A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Saturday, August 29, 2015
The Use of Strategic Considerations in Elections
Photograph by REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawatte, via Daily Nation
- by Devanesan Nesiah
- - on 08/28/2015
On what criteria should we vote in elections? Should it based on the
issues closest to our own, irrespective of likely consequences? Or
should it be strategic, designed to achieve the best possible results
(long term and immediate)?
I have been mostly Colombo based and voting since the parliamentary
elections of 1956. Initially, there was no conflict because the
candidates with election manifestos I liked were electable. Later, they
changed to policies on ethnic issues that were not to my liking but I
was able to find other candidates who had better policies who were also
electable. Later, they too changed to ethnic policies that I disliked
and I found myself voting for candidates who were not electable, i.e.
their vote base was too small. I thought that they may become electable
or, at least, influential in due course, but that did not happen. My
votes were, therefore, wasted.
In due course, I thought I would vote strategically to achieve the best
possible results even if I had serious reservations on some of the
policies of the persons for whom I voted. This year I decided to vote
accordingly and, happily, all three candidates for whom I voted got
elected to Parliament. I decided that this shall be my policy in the
future – I will vote strategically. This is in keeping with the
Christian teaching to be as harmless as doves and as wise as serpents.
What is meant by ‘wise as serpents’? I think in every culture, including
that in the myth of the Garden of Eden, serpents are not seen as wise
in the sense of possessing expertise in philosophy or mathematics or
science, but in cunningly achieving their objectives. They are also
sometimes seen as evil, but the other objective, be as harmless as
doves, overrides that problem.
It is interesting to see strategy employed not only by voters but also
by politicians. Happily, in the recent elections those politicians who
promoted Sinhala Buddhist chauvinist ideologies on the grounds that two
thirds of the total electorate is Sinhala Buddhist have not been very
successful. Similarly, politicians in the North who promoted Tamil
chauvinist ideology on the grounds that their electorate is
overwhelmingly Tamil have also not been very successful. Overall, the
message is that increasingly our people of all ethnicities are gradually
turning away from chauvinism towards national reconciliation.
Hopefully, this trend will continue.
Politicians, like voters, have strategic options. Contrary to what many
predicted, the chauvinist line promoted by the UPFA has not been very
successful. In contrast, the UNP, which this time promoted national
reconciliation, has gained and Ranil Wickremasinghe, to the surprise of
many, has established his leadership with no serious challenge from
within his party. Most other parties have either split or have lost
ground. This has happened, in particular, to the parties of the Left and
to the UPFA.
A few days before the elections President Maithripala Sirisena firmly
reiterated his position that Mahinda Rajapaksa will not be appointed
Prime Minister and went further to publicly name seven persons (six
Sinhalese and a Muslim) from the UPFA from among whom he proposed to
nominate the Prime Minister. This precipitated a crisis which was
further complicated by the six Sinhalese UPFA leaders named being
summoned to the residence of Mahinda Rajapaksa and from there issuing a
letter refusing to accept the post of Prime Minister and instead
supporting the appointment of Mahinda Rajapaksa as Prime Minister.
The voting as between the UNP and UPFA was expected to be, and in fact
was, quite close. In the event that no party gains an absolute majority,
the President is required to select the person who in his opinion is
most likely to be able to form the most stable coalition. The President
had this option but had tied his hand as he had publicly said that he
preferred a UPFA Prime Minister from among the list that he named. But
since the UPFA leaders named had all refused to accept the nomination
and since he did not consider Mahinda Rajapaksa to be eligible he had no
option but to appoint Ranil Wickremasinghe. Of those whom he named
Fowzie may have been included for cosmetic reasons but each of Nimal
Siripala de Silva, John Seneviratne, Chamal Rajapaksa, Athauda
Seneviratne, Susil Premajayantha and Anura Priyadharshana Yapa clearly
had the capacity to muster a stable coalition government, but they had
ruled themselves out. Sri Lanka’s political culture is such that
engineering the crossover of ten or fifteen members with the promise of
portfolios or other inducements is not difficult. Since the President’s
letter was made public he would have been obliged to appoint one of them
if they had not declined in advance. In consequence, the President had
no alternative but to appoint Ranil Wickremasinghe as Prime Minister
contrary to the hopes he had expressed in his open letter and also
contrary to the intent of the UPFA response. There is no doubt that
Ranil Wickremasinghe will be able to establish a stable government and
will work together with the President to bring progress to the country.
Curiously, this outcome is not the result of successful execution of
good strategy but the failure of bad strategy.
Perhaps if the President’s letter was not made public there may have
been no public response rejecting the proposed appointment of a named
UPFA leader. Once appointed, that leader would have consolidated his
rule by co-opting supportive Members of Parliament and it would have
been difficult to dislodge him. Similarly, if the joint letter was not
sent to the President, one of the UPFA leaders may have been appointed
and taken office. Finally, but was the thinking of Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremasinghe? Had he responded in any manner to the President’s open
letter expressing his preference for a UPFA Prime Minister, he would
have messed up the issue and ruled himself out. Presumably, he thought
all this through, opted to keep a discrete silence, and won. This
outcome underlines the need for both voters and politicians to gain a
better understanding of strategic considerations in decision making.