Journalists for Rights urge the President to appoint persons of integrity as the new commissioners of the RTI Commission

image courtesy of RTI Wiki.

By Sri Lanka Brief-29/09/2021

Issuing a statement Journalists for Rights urges the President to appoint persons with a history of integrity as the new commissioners of the Right to Information Commission.

The term of the incumbent commissioners of the Right to Information Commission will expire soon, and the President is supposed to appoint a new commission under the powers vested in him by the 20th amendment to the constitution.

The statement in full.

Let us Guarantee the ‘information vaccine’ for all

Under the resolution 38C 57, in 2019, the 74th UN General Assembly (UNGA) proclaimed 28 September as the International Day for Universal Access to Information.

Although Sri Lanka has achieved fourth place in the Right to Information (RTI) global rating, gaining 131 of 150 marks, the future of Sri Lanka’s Right to Information is in jeopardy now, as some stakeholders perceive.

The 20th amendment to the constitution, passed by the current President Gotabaya
Rajapaksa, immediately after he came to power, undermined many legal reforms to
strengthen democracy and citizens’ rights. However, thankfully, we must mention that the
government has defended the people’s Right to Information.

However, we understand that the authenticity of the independent commissions essential for
uplifting democracy and citizens’ rights is contested by the 20th amendment. For example,
the independence of the Right to Information Act is directly affected because the President
has retained the power to appoint the commissioners. The term of the incumbent
commissioners of the Right to Information Commission will expire soon, and the President is supposed to appoint a new commission under the powers vested in him by the 20 th
amendment to the constitution.

Against this backdrop, we urge the President to appoint persons with a history of integrity
as the new commissioners of the Right to Information Commission.

We want to point out further that we have failed to create a culture of opening information
to people, although Sri Lanka has been internationally recognized in terms of the Right to
Information. We believe that state agencies do not need to wait until a request is made to
open information to the public. Therefore, we urge the government to create a culture of
opening information in the public authorities.

We highlight that the incident of destruction of the National Medicines Regulatory Authority
database is a new type of technology-based threat to the citizen's Right to Information. We stress to the government that safeguarding the people’s Right to Information is a state responsibility. Therefore, the government must conduct an independent investigation regarding data theft and initiate stern action to stop recurrence. We are vigilant about the progress of the investigation and the effort to safeguard public information.

Journalists for Rights emphasize that the Right to Information is part of sovereignty and that the state has the inalienable responsibility of safeguarding fundamental rights, including the Right to Information.

Just as people require vaccination to protect from COVID-19 virus, the Right to Information is essential for the sustainability of democracy and an independent citizen who enjoys freedoms and rights.

Dulan Dasanayaka
K. Sanjeewa
Jayani Abesekara
for Convenors
Journalists for Rights

29.09.2021

 

Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and reality – Part 1

The decision to go to the IMF for assistance rests entirely with the IMF members. However, the relationship between the IMF and its developing-country members under stabilisation programmes has not always been smooth

Sri Lanka’s first attempt to borrow from the IMF under an SBA was by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) Coalition Government in 1964. By that time import restriction and capital controls had been carried out to the maximum and it was becoming increasingly difficult to introduce further restrictions without damaging the economy. Because of the nationalisation of the foreign-owned gas and petroleum outlets in 1961, Sri Lanka became the first country against which the US Government invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the suspension of US aid to countries expropriating US property without compensation. Following this, the international aid community virtually isolated Sri Lanka

 

Thursday, 30 September 2021

“We cannot brush aside and completely ignore these international institutions; we can repudiate their terms only if we are prepared to face the far-reaching distortions”

“The Government’s effort to put its own house in order is not the result of IMF advice but is the obvious thing to do in the national interest”

– Dr. N.M. Perera, Finance Minister of the United Front Government, 1970-’75 –

Sri Lanka is now in the midst of its worst macroeconomic crisis since independence. Whether to seek financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in managing the crisis is a hotly-debated issue in Sri Lankan policy circles. The debate is largely ideologically-driven: strongly-held, opposing views are expressed without facts. 

The purpose of this paper is to demystify the debate by documenting and analysing Sri Lanka’s experience under IMF-supported macroeconomic adjustment programs, the economic circumstances that propelled the country to seek IMF support, and implications of these programmes for economic stabilisation and growth. 

The discussion focuses on two key issues emphasised by the current political leadership and the Central Bank to justify their attempt to avert going to the IMF: IMF dictates policy reforms at the expense of national policy autonomy, and the conditions attached to IMF programs are harmful to national development. The paper primarily adopts an economist’s perspective, but where relevant economics is combined with politics in order to understand the vicissitudes of Sri Lanka-IMF relations.

The paper begins with a short introduction to the role of the IMF in economic stabilisation reforms in developing countries to provide the context for the ensuing analysis. The next section provides as analytical narrative of the history of Sri Lanka-IMF relations. The following section examines the impact of IMF programs on the Sri Lankan economy. The final section provides concluding remarks with a focus on the current debate on entering into an IMF programme.

 

The IMF and economic stabilisation

The IMF was set up in 1945 to provide member countries with bridging loans to help them get over balance of payments difficulties. A member’s access to the IMF’s financing is expressed in terms of tranches, equal to 25% of its quota of the IMF. The first four trenches (‘reserve’ tranches, in total up to 100% of its quota) can be accessed free of charge at the member’s own discretion.

The IMF also has other concessional credit facilities introduced to help member countries in the event of unforeseeable economic shocks: Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF), the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF), the Trust Fund and Subsidy Account (TFSA) financing, Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) and Emergency Assistance (EA).

When a country borrows beyond the reserve trenches or eligible concessional credit facilities, it has to agree on a reform package to overcome its problems that led to seek financial support. These lending programs are called structural adjustment (or stabilisation) programmes. The policy measures prescribed by the IMF relating to these lending programmes are known as ‘IMF conditionality’.

