A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Thursday, November 26, 2015
Legality of “THE BUDGET”: The Citizen’s Power over the Public Purse - Chrishmal Warnasuriya
Introduction - Theory Behind Spending “Public Money” In a Democracy?
Given that one-in-every-ten words we hear these days have something to
do with “the budget”, I thought of posting a few related thoughts,
purely from a politico-legal perspective, for public dialogue and
debate; with the primary intention of invoking a thought process in the
all powerful Sri Lankan citizenry, who are at least in theory and in
Law, supposedly the supreme authority over public expenditure, fiscal
policy and management of the State’s resources.
As man’s unlimited wants grew out of proportion with the limited
resources available, the same constraints on time spent in governing a
country, such as the decision making process of allocating its limited
resources to meet these demands also automatically evolved; from
“direct- democracy” as practiced in the historical nation-states like
Athens or Sparta where the citizens themselves directly participated in
decision making to what we have now, which is
“representative-democracy”, where we elect a few chaps periodically and
pay them a salary (and in my opinion excessive perks) to do this job for
us. A primary annual task of these elected representatives is to debate
and arrive at the best possible manner of allocating our limited
resources to meet our unlimited requirements, by approval or dissent of
the Appropriation Bill; in popular parlance referred to simply as “the
budget”.
Legal / Constitutional Basis for Public Expenditure:
As we know the absolute sovereign of this Republic (at least in theory)
is us, the Citizen, in terms of Article 3 of the Constitution; not for
instance some king or queen as in a monarchy and therefore any
governmental action including public expenditure must be sanctioned by
us. So how does this scheme work in terms of the law?
oExpenditure planning by the Executive – by Article 4(b) read
with Article 43 we have authorized our representatives holding our
Executive Power, the President & Cabinet to analyze our competing
interests with the resources available for this year (not how much they
get to spend and put up shows for us on TV) and plan out the various
allocations to ministries, which is then presented as the Budget through
the Finance Minister;
oDebate and approval or disproval by the Legislature – by Article 4(a) we have vested our Legislative Power in a Parliament and the checks & balances work in two principal ways –
to debate whether the Budget that has been presented is indeed the
right way to manage our monies (not agree simply because they get some
gratification thrown their way by the Executive) and if not, to defeat
it;
Their job doesn’t end there, as once those monies are allocated they
are supposed to monitor its actual expenditure via parliamentary
oversight committees etc and ensure that our intended purposes have been
met
oJudicial Review – By Article 4(c) we have sanctified
for our punitive powers in public trust in a system of Courts, Tribunals
and a judicial system, which is meant to ensure that those who violate
our laws and thereby harm us are dealt with and disciplined
This is how the Sri Lankan Citizen expects to exercise his/her absolute
power over public expenditure, which looks very promising indeed in
theory; but how is it practiced?
An Important Correction - Misnomer over the Budget Speech:
I heard it said recently over the media that no sooner the budget speech
was read in parliament, that gave sanctity to act upon its proposals;
so basically traders could run and paint the town pink (if they so
wished), increase prices of goods and services based on budget proposals
– this is wrong law!
What then is the “legal basis” for acting upon the budget? Erskine May
argues that a constitutional principle operates, that it must be
“authorised by law” which on this occasion comes in the form of
parliamentary assent for the “Appropriation Bill” (which upon such
assent becomes “Law”). Dicey too follows, that “the power over the
purse” (by Parliament) provides the legal basis for the constitutional
subordination of the Executive to Parliament and therefore by
implication to the People; who in Sri Lanka are the absolute
repositories of this power. Speaking in political scientific theory
there is also a “quantitative” and a “qualitative” distinction
of this power of the People. The votes (in favour or opposed) represent
our choice of priorities amongst competing interests for resources this
year. This is why the Appropriation Bill must be won in a vote to become
law and only then will it acquire a legal binding; this is why a
government must return to the House and obtain another vote if they were
to change any proposals and a government can fall if the vote is
continuously defeated. The Bill alone does not attribute legality; it
only sets out the quantitative parameters for spending and it
is only permanent legislation (such as Acts passed for separate projects
thereafter or existing Acts under which subsequent expenditure is
incurred) that provides the qualitative legal basis for that authorisation of spending.
