led mission and a U.S. counterterrorism mission largely directed at groups such as Islamic State and al Qaeda.
Some 8,000 troops from 38 other countries are participating in the operation, known as Resolute Support.
Diplomats and military attaches from many of those countries describe an intense desire to leave. Italy is considering sending home its 900 troops within a year.
The period after any deal and withdrawal is also fraught with risks. Kabul-based Western envoys say little hard thought has been given to how aid plans and other support would have to be intensified and tailored to fit a new era of peace, and possible power sharing.
Some also warn of a spike in violence as fighters on both sides return to villages and start new lives.
Afghans and regional diplomats also fear a U.S. bid to cut a hasty deal with the Taliban could allow militia groups to exploit ethnic rivalries to usurp power.
Then there is the worry that the country’s nascent democracy and women’s rights could crumble in the absence of foreign forces.
Ghani made clear this week they are worries he shares, even if question marks remain over his ability to shape events ahead.
“I, as an elected leader in charge of 35 million Afghans, ... know what are the probable dangers and threats after the peace deal.”
Additional reporting James Mackenzie in Islamabad; Editing by Nick Macfie
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