The main structural adjustment loan programme is the Stand-By Agreement (SBA) facility, introduced in 1952. The key objectives of SBAs are to rebuild the external reserves, strengthen the fiscal position, maintain monetary stability, and fortify the domestic financial system. The length of the typical SBA programme is 12 to 18 months and loans are to be repaid within a maximum of five years.

The other IMF stabilisation facilities are the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) (established in 1974); Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) (1982) and later remained Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and Poverty Reduction and Growth facility (PRGF) introduced in 1999 in place of the ESAF specifically to help low-income countries. These programmes have been established to provide support to comprehensive structural adjustment programmes that include policies of the scope and character required to correct structural imbalances over an extended period. Normally the duration of these programmes varies from three to five years, and repayment is over four to 10 years from the date of drawing. 

Under the structural adjustment programmes, the IMF releases funds by quarterly credit tranches. The country has to observe the quarterly programme criteria at each test data. The interest rate comprises two components: the service charge and a ‘fixed margin’ (an annual interest rate). The service charge is calculated weekly, based on a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) rate (applicable to all borrowings from the IMF) and the fixed margin is applicable to loans up to 300% of the member’s IMF quota and a surcharge is applicable to loans beyond that limit. The interest rate is normally about one third of the average rate applicable to sovereign bonds issued by the typical developing country.

Unlike the other multilateral and bilateral lenders who lend to the government of the borrowing country, the IMF always lends funds to the central banks of the country. The IMF loans to the central bank are strictly for the purpose of building international reserves to meet external payments. Therefore, borrowing under IMF programmes does not have any direct impact on domestic money supply and hence on domestic inflation. 

Entering into an IMF supported programme also acts as a catalyst to generate additional international financial assistance in three ways (Bird and Rowlands 2007). First, having a macroeconomic adjustment programme with the IMF is often a prerequisite for obtaining World Bank adjustment loans. Second, as part of entering into a stabilisation programme, the IMF arranges aid consortia of donor countries to assist the given country, Most of the donor funds harnessed under these consortia are outright grants or long-term loans that carry low interest rates. Third, credibility of the reform program gained by entering into an IMF programme helps raising funds at competitive interest rates from private capital markets.

The core of an IMF stabilisation programme is a ‘letter of intent’ that contains ‘performance criteria’ (conditionality) agreed with the IMF. The performance criteria vary from case to case, but typically centre on four key variables: budget deficit, the rate at which domestic credit is created, interest rates for both depositors and borrowers, and the exchange rate. In recent decades, the IMF has begun to focus on domestic pricing policy for petroleum products, when the domestic prices are badly out of line with world prices. 

In the typical developing economy where the local capital market is weak and access to foreign credit is limited, domestic credit expansion is largely driven by the budget deficit. In IMF reform programs the major emphasis is, therefore, placed on fiscal reforms, cutting the budget deficit through both government revenue reform and rationalising government expenditure. (There is a saying that the acronym ‘IMF’ stands for ‘It’s Mostly Fiscal’!) 

A straightforward reduction of absorption (expenditure) is likely to entail a decline in total output and employment unless wages are exceptionally flexible and labour and capital is highly mobile among economic sectors. Therefore, exchange rate depreciation is recommended to make tradable goods (exports and imports competing goods) relatively more profitable compared to ‘non-tradables’ (mostly services and construction). The expansion of domestic tradable goods production relatively to non-tradable production is expected to help maintaining growth dynamism of the economy in face of policy-induced contraction in aggregate domestic absorption (Cooper 1992).

The decision to go to the IMF for assistance rests entirely with the IMF members. However, the relationship between the IMF and its developing-country members under stabilisation programmes has not always been smooth. Much of the disagreements hinge on judgements relating to conditionality attached to the lending programmes. While the principle of conditionality is not generally contested, often there are strong reservations on the part of members about the design and application of conditionality. The national officials are typically more optimistic than the IMF staff and the favourable developments they anticipate could imply less difficult action. 

On the other hand, in some cases, the national government’s discontent could also arise because, in setting conditions, the IMF staff has the tendency go beyond the basic framework. For instance, they could get into details of exactly what expenditures should be cut or what taxes should be raised to reduce the budget deficit, instead of leaving the responsibility for meeting the targets with the officials of the country concerned by taking into account country-specific political as well as economic considerations. 

Negotiating a stabilisation programme in a crisis context has the tendency to give the unwarranted impression that a country is rushing into action with a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis the IMF. The governments may resent IMF conditionality because of the loss of sovereignty implied and also because of a belief that the IMF’s objectives do not necessarily coincide with those of the national government. 

In such a context, naturally there is a tendency on the prat of the governments to make the IMF a scapegoat for (to hold the IMF responsibility for) politically unpopular decisions taken by them or for their own poor economic management. Indeed, such scapegoating often lead many to believe that the IMF forces countries to take politically disagreeable, and sometimes economically costly, action (Cooper 1992, Bird 2007). 

 

Sri Lanka and the IMF 

Sri Lanka (then ‘Ceylon’) became a member of the IMF (and the World Bank) on 29 August 1950. It accepted the obligation for liberalisation of the current account transaction under the IMF Article VIII in March 1994. 

Sri Lanka did not recourse to IMF financing throughout the 1950s, given the healthy external reserve position built up during the Second Word War, which was subsequently buttressed by the Korean War commodity boom (1950-51) and the tea boom (1954-55). The country obtained IMF finance for the first time in 1961, and then in 1962, within the reserve trenches. 

 

1964: Trotskyite Finance Minister seeking IMF support

Sri Lanka’s first attempt to borrow from the IMF under an SBA was by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) Coalition Government in 1964. By that time import restriction and capital controls had been carried out to the maximum and it was becoming increasingly difficult to introduce further restrictions without damaging the economy (Corea 1971). Because of the nationalisation of the foreign-owned gas and petroleum outlets in 1961, Sri Lanka became the first country against which the US Government invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the suspension of US aid to countries expropriating US property without compensation (Olson 1977). Following this, the international aid community virtually isolated Sri Lanka.

