A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, August 30, 2015
On political equations that never 'stay'
Power struggles are rarely about people. Rhetoric is scripted in, yes, but for the most it remains a necessity as a means to an end. Outcomes which get preferred by parties never privilege the voter. This we know. As such election-aftermath has more to do with power and frill than it has with serving the people. This too we know.
Writing 12 days before Maithripala Sirisena defected from the SLFP and
thereby wrecked the political equation, Udaya Gammanpila, then allied
with the Jathika Hela Urumaya, commented on Ranil Wickremesinghe’s
moves. Arguing that Wickremesinghe would use a proxy, Gammanpila made a
classic inference: that he would use this move to retain position within
his party.
This is true. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s conduct during the presidential and
parliamentary elections was suave to say the least. He aced dissidents
within his own party and that in a way which lent credibility to his
faction. If at all, he convinced those within the United National Party
(UNP) to join him, and thus privilege party above anything else.
Political equations do not last long, however. Scripted into MOUs and
agreements (between and within parties) are escape clauses. True,
Ranil’s grip on party leadership and his ability to wield power in the
face of popular dissent is not unknown. If at all, this will sustain his
vision for party and government for quite some time.
But this is just half the picture.
Dayan Jayatilleka once observed that the only way to salvage the UNP was
to join up with the JVP and other dissident parties and embark on a
consciousness-raising exercise against Mahinda Rajapaksa. What unfolded
later wasn’t just a consciousness-raiser but a revolt against incumbent.
Both Jayatilleka and Gammanpila couldn’t have predicted Wickremesinghe
using a stalwart from the ruling party to become prime minister, which
explains why both opposed Sirisena’s campaign, the former on principal.
What happened next was the formation of four different voter-camps, all
of whom supported Sirisena. They were those who: 1. Supported the UNP;
2. Embraced him from the UPFA; 3. Let go of ideology and supported him
(from the JVP, TNA etc); and 4. Were courted by the Jathika Hela Urumaya
upon its ejection from the Alliance and hence congealed into the
floating voter.
The point is that Wickremesinghe’s equation is shaky. Those four classes
remain intact, but altered slightly. Now those with the UNP will remain
with the UNP. Those who supported Maithripala Sirisena from the UPFA
are with the president. But the other two classes, particularly those
from the floating vote-base, are what count. Wickremesinghe’s position
should be based or rather positioned on this ground. Why?
First of all, what’s national in this National Government? What we’ve
seen is a coalition, yes, but one in which the UNP dominates.
Power-sharing has been for the most vertical, with state largesse
remaining with the Greens and “titbit” ministries going to the Blues. In
this context it’s not too hard for the prime minister to court
popularity within his party.
Problem is, these things don’t remain constant forever. Wickremesinghe’s
strategy was and is to split the SLFP and this in a way which ensures
that his faction within the UNP holds sway on government and party. He
needs to do two things here: a successor who’ll continue his legacy, and
ensure that his party “gets” the presidency some day. Whether he can do
this while accommodating those who’ve been known to oppose him within
the UNP is for another article.
Right now, here’s what counts. Without delivering on the mandate given
to him by the floating voter, Wickremesinghe’s government can hope for
very little. This is not just because the UPFAers who affirm(ed) the
National Government are led by a party-less drive to weed out corruption
and adjust structural flaws. This is also because their representatives
wrecked one political equation, turning Rajapaksa into a lost cause.
History, as we know, can and does repeat itself.
Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero is not Green. Nor is Patali Champika Ranawaka and the JHU, as well as those who helped the yahapalana campaign,
Shiral Lakthilaka included. They are as colourless as they can get. As
such the primary need to contain opposition and lend credence to a Green
government means that two requirements need to be met: national
security and foreign affairs.
Here’s why.
Part of the reason why the UNP lacks support from the rural voter is
that it’s perceived as anti-poor and pro-West. This doesn’t make the
SLFP a socialist paradise either, but the point is that for almost 10
years, ever since Rajapaksa breached the famous Maithri-Malik deal by
allowing defectors to join his government, the UNP was badmouthed as a
party which stood against the war. Making matters worse was its tilt
towards the West, even when geopolitical realities recommended
otherwise.
Here’s the pincer: the floating voter supported Sirisena to drive out
Rajapaksa for a reason. That had less to do with a rejection of
everything Rajapaksa stood for than a need to get his corrupt group out
of the way. The former president, let’s not forget, still courts
popularity, and from some of his own critics, for the way he handled the
war. Those who claim that other factors helped him are hence at a loss
for words when asked, “Would these factors have helped without him?”
Logically therefore, two things should remain constant should a
Rajapaksa Restoration NOT be legitimised: the country’s security
apparatus and its foreign relations, the latter of which should remain
as neutral and non-aligned as possible.
In an interview with foreign correspondent Padma Rao Sundarji (for her book Sri Lanka: A New Country),
Sirisena emphatically stated that national security would remain a
priority, while the armed forces would gradually exit civil
administration. Sirisena’s statement affirms the view that what
Rajapaksa left behind must be held together and that in a way which
ensures the opposition cannot justify his predecessor’s return to power.
The same, by the way, can be said of the country’s foreign relations.
As things stand, the UNP has much to gain. Even from the SLFP. Having
gained power in a way which would have made Machiavelli proud,
Wickremesinghe must now ensure that what he got cannot be squandered. At
all. For that, he must satisfy those two requirements without letting
go of the broader canvas which he and his party seeks to enforce in this
country, economically, socially, and politically. If he’s successful in
this, there’s no doubt that the political equation will “stay”, indeed
for quite some time.