Therefore it is good to stand corrected, perhaps for the media too not
to encourage traders or dealers to breach this important public law;
proposals do not attract legality until they are approved by the People
through this vote!
Accountability – Checks on Public Expenditure:
This is once again an area which I feel we lose out on as a democracy,
because whilst everyone including the buffalo tied to the coconut tree
in the yard is spellbound to hear what “they will get from the budget”
on the day of the speech; everyone including that same buffalo and the
so called Opposition (it is not clear if we have one or more or none in
the present Parliament) forget it altogether and we await for another
speech the following year.
So how important is budgetary monitoring? How many civil society groups
do we have, perhaps with dedicated economists who will engage the public
through regular discourse on what had been assured and what had been
delivered / not delivered? I will let you be the judge! There are
several ways in which we the people may question public expenditure:
Via the office of the Auditor General - Which is meant to carry out an annual audit on the various ministerial allocations of monies and how they have been spent
o It is hoped that we will have the proposed National Audit Legislation
coming out soon. We are made to understand that provision has been made
for VFM audits (Value for Money) rather than the age-old expenditure
accounting, which is simply to see whether there is a bill in the file
for the monies spent. We all know how easy it is to get such a “bill in
the file”whether or not you have spent the money
o VFM Audit in contrast will permit the Officers of the Auditor
General’s Dept to dig deep into the various heads of expenditure and
actually question officials on how much “value for the money” was
achieved. A VFM audit must ensure that monies were spent –
Economically – what efforts have been taken to minimise the costs involved in that particular project
Efficiently – has the spending in question achieved or obtained maximum results achievable or in other words, has it performed to capacity,
Effectively – what is the extent to which the policy objectives of the government in authorising that spending had been achieved?
Public Accounts Committee / COPE – These are creatures
of parliament itself, ideally to be under a Chairmanship of an
opposition MP so that there will be a transparent process
Judicial Review by Courts - Article 4(c) is a
constitutional right that it is the “People’s Judicial Power” that is
exercised through Courts & Tribunals and if the People’s Executive
is not attending to public expenditure as it ought to, it is a
constitutional safeguard or a checking mechanism available to the
citizen to challenge it before Courts
How will our Courts respond to this challenge:
Traditionally Courts have exercised restraint in stepping into what is
generally considered a “no- go area” for judges (of public policy) which
is regarded as best left to elected people’s representatives in
Parliament. However consistent breaches of the People’s Public Trust by
them left Courts with no alternative but to answer several public
spirited citizens that came before it during the early 2001 – 2004 era
with valid grievances of corruption and abuse of public funds, thus
creating a wealth of legal authority in Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
such as those cases involving P-Toms, Water’s Edge, SLIC. Unfortunately
we do not see similar public applications to Court over several recent
issues, such as Avante Garde or Dubai Money affairs, as perhaps those
citizens are no more or they are no longer interested.
Why Courts have generally left such spending to the checks by the system
itself, via institutions such as the Treasury, Public Accounts
Committees or the Auditor General was principally predicated on the
assumption that these mechanisms were strong enough to regulate the
system. However by the political paradox of the previously independent
“Public / Civil Servant”, some of whom at times in our golden history
had the will to question even the Head of the Executive being rendered
nothing but a simple “Government Servant” or a “Yes-Man” for any party
of the day, the People must now find other avenues of checking on how
our monies are spent and how best we can assure ourselves the “good
governance” and the “rule of law” that was promised to us; which some of
us rallied the People to demand, which they answered with a resounding
“YES” both on the 8th of January and 17th of August this year.
Power to the People!
By Chrishmal Warnasuriya
BA (Colombo), P Dip. (Hons), LLM (Hons) (London)
BA (Colombo), P Dip. (Hons), LLM (Hons) (London)
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by (2015-11-25 21:03:17)
by (2015-11-25 21:03:17)