The pragmatic Trotskyite Finance Minister, Dr. N.M. Perera (NM) decided to approach the IMF. In September 1964, at the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank held in Tokyo, the Sri Lankan team led by NM consulted the IMF on the possibility of obtaining financial support under an SBA. The Government was defeated in the Parliament before the negotiations ended. However, according to a statement made by Dudley Senanayake (the Opposition Leader) at a parliamentary debate, the negotiation with the IMF failed well before because NM was not prepared to touch the politically-sensitive subsidy on rice (Hansard Vol 73, No. 13, 1767 c. 2898).

 

1965-70: Four back-to-back SBAs

During 1965-1970, the right-of-the-centre United National Party (UNP) Government obtained IMF financial support under four SBAs. The IMF conditionality of the Letters of Intent of these SBAs reflected the very nature of the mainstream development thinking at the time, which favoured import-substitution industrialisation with the Government directly playing a major role. 

Redressing the fiscal imbalance by rationalising expenditure, in particular reducing subsidies was the key focus. Reforming State-Owned Enterprises was not part of conditionality even though converting their losses had already become a big drain on the Government budget. Under the third SBA signed in May 1968, a Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate Scheme (FFECS), a dual exchange rate systems, designed to provide incentives to sleeted ‘non-traditional’ exports and to lift quantitative restrictions on selected imports at a premium above the official exchange rate (initially set at 44%). Other than this, there was no emphasis by the IMF on unshackling the economy from import restrictions and other direct Government intervention in the economy.

An important development in the policy scene during this period, which has not received only scant attention in the post-independence development history of Sri Lanka, is a failed attempt by J.R. Jayewardene (JR), the then Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister, to seek IMF support for a major liberalisation reform. At the time the economy was in the doldrums because of the closed-economy polices pursued by the country from the late 1950s. JR ‘regarded the crisis as an opportunity to embark on a radical change in economic policies that would amount to a departure from the dirigiste policies’ (de Silva and Wriggins 1998, p168). 

He approached B. R. Shenoy, the Indian liberal economist (who had taught at the Ceylon University College in the late 1940s) for advice. Shenoy responded with a comprehensive policy blueprint for unshackling the economy (Shenoy 1966). JR presented the Shenoy report to the Cabinet but there was little chance of being adopted the radical reform package given the political adjustments and realignments within the multi-party Cabinet. He had to wait until the UNP’s election victory under his leadership in 1977 to implement the proposed reforms. 

( To be continued tomorrow)

(The writer is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, and Emeritus Professor of Economics at the Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

[In writing the analytical native of Sri Lanka-IMF relations during 1960-1985, the author has drawn heavily on the PhD thesis of J.B.A.D Jayalath, ‘The Political Economy of Adjustment and Stabilization: Sri Lanka’s Relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 1960-1985’ (The University of New England, Australia, 1990). He has also benefited from discussions with Sisira Jayasuriya. The full paper will be available soon at https://acde.crawford.anu.edu.au/acde-research/working-papers-trade-and-development.]

  Mangala Samaraweera: The Utopian Expedient..!

-By Daniel Alphonsus

(Lanka-e-News -29.Sep.2021, 11.45PM) “This is not a Sinhala-Buddhist country”. This war cry, triumphantly proclaimed in the deepest South after the Easter Bombings, were probably Mangala’s most famous words. And rightly so, for they captured the essence of the man. The attacks unleashed a volcano of fear and hate, which no one could stop. Most were silent, some tried to soothe. It was only Mangala who dared confront. That confrontation arose from compassion. Compassion which also led him to comfort. From his Matara home, that served as the office of the Mothers’ Front in the 1980s, to the Eid dinner at his Muslim bodyguard’s home after the attacks, Mangala always cared for those who lived in the dark shadow of oppression. He was often the only leader to speak, or march in solidarity. As a friend put it, with Mangala “power spoke truth”. This is why his loss continues to be felt in every corner of the island and will be for many more years to come. 

Mangala’s piercing vision for his beloved Sri Lanka arose from his love of people. His dreams were not sterile blueprints but rich and colourful tapestries woven from the joys, hopes, laughs and tears of the people he encountered. The discrimination he personally felt did not make him bitter. Instead it endowed him with great sensitivity. He wanted nothing more than for Sri Lankans - individually and collectively – to be free and to reach their fullest potential. To think their own thoughts, do what made them happy and to celebrate life in all its glory. Amidst the deep disappointment and betrayal he felt after the last Presidential election – many will remember his tweet from that day – he considered retiring from Sri Lanka to travel the world. That thought vanished, when a few weeks later he went to Matara and met his constituents. They had been by his side for decades and had always accepted him for who he was. Talk of retiring ended. Resolve returned and he began preparing for wrenching Sri Lanka from its post-Independence quagmire. 

A guiding rainbow..

Courage may be the virtue most lacking in politicians, but wisdom is a close second. As we all know, Mangala was more than a courageous dreamer. He held many of the great offices of state and was, for many years, Colombo’s most influential power-broker. His achievements and regrets have been recounted by others. But Mangala was greater than his office, influence or achievements. He was a leader. His ideas and example were, and remain, a guiding rainbow to us all. 

Mangala’s wisdom was practical. In politics and statecraft, noble ends are often necessarily achieved using ignoble means. Knowing this, but also knowing when to stop, when not to cross a line, is the central ethical challenge for any statesman. Mangala was incorruptible. But he also understood that if he did not grant thousands of jobs to his constituents, dreams would remain dreams. He understood power as only a politician can; he studied its many forms and practiced its many arts. He was a master of the secret alliance, subtle leak, cutting rumour, cunning seating arrangement, selective dinner invite, carefully chosen gift and sincere flattery. Yet it was his conscience’s mastery over the siren song of power and office that made him a statesman, whose stature will wax rather than wane as the years and decades pass. He took laws and institutions seriously. But he knew their limits. Ultimately, power was in politics: in ballots, ideas and emotions. That was his main arena, where he bent perception to shape reality.  

