A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Wednesday, May 1, 2013
New Delhi’s Dilemma Since Geneva Resolution On Sri Lanka
What
exactly is New Delhi working on after voting for the second time with the US
sponsored resolution at the UNHRC Sessions in Geneva, to diffuse separatist
Thamilean agitations and tensions in Tamil Nadu ? TN politics funded and backed
by different Tamil Diaspora groups, will not lie low though subdued for now, on
their demand for a separate Tamil Eelam in N-E SL. Congress as a political party
can not afford to get totally submerged in such extremist and separatist
politics in TN or elsewhere.
New
Delhi certainly can not say, it’s relations with Colombo will be redefined to
suit the fancies of these TN agitators. It has to go on saying, relations with
the Rajapaksas are as good as they were and India has always been a close ally
of Sri Lanka. So says Colombo too. They both use historical and cultural
statements as proof. Neither is wrong, though neither speaks the truth. After
Jayawardne became Executive President of Sri Lanka in 1978, relations between
the two countries were never as before. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister resented
Jayawardne’s pro Western diplomacy. Since then, Indian duplicity in influencing
the Colombo regime, though never openly spelt out after High Commissioner
Dixit’s obtrusively intrusive diplomacy, never ended.
For
now, New Delhi is not very comfortable with Rajapaksa despite Rajapaksa claiming
he fought India’s war in eliminating the LTTE. He perhaps told that to Sonia
Gandhi and not to India. He is not joking too. He is factually right on that. It
was India’s war as well and New Delhi played its role without qualms. But, it is
post war Sri Lanka, the two are rubbing knuckles against each other.
New
Delhi politics regarding SL, carries with it a core national interest
compromised where necessary with the political necessities of the ruling party
and that of Tamil Nadu. This has often been a dichotomy with TN politics, except
when M.G. Ramachandran was in tow with the Indira Gandhi line of intervention on
Sri Lanka. In early 1980′s, they both nurtured and fostered all the SL armed
Tamil groups, for two different reasons. Madam Gandhi to balance off Jayawardne
in Colombo on his Western stance and MGR for his popularity, cultivating a Tamil
voter bloc in TN.
Most
unfortunately, for everyone on either side of the Palk Straits, ever since PM
Gandhi’s decision in 1980 to arm, train and fund SL Tamil groups, all political
decisions taken in New Delhi, have backfired. They have neither helped New
Delhi, nor Colombo, nor even the SL Tamil people. All such arrogance in
blundering diplomacy has given competing TN political leaders, good enough
reasons to galvanise more Thamilean sentiments for their own electoral
advantage. For those in the fringe, good enough reasons to keep them afloat as
TN radicals.
On
a very nostalgic note, one may question PM Indira Gandhi’s intrusive diplomacy
in reining in Jayawardne on his pro American foreign policy, though Dixit has
excuses and explanations in his biographical sketch “Assignment Colombo”. The
Indo – SL Accord under PM Rajiv Gandhi that coerced Jayawardne to amend the SL
Constitution to accommodate Provincial Councils (PC) remains a very unpopular
intervention. Power sharing as a concept, nevertheless is still an accepted
answer to Tamil political aspirations. The hastily pushed Accord in 1987 July,
with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) deployed in North-East Sri Lanka to
back it, was a one way trip with many tragedies that denied a political
discourse in SL in achieving social consensus, before it was made into law. The
returns were pathetic and chaotic.
Thereafter,
New Delhi worked on a single, undeclared assumption. No political solution would
be allowed for the SL Tamils, with LTTE playing a pivotal role. India’s decision
to keep out of all negotiations and facilitations worked out by the Norwegian
government after the 2002 February “Cease Fire Agreement” (CFA) between the
Wickramasinghe government and the LTTE, is open proof. New Delhi refused to
participate at the SL Aid Forum in Brussels in 2002. A message, India does not
accept the LTTE as the sole negotiator. Instead New Delhi cultivated a bizarre
friendship with the pro war JVP, an avowed anti Indian Sinhala nationalist
party. For the first time, JVP leaders were seen walking the corridors of “India
House” at the Indian National Day celebrations in Colombo in 2002 and then in
2003. The Indian HC in Colombo not so covertly, cultivating an alliance that was
hostile to the CFA and for a negotiated settlement.
It
was later rumoured and quite strongly too in Colombo political circles,
President Chandrika Kumaranatunge was given the nod in 2003 by New Delhi to
bring down Wickramasinghe’s government and it was then she moved in to take over
03 ministries back in December 2003. In return, Kumaranatunge had to adopt a
power sharing mechanism New Delhi was comfortable with. Her Post-Tsunami
Operations Management Structure, better known as P-TOMS, was based on that
Indian consent, but was pre judged a failure with the JVP dissenting.