I only knew Mangala at a time when this intuition had matured. Yet it is a testament to his spirit that after decades spent at the frontlines of our muddy polity, rather a conscience mutilated and crushed, Mangala Experience had a more refined ethical sensibility than Mangala Innocence. As a tribute from across the aisle put it, he joined politics as a member of the party of conscience and ended life in that party. 

Mangala saw peoples' dreams..

Courage and wisdom count for little without capability and ambition. In a country where people move in their tribes – whether family, school, community or class - Mangala saw individuals for who they were. He saw their dreams, recognized their abilities and trusted them when no one else did. He empowered people to do what they always wanted to. He didn’t give a damn about sex, ethnicity, age or anything else. As long as you had passion and wanted to do something, he would quietly be there to help. 

He had the genius to unite revolutionary and capitalist, dreamer and fixer, artist and boffin, civil servant and activist, bringing them together to serve progress and serve Sri Lanka. As one person put it, “he made our profession our responsibility”. Just as his friendships reached across the kaduwa, his home and office bridged the English and vernacular universes. One feature of Mangala’s legacy less remarked on is his quiet record of appointing women to positions of responsibility. Ever the true liberal, he made sure all knew that this was because he thought that those women would do a better job than anyone else, not because they were women. All these people – chosen for their merit and passion, trusted and listened to – repaid Mangala’s trust many-fold. They worked and fought to realize his vision and earn his favour. He was also able to earn the trust and respect of the civil service. 

Mangala’s economic record is formidable..

Though politics and art were Mangala’s premier passions, ironically his successes were greater in the economic realm. We all know the SLT revolution paved the way for the privatization of Sri Lankan Airlines and SAGT, which has made Colombo one of the world’s great ports. Mangala’s Economics by Deshal de Mel authoritatively demonstrates his tenure as finance minister was no less accomplished than his triumphs as telecoms and foreign minister. Even as a diplomat, Mangala’s economic record is formidable as he played a pivotal role in regaining GSP+ and securing the $500 million MCC grant. 

With rebellious blue-hair, tattoos, Bowie and TikTok, Mangala was a child of Punk London. But he was also an heir of the Victorian tradition in Sri Lankan politics. He was sensible, decent and humble. Underneath that colourful, irreverent personality he carried with him a political tradition of restraint that is nearing extinction. The distinctions between state, government and party were instinctual. He always knew what should (and should not) be said and done in ministry, Parliament and political rally respectively. He abhorred the trappings of power and trinkets of wealth that increasingly found favour among his parliamentary colleagues. In this age of performativity, Mangala loathed pretense and hated servility even more. He had few friends remaining among his fellow politicians. In Parliament, where dining is largely social, he often ate lonely meals alone in his office. A loneliness presumably made deeper by the many betrayals he experienced over the years, which left him deeply guarded.  

I first met Mangala in his Sirikotha lair in the dark days of August 2014 when I was amateur cameraman for Amita Arudpragasam’s constitutional reform film. We talked of Sudu Nelum, we dreamt a bit and we laughed about the dark arts of political gossip sites. Sri Lanka was on his mind. The last time I met Mangala was a few days before he died. As we overlooked the sunny Bolgoda, we dreamt a bit, we laughed at our own bawdy jokes and we talked about his plans to contest in 2024 and the laws we needed to draft in anticipation. Sri Lanka was on his mind. 

History was on his side...

I do not weep for Mangala. His life was a life of ‘no ragrets’. He lived more in sixty-five years than many will live in as many lifetimes. I weep for myself and for Sri Lanka. I shall always remember the rally held at the Tagore auditorium in Matara, where Sampanthan and Mangala, representing Point Pedro and Dondra, stood as Palmyrah and Coconut as the young singers called out in Sinhalese and Tamil, to the audience and each other, Peratama Yamu Lanka. As the days and years go by, our sense of loss, of lost opportunities, only grows. This is my way of not giving up: “may the double gem bless us all”. 

Mangala Samaraweera died on 24 August 2021. He carried the hopes, often the last hopes, of many. His Lanka may take a few decades more to come to pass. But he believed history was on his side. Mangala is dead, long live Mangala!

-Daniel Alphonsus

Photo -Buddhika Weerasinghe

---------------------------
by     (2021-09-29 19:21:36)

 

Inmates file FR case against State Minister Lohan Ratwatte over prison incident

By Sri Lanka Brief-30/09/2021

A Fundamental Rights (FR) application has been filed in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka against State Minister Lohan Ratwatte.

The FR petition has been filed by eight Tamil political prisoners against the State Minister.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP M. A. Sumanthiran PC along with Attorney-at-Law Kesavan Sajanthan will appear on behalf of the prisoners.

MP Sumanthiran told NewsWire that he had met the prisoners on Saturday (25), during which they had requested for a case to be filed over the incident.

He said after obtaining all necessary details from the prisoners, he had taken the necessary measures to file the FR petition.

MP Sumanthiran added that he expects the Supreme Court to support the case soon, addressing it as an urgent matter.

The petition comes after State Minister Lohan Ratwatte was accused of breaking into the Welikada and Anuradhapura prisons while under the influence of alcohol.

He was also reported to have threatened two Tamil political prisoners at the Anuradhapura prison, making them kneel under gunpoint.

The State Minister was forced to resign from his portfolio of Prison Management and Prisoners’ Rehabilitation after concerns were raised over his actions.

The Justice Ministry has also appointed a retired judge to conduct investigations into the allegations levelled against State Minister Lohan Ratwatte. (NewsWire)

 

Sri Lanka: Missed opportunities!

Perhaps former Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendavitharana can be engaged to work out a proper strategy. Intelligence veteran Hendavitharana can be part of a special team assigned to build a strong case on behalf of the country on the basis of available information.

by Shamindra Ferdinando-September 29, 2021

UN Resident Coordinator in Colombo Hanna Singer-Hamdy paid a courtesy call on Defence Secretary (retd.) Gen. Kamal Gunaratne on Sept. 23 at the Defence Headquarters Complex, Sri Jayewardenepura, Kotte. The Egyptian was accompanied by the head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Alan Cole, formerly of the British Royal Navy.

The discussion covered Sri Lanka’s high profile ongoing campaign against narcotics trade and the government’s response to the raging Covid-19 epidemic.

A brief press release issued by Lt. Col. Nalin Herath, Officiating Director, Army Media Centre, in Sinhala, Tamil and English didn’t make reference to any other issue. Therefore, the writer rationally ascertained that no other matter had been taken up at the discussion.

Against the backdrop of the 48th session of the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the 76th session of the UNGA in New York, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) government could have used the Sept. 23 meet to brief the UN Resident Coordinator Singer as regards the accountability process.

The Defence Secretary, on behalf of the government, could have handed over a comprehensive report to the top UN official in Sri Lanka, in response to one-sided and high-handed the war crimes agenda pursued by the UNHRC against the country. Unfortunately, the government didn’t. The failure on the part of the government to do so underscored the absence of a cohesive mechanism to counter the campaign targeting Sri Lanka. Shoddy handling of the accountability process is an affront to the war-winning military that sacrificed so much to fight and defeat, militarily, ‘the world’s worst terrorist outfit’. More than 12 years after the eradication of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka remains under the UNHRC microscope, while many other countries, that caused death and misery to millions by launching false pretext wars or through illegal regime change actions are allowed to go scot-free.

For some strange reason, most probably for lack of competence at the Foreign Ministry, the government is reluctant to properly present Sri Lanka’s case before the international community. Let us hope that with Prof. G.L. Peiris, the eminent former law academic at the helm of the Foreign Ministry, we can mount a relentless diplomatic campaign to have the country cleared from such blatant accusations. In the process, it could even go to the extent of exposing, particularly our main accusers, who despite having plenty of innocent blood in their hands are pursuing this vendetta against us due to geo-political agendas.

The wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) the elite 53 Division, the then Maj. Gen. Gunaratne could have meticulously briefed the UN Chief here, who, too, has had the audacity to make public comments on the country’s internal affairs and get away with such behaviour.

The author of ‘Road to Nanthikadal’, Gunaratne commanded one of the two fighting Divisions, the other being the 58 Division commanded by the present Army Commander, General Shavendra Silva, involved in the final phase of the offensive. It would be pertinent to mention that a battalion (4 Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment) that had been under the overall command of the then Maj. Gen. Gunaratne killed Prabhakaran. The 53 Division had been involved in the unprecedented Anandapuram battle (late March-early April 2009) along with 58 Division and Task Force 8 that dealt a massive blow to the LTTE.

Why didn’t the government exploit the Sept. 23 meet that took place the day after President Rajapaksa addressed the 76th session of the UNGA in New York?

Sri Lanka’s continuing failure to set the record straight should be examined taking into consideration UNHRC Chief Michelle Bachelet’s latest oral update on the situation in Sri Lanka (on Sept. 13), Foreign Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris’ response by Zoom to the former twice Chilean President Bachelet on the following day, President Rajapaksa’s meet with UNSG Antonio Guterres (on Sept. 19), President Rajapaksa’s address to the UNGA (Sept. 20) and three meetings Foreign Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris had with Commonwealth Secretary General Patricia Scotland, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar also in New York.

The Defence Secretary is the ideal person to discuss the accountability issue. With Sri Lanka firmly on the UN agenda and the issue coming up for scrutiny once again at the 49th session in March 2022, the government cannot turn a blind eye to the developments taking place.

Vanni war compared with Ruwanda et al

Antonio Guterres’s predecessor, Ban Ki-moon once compared the Vanni offensive with that of Ruwanda and Serbia genocides in the 1990s. Gunaratne strongly disputed Ban Ki-moon’s comparison of Vanni offensive with clear cut cases of genocide in those two countries

South Korean Ki-moon played his part to facilitate the Western agenda in spite of his own mission in Colombo contradicting unsubstantiated accusations.

The government owed an explanation why absolutely no attempt was made in Geneva or New York to challenge the unsubstantiated war crimes allegations that paved the way for Western powers and other interested parties to place Sri Lanka on the Geneva agenda.

Instead of setting the record straight, President Rajapaksa assured his readiness to work with domestic stakeholders, international partners, UN, civil society and Tamil expatriate groups, whereas FM Peiris reiterated Sri Lanka’s commitment to some key provisions in the resolution co-sponsored by the then Yahapalana government in 2015 as fait accompli, while strongly rejecting external interventions.

In separate meetings with Aussie Foreign Minister Patricia, Scotland Marise Payne and Indian counterpart Dr. Jaishankar, Prof. Peiris explained ground realities and the hostile approach adopted by interested parties. Prof. Peiris also elucidated to Scotland the wrongness in replacing domestic accountability mechanisms with external bodies, particularly the ad-hoc mechanism approved at the 46th Geneva session.

 Bachelet declared in her Sept. 13 speech that the UNHRC was going ahead with the investigation. Sri Lanka shouldn’t expect Scotland to take a stand favourable to Sri Lanka, under any circumstances, as the organisation Bachelet leads conveniently turned a Nelsonian eye to Indian sponsored terrorism that ravaged Sri Lanka. Did Commonwealth ever take a stand on the destabilisation of the smaller neighbour by the Commonwealth giant?