All
were manoeuvrings by New Delhi with the sole intention of keeping the LTTE away
in working out a solution. Decisions in New Delhi that strengthened extremist
politics on both sides of the ethnic divide in SL and on either side of the Palk
Straits too. The only occasion in post independence SL Tamil history, when New
Delhi and Prabhakaran saw eye to eye was when they both thought it was good for
different reasons to have Wickramasinghe defeated at the 2005 presidential
elections. India, New Delhi to be precise, is thus on a collision course now
with the Rajapaksa regime that can not honour any promise on power sharing,
having brought together a very strong Sinhala sentiment as its buffer, to be in
power and to continue in power. In a post LTTE Sri Lanka, that New Delhi thought
could make this Rajapaksa regime honour its own promise of implementing a “home
grown” solution acceptable to “all” and is failing on its calculations once
again.
The
two UNHRC Resolutions clearly show, New Delhi and Colombo have diplomatically
drifted quite far apart in their political calculations. Though TN keeps
pressing New Delhi to adopt a still harder line, this UPA regime with its
liberalised economic policy for the corporates, is duty bound to accommodate SL.
In addition to long time investors like TATA, CEAT, Ashok Leyland, others like
Airtel, Dabur, Britania and Piramals have also come to top up Indian banks that
already have their branches operating. It has to continue with investments, the
Rajapaksa regime is eager to have, to grease its own failing economy. Indian
imports to SL in 2012 had bounced to a massive USD 3,483.7 million and India
emerged the largest investor the same year in SL with USD 210 million in the
first 09 months after investing USD 147 million, the previous year.
Early
this year, a 13 member business delegation from New Delhi visited Colombo
representing the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII). Apart from Chinese
labour, SL have even imported South Indian labour for numerous projects funded
by Indian credit. Cheap South Indian labour in the Colombo Dockyard, in steel
companies, working in the Northern railway constructions and in many similar
projects, is now said to exceed 5,000 brought in without any legal status for
employment. There were even seasonal agricultural labour from South India
working on SL rice cultivations, a few months ago. It is now known, the
Rajapaksa regime has asked the Labour, Immigration and the SL BOI authorities to
amend law to regularise labour imports to SL. For more cheap labour to be
brought by Indian contractors.
Obviously,
the UPA government in New Delhi has to openly live with the Geneva Resolution it
voted for and can not afford to give into TN demands in cutting out SL
completely, for three other good reasons. One, it can not help promote a
political demand that works round a separate Tamil State. Two, it can not oppose
the needs of big Indian businesses and is very much influenced by the corporate
world. Three, it can not allow the Chinese dragon to roam free in SL.
This
leaves New Delhi with two diplomatic options. One, an overt option that would
not contradict the Geneva UNHRC Resolution and the other, a covert manipulation
to see if it could diffuse tensions in TN. The first, it could pressure the
Rajapaksa regime to engage the TNA in particular and all other Tamil political
parties, in working out a permanent power sharing solution, if New Delhi is
prepared to talk about the “All Party Representative Committee” (APRC) Final
Report. The second is to provoke a regime change that could facilitate a
reasonable solution to the Tamil national question that could help diffuse TN
protests and demands.
The
best would be to have the APRC Final Report thrust upon the Rajapaksas that
would not make India look the old “Air dropping” invader over SL skies. The
advantage is, the APRC Final Report carries with it a Sinhala consensus on power
sharing, with all the Sinhala political parties with the Rajapaksa regime having
consented to this final report. This incidentally is why Rajapaksa fights shy in
making this report public. Once officially out, not only President Rajapaksa,
but his Sinhala allies too would feel trapped within a power sharing mechanism,
recommended by them and on their own, on a broad consensus.
New
Delhi instead seems to be out hunting on the other option to find an alternate
leadership. Recent two day hurried visit to New Delhi by the SL Opposition
Leader Wickramasinghe, also points to such dialogue, with former President
Chandrika Kumaratunge peddled in Colombo as a probable candidate from the joint
opposition. Urban middle class sentiments, perhaps what the Colombo Indian High
Commission gets its feedback from, is now discussing Chandrika Kumaratunge as
one who could deliver on the never delivered promise of abolishing the Executive
Presidency. A rejuvenated slogan presented by Ven. Maduluwawe Sobhitha thera, a
popular “middle of the road Buddhist monk” and his group of urban middle class
Sinhala professionals. New Delhi no doubt could feel better supporting the
better known Chandrika Kumaratunge for such common candidacy, than a common
candidate backed by a Buddhist monk.
The
unanswered question yet is, with Rajapaksa having the Constitutional right to
decide when he would call for elections, that would have to be after 2014
November, would he ? What if he opts for another Constitutional Amendment to
give him another term, with this same 2/3rd majority
parliament that Wickramasinghe argued is supreme, when the 43rd Chief
Justice was being impeached ? Even if Rajapaksa does call for elections after
2014 November for the Indian choice in Chandrika to contest yet again, has the
Tamil people to wait that long for a solution favoured by India ?
Worst
is, the Rajapaksa regime is officially in no mood to go with the UNHRC
Resolution, perhaps expecting the US to compromise too, on Chinese presence in
Sri Lanka. The paper by the Sri Lankan Ambassador for US seeing the US
differently with much favour, was definitely no personal note. Now, is India in
the know ?
(Originally
written for “The Hindu” news paper and slightly edited for SAS, writer Kusal
Perera is a Sri Lankan journalist and a political commentator based in
Colombo.)