Prof. G.L. Peiris told his Australian counterpart Marise Payne how Bachelet followed a policy extremely detrimental to Sri Lanka as regards the accountability process. A Foreign Ministry press release quoted Prof. Peiris as having told Payne: “….there is a need to allow local institutions the space and opportunity to carry out their mandates and the establishment of an ad-hoc external mechanism that overrides this work is unnecessary and detrimental. It is premature and inappropriate to have a mechanism selectively targeting Sri Lanka that goes against the very principles of the UN Charter.”

Australia is aware of the Geneva project meant to undermine Sri Lanka. Regardless of close bilateral relations between Australia and Sri Lanka, the former will abide by the US position vis-a-vis Sri Lanka. The Australian policy should be examined, keeping in mind its role in the US-led alliances against China and extremely close relationship between Sri Lanka and China, the emerging world power.

The surprise Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) alliance struck recently, at the expense of France, on supplying a nuclear powered submarine fleet to their colonial cousin Australia should be an example of the old adage that blood is thicker than water.

The new three nation Anglo-Saxon alliance suddenly arrayed against China should also serve as a warning to New Delhi that it is already an odd partner, though one of the earliest to sign up for Quad, comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia ranged against China. If they could ditch long standing European ally France without batting an eye lid, Delhi can imagine how they will treat her if they suddenly see India too as a rival like China.

French Foreign Minister Jan-Yves Le Drian went to the extent of alleging US President Joe Biden of stabbing France in the back.

“It’s really a stab in the back. We had established a relationship of trust with Australia, this trust has been betrayed”, Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told France Info radio. “I’m very angry today, and bitter… this is not something allies do to each other”, he said, noting that Australia would now have to explain how it would exit the contract.

A lesson for France

So Sri Lanka should not depend on foreign powers, entirely. It would be Sri Lanka’s responsibility to present its case before the global community. Major Western powers will never take a stand in support of a smaller nation at the expense of their overall strategy and lucrative business interests, the only exception being the case of Israel. There cannot be a better example than Australia going back on an agreement with France for what it considered a much better arrangement for Canberra. Obviously, not only Biden but the British and Australian leaders, too, stabbed France in the back.

In his talks with Dr. Jaishankar, Prof. Peiris declared Sri Lanka couldn’t accept external mechanisms active on the ground whereas the Indian Minister underscored the need for a fair and just resolution of residual issues in the interest of both countries.

Sri Lanka seems trapped in the eneva machinations. India, too, should be wary as its much touted relationship with the US does not mean a thing if one examined the way the US, the British and Australians sprang quite a despicable surprise.

Hope the world hasn’t forgotten how the US discarded Pakistan after having used the country in its proxy war to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and to intimidate India when it was seen as being in Soviet camp. New Delhi remained noncommittal regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In fact, Indian destabilisation of Sri Lanka, in the 80s, is in line with its overall strategy to counter domestic threats emanating from Tamil Nadu in the backdrop of perceived threat of Sri Lanka being a base for US-Israeli operations.

However, for want of cohesive policy Sri Lanka, at least after the end of the war hadn’t made a genuine effort to set the record straight.

Prof. Peiris during his interactions with foreign dignitaries, has quite clearly explained Sri Lanka’s refusal to accept external mechanisms. President Rajapaksa, too, stressed the importance of domestic mechanisms in achieving reconciliation. Both the President and the Foreign Minister declared Sri Lanka’s readiness to work with domestic stakeholders, including the civil society, Tamil expatriate groups, international partners and the UN to accomplish genuine peace.

Pompeo on Shavendra

However, the incumbent government has so far failed to question the very basis for domestic mechanisms set up by the previous government on the strength of unsubstantiated allegations. The government owed an urgent explanation. There cannot be any excuse for not presenting a proper defense on behalf of the war-winning armed forces. Commander of the Army Gen. Shavendra Silva remains blacklisted by the US on unsubstantiated allegations. Let me reproduce the former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declaration on Feb 14, 2020: “I am designating Shavendra Silva making him ineligible for entry into the U.S. due to his involvement in extrajudicial killings during Sri Lanka’s Civil War. The U.S. will not waver in its pursuit of accountability for those who commit war crimes and violate human rights.”

The US made the announcement after President Gotabaya Rajapaksa named Silva the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Another Gajaba Regiment veteran Chagie Gallage highlighted Sri Lanka’s pathetic failure to defend the military when he retired on August 31, 2018.

There had never been a previous instance of a senior officer in his farewell speech questioning the overall failure to counter the foreign project. This happened at Saliyapura, the famed Gajaba Regimental Headquarters.

He said: “Gajaba is engraved in golden letters in the annals of the Sri Lanka Army’s history, if not in the history of Sri Lanka … and I’m certain it will never be reversed by any. So, I’m happy to be retired being a tiny particle of that proud chapter of the history, though designated as a ‘War Criminal”.

About 10 months before Gallage’s retirement, Lord Naseby made a stunning revelation in the House of Lords. On the basis of hitherto confidential dispatches from the British High Commission in Colombo, during January-May 2009, the Conservative politician contradicted the very basis of the three-member Darusman report. This report, released on March 31, 2011, had been the primary reason for the 2015 accountability resolution that faulted the Sri Lanka Army.

The World War 11 fighter pilot fought a near three-year battle with the British administration to secure the confidential dispatches and was finally able to obtain a highly redacted version to contradict the lies in the second week of Oct 2017. Although the then Foreign Minister Tilak Marapana, PC, in his address to the UNHRC made a reference to Lord Naseby’s revelations, Sri Lanka has so far not requested Geneva to examine the British dispatches.

The author of British dispatches Lt. Col. Anthony Gash has never challenged the authenticity of heavily censored dispatches disclosed by Lord Naseby.

Sri Lanka earlier squandered a similar golden opportunity to make a strong case for a revisit of the Darusman report in June 2011. The then US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith quite convincingly defended the Sri Lanka Army at the 2011 Colombo Defence Seminar. The American contradicted unsubstantiated allegations raised by a retired Indian Major General Ashok K. Metha, formerly of the IPKF. Lt. Col. Smith must have made that declaration, based on information available to the US Embassy in Colombo as well as other dispatches from our war zone. And most importantly, the American officer made the declaration within three months after the releasing of the Darusman report. Sri Lanka is yet to use British and American dispatches in her defence.

Western powers continue to harass Sri Lanka on the basis of unsubstantiated war crimes accusations. Bachelet’s move to further investigate Sri Lanka should be challenged as the previous accusations that led to the 2015 Geneva resolution remained uninvestigated.

According to the Darusman report (paragraph 23: Confidentiality of the Panel’s records), the accusations cannot be examined till 2031. This strange stipulation has a further clause stating that the time bar could be extended for a further period. We must be the only country not allowed to see our accusers or the case against us for so long! But, successive governments never took the entire gamut of issues into consideration before making representations on behalf of the country. The incumbent SLPP is no exception. In spite of repeated vows to defend the armed forces, the SLPP had pathetically failed in its duty and responsibility.

Predicament of former SLAF Chief

As a result of sheer negligence, Sri Lanka has ended up being categorised as a perpetrator of war crimes, and those who had fought for the country are targeted. There cannot be a better example than Air Marshal Sumangala Dias who suffered due to Sri Lanka’s failure. Canada refused to accept Dias as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner though the former Sri Lanka Air Force Commander is not under human rights scrutiny. Subsequently, the government proposed Dias as Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to Italy. However, we are yet unaware of Italy’s position. Italy as a member state of the EU, pursuing war crimes accusations against Sri Lanka, may not accept the retired SLAF Chief.

Prominent civil society activist Harsha Kumara Navaratne has quit the Human Rights Commission to take over the country’s mission in Ottawa. The former head of the NGO Seva Lanka, with his experience with the HRC, hopefully would be able to improve Sri Lanka’s image in Canada. The decision to name former minister Mahinda Samarasinghe as Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Washington, too, is an interesting development. Samarasinghe handled human rights and related matters during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidency and was part of Sri Lanka’s delegation to Geneva. Perhaps the government expects missions in Washington (non- career diplomat), Ottawa (non- career diplomat) and London manned by career diplomat Saroja Sirisena to improve the ground situation. New Delhi should be part of the operation. Milinda Moragoda, who had served Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government as a Cabinet minister before switching allegiance to Mahinda Rajapaksa, recently took over the New Delhi mission. So, we now have two former ministers as heads of missions in New Delhi and Washington and prominent civil society activist in Ottawa.

Samarasinghe last served as the Ports and Shipping Minister. Having succeeded Arjuna Ranatunga (UNP), Samarasinghe, who represented the SLFP at that time, signed the 99-year-lease on the Hambantota port. Navaratne quit Seva Lanka chairmanship last month having disengaged from the NGO’s activity, beginning January this year. Navaratne’s appointment is in line with the government entering into a dialogue with the local civil society as well as President Gotabaya Rakapaksa’s declaration in New York his readiness to talk with Tamil expatriate groups. Whatever, the SLPP government does, it should set up a mechanism, without further delay, to counter those propagating lies in support of the Geneva project.

A role for ex-CNI

Perhaps former Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendavitharana can be engaged to work out a proper strategy. Intelligence veteran Hendavitharana can be part of a special team assigned to build a strong case on behalf of the country on the basis of available information.

The information unintentionally made available by those pursuing war crimes probe can be quite useful to Sri Lanka as they are astonishing. Let there be a meticulous study of statements, accusations, documents and reports pertaining to accountability issues. Bachelet rushing to accuse the Sri Lanka Army of being responsible for so-called mass graves in Mannar, discovered in 2019, exposed the irresponsible conduct of the Geneva body, when a reputed US lab determined that those remains belonged to the colonial era.

Bachelet obviously acted on information provided by some Colombo-based diplomatic missions. There is no doubt that the British HC and the German Embassy in Colombo (both members of the self-appointed Sri Lanka Core Group in Geneva) influenced Bachel’s decision.

Due to petty political backbiting, Sri Lanka then lacked the political will to expose the Geneva project. As the simmering controversy over Mannar mass graves erupted during the yahapalana administration, the Foreign Ministry conveniently remained silent. That was nothing but treacherous behaviour and the Ministry, as one of the most important institutions, should be ashamed.

Sri Lanka didn’t have the guts to use Bachelet’s irresponsible conduct to challenge the overall process. Had there been a proper review of facts, since the change of government in Nov 2019, Gen. Gunaratne could have exploited his meeting with Hanaa Singer-Hamdy.

 Not to the UN or Bologna, the Govt should go to IMF to avoid a full-blown economic collapse

29 September 2021

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa enplaned to New York to address the UN General Assembly. His brother, Prime Minister Mahinda with a 17 member delegation travelled to Italy to speak at an interfaith dialogue of G20 nations held in Bologna. In normal times, those visits would have been customary and, also, tolerable to the local taxpayers. If visits were eventful, it would have been a consolation. However, they weren’t: the host, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi did not even afford a meeting with his visiting Sri Lankan counterpart. Equally uneventful was President’s UN visit. Other than a customary brief meeting with the UN Secretary-General, his only significant engagement was with the Prime Minister of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Hamad Al-Sabah. The lack of engagement may not have a direct correlation with the country’s foreign profile.  Earlier, the United States urged the member states not to send their leaders and instead give a video address, to prevent the annual high-level week from becoming “a super-spreader event”. But they came in droves and Mr Rajapaksa cannot be blamed for  following suit.

Instead of these wasteful foreign junkets for sake of ego boost, the government should swallow up false pride and go for an IMF programme.  As the two leaders were in their foreign sojourn, the public back home were facing an unprecedented food crisis, a throwback to another period of megalomaniac economic policies in 1970-77. 
The government’s spin doctors may deny the existence of such. But milk powder is now rarer and rare earths. Buying a gas canister is an uphill battle. A shortage of rice is worsening as the producers are complaining of an economically unviable control price. To further complicate matters, the shortage could spread to medical supplies at some point. A fuel shortage is a looming possibility, though the lockdown might have spared the country from a full-blown fuel crisis for the time being. Lebanon, another country that is faced with an identical economic crisis earlier limited schools to be opened for only three days to save fuel, and Hizbullah, an Iranian backed militant group that has a stake in the government imported  Iranian fuel in breach of the US economic sanctions against Iran. 

In Lebanon, political instability and the absence of a functioning government, until the formation of a new one early this month, had exacerbated the economic crisis, fixing which needs deep structural reforms. The political context in Sri Lanka is worlds apart from Lebanon. 

Here, an all-powerful president, who had indulged in a wholesale concentration of state power at the expense of other pillars of the government and a ruling party headed by his elder brother who commands a two-third majority in Parliament are scheming to postpone a full-blown crisis through piecemeal politically convenient solutions. That is a crime. Because , they know all too well, these solutions are not solutions at all. They indeed are worsening Sri Lanka’s economic standing in the long term. Without the right economic intervention and painful and politically unpalatable structural reforms and debt restructuring,  the crisis-hit economy would explode at some point, leaving 21 million people hapless and their savings worthless. 

"If Covid is brought under control and tourist numbers pick up to pre-covid levels, the country might manage to avoid the worst of the economic complications."

Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves have fallen to an estimated US $ 2.30 billion at present from  US$ 4.8  billion at the beginning of the year. This is the lowest ebb of the country’s foreign reserves since July 2009. Reserves are depleting rapidly as the cash strapped government is using them to repay foreign loans, including a US$ 1 billion bond repayment in August. Meanwhile, the trade deficit for the first seven months of 2021 has widened to US$ 4.7 billion. The government has already restricted much of what it termed as non essential items, the lion share of the trade deficit is due to the import of intermediate goods for value addition and capital goods.  
Tourism revenue had dried up and remittance from migrant labour is taking a hit from the Covid-19 pandemic, both due to factors beyond the control of the government. However, they would further complicate the bridging of the trade deficit.

To make matters worse, a dimwitted ban on chemical fertilizer is expected to result in a substantial loss in the yield of the cash crop. The tea industry is bracing for the eventuality. Other cash crops are similarly affected. The vegetable and rice harvest suffers from the same fate. The fertilizer/pesticide ban would likely result in a 20 per cent drop in production under the most conservative estimates.

In the meanwhile, Sri Lanka has to repay US$ 3.6 billion in foreign loans and interest in 2022. That is more than the country’s foreign reserves at present.  The oil import bill is also soaring again. Oil alone accounted for 20 per cent of the import bill, or US$ 3.9 billion in 2019. The decline in the oil prices last year helped the country save an estimated US $  1.3 billion. However, with the oil price increase in the global market,  Sri Lanka’s oil imports increased by 43.7 per cent year on year to US$ 1,.78 billion in the first half of this year, according to Central Bank of Sri Lanka data. The government is reportedly lobbying to buy oil on a credit line from the UAE. 

There is no quick fixes, nor piecemeal solutions to the country’s economic crisis. If Covid is brought under control and tourists numbers pick up to pre-Covid levels, the country might manage to avoid the worst of the economic complications. However, the underline rot will remain unattended.
The worst-case scenario is still a possibility. If the economy and the country is crippled by long Covid, or tourists do not come in expected numbers and migrant remittances remains lower than expected, Sri Lanka might head for a disorderly default of its foreign loans. 

"The painful but essential path for the long term recovery for Sri Lanka is to opt for an IMF programme, which of course would come with strings, but also expedite the country’s much needed structural reforms on a priority and mandatory basis."

Foreign exchange control of the government has already created a parallel underground market for the dollar, a fate reminiscent of Venezuela or Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. It is the egoistic and self-destructive policies of their leaders that resulted in the collapse of those countries.  As for Sri Lanka, the artificial rupee peg can not be sustained without causing a major shortage of imported essential supplies, medicine, electronics and fuel.
The government’s piecemeal economic solutions are intended to save not so much the economy, but the political calculations of the political leadership. It appears as if they are planning to postpone a full-blown economic crisis by 2- 3 years so that it could pass the buck to a future government. 
In the meanwhile, it had tried on short term import restrictions and an unsustainable rupee peg. These policies have done more harm, with no long term gains, to the economy than going to IMF for a debt restricting programme.

 Another modus operandi of the government, seeking bilateral help from China, India, Bangladesh etc, have thrown a lifeline momentarily, but, fundamental economic problems remain unanswered. To be fair by Sri Lanka’s like-minded friends, none of these countries has an appetite and with the exception of China, the wherewithal to salvage Sri Lanka from its current foreign exchange crisis.
The painful but essential path for the long term recovery for Sri Lanka is to opt for an IMF programme, which of course would come with strings, but also expedite the country’s much needed structural reforms on a priority and mandatory basis. 

It is these conditions that this government is loathing. Rajapaksas have dolled out the government jobs and expanded the public sector workforce as if their salaries are paid from an endowment in Medamulana. Gotabaya Rajapaksa kicked off in his new office by recruiting another 100,000 to the lower rungs of the government sector. Such largess at the expense of public tax money is the bane of the country’s economy. Cronyism and backdoor tenders and contracts might also have to be eschewed under the oversight of an IMF led debt restructuring. Ajit Nivard Cabraal, the new Central Bank governor asks what the government would tell the country’s youth if it enters into an IMF programme. He was referring to the fact that the government would not be able to doll out public sector jobs.
A vicious cycle of political calculations that created a culture of dependency, low attainment and low output keeps going on. 

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