A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Friday, November 4, 2016
Chinese Whispering in Sri Lanka: On Gossip, Anxieties and Politics
Featured image courtesy Sri Lanka Unites
Chinese whispering in Sri Lanka is suggestive of at least twofold
meanings – literally and metaphorically. One has to do with the
geo-political and international trade related issues, as many
International Relations experts have put it. This meaning duly
emphasises the significant role China plays in Sri Lanka’s economy and
foreign policy. The other significant meaning is about the
socio-political fabric intrinsic to post-war Sri Lanka, in which the
presence of China gives birth to manifold gossiping, some factually
substantiated and some others entirely fantastic. But then, fantasies
aid in performative notions as many anthropologists have taught us. Thus
the truism makes sense that Chinese whispering is not all about China’s
presence in Sri Lanka. It is more about the many hushed-up tales and
humid gossip looming large over the shores of the Indian Ocean. At
least, this is what might attract a wandering anthropologist’s – such as
this essayist’s – cruising glance. Some of this gossip and tales are of
significant value and they intersect with geo-political perspectives on
the relations of China and Sri Lanka, bringing in India to the picture
as well — as a perennially anxious entity. They solicit the rabid acumen
of analysts keen about strategic relations, international trade and
politics.
However, more important than the apprehensions about geo-political
calculus couched in the grammar of international analyses is something
very local, concrete and enveloped in multiple layers of anxieties. It
is not hard to come across this kind of gossip, which this essay dwells
upon, related to the inter-ethnic discontents in post-war Sri Lanka.
This is as much concrete as the ‘ethnicised communities’,
broadly Sinhalese and Tamil in the context of this story. A wandering
non-Sri Lankan anthropologist is likely to deduce from freely
circulating gossip the following: things are not ‘fine’ in the midst of
rhetorical performance of reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka. And if
this is the case, any initiative by any government may not really amount
to building much needed inter-ethnic trust. As some Tamil youth I
encountered (anonymity intended henceforth) would put it: ‘It’s just a matter of time to see the resurgence.’More than a statement of fact, this is an articulation of an anxiety, a frustration.
For, Fumes presuppose fire
If this is the broad scene, Chinese whispering cannot
be confined to the mere corporeal presence of China. It acquires a
little more than what pundits of international relations could grasp
even in the wildest of their collective imaginations. The slivers of
fumes, indeed, presuppose fire. To cut a long story short, Chinese
interests in Sri Lanka, both economic and strategic, are beyond any
doubt very real. Also, there is a glamorous posterity of this relation.
In ‘confidential’ reports WikiLeaks released
in the public domain, Sino-Lanka friendship has facilitated to combat
Soviet impact, as well as put a check on India’s regional interests. In
the condolence meeting upon the death of Mao, the then Prime Minister of
Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaike was
sufficiently vocal in articulating the role of China in Sri Lanka. If
this seems a very archaic indicator of mutual interests, one needs to
look at the massive Port City project
underway in the proximity of Galle Face in Colombo. The Chinese
initiative worth US$1.4 billion to construct a “mini-city” atop
reclaimed land in Colombo inspired whispers of different kinds. The
project was signed when the former president, Mahinda Rajapaksa assumed
power in 2005.
Many whispered accounts suggest considerable corruption entailed in this
deal, as in many others. It is hard to corroborate such allegations
with factual evidence. But what matters is the ability of
the Lankan public to whisper about the possibilities, no matter
how unsavoury and unverifiable. This whispering could underline the idea
that the ‘Lankan public’ is willing to cross the socially and
politically divisive identities and discourses in order to hint at
potential white-collar malpractices. It is also indicative of the public
suspicion of powers that be. At the height of the power of the
Rajapaksas, these whispers worked as a kind of ‘weapons of the weak’ in
the sense suggested by James Scott. But some of these have now come to
the surface as more concrete forms of agitation consequent to the
electoral defeat of the Rajapaksa regime. Indeed, it augurs well for a
discerning civil society, otherwise terribly fragmented in Sri Lanka in
correspondence with the socio-political cleavages amongst various
identity-groups. But then, there are other undercurrents of social
whispering too which an observer can come across while interacting with
folks any evening along the shore.
As part of social whispering, it is possible to hear a Tamil youth (anonymity intended) saying: ‘This
is a Sinhalese conspiracy to prosper with Chinese money, get more
employment opportunities for youth of Sinhala origin, and consequently
push aside Tamil youth.’ Once again, there is no factual corroboration
for this narrative. But what matters here is the clear existence of an
inter-ethnic trust deficit and lack of any systemic initiatives thus far
by the state or by non-state actors to ensure that these kinds of
whispered account do not have a receptive audience. So once formed,
these kinds of perceptions become ‘real’ in the minds of believers.
The seemingly concrete premise supporting the whispered apprehensions is
partly derived from the long haul of political violence,
which Sri Lanka underwent in the recent past. The premise also derives
its strength from the nearly unconditional support of the present regime
to Chinese project(s), known as well as unknown. On the other hand,
however, a Sinhala youth (anonymity intended) could whisper with due
reverence to the new god of contemporary South Asia, namely development:
‘This project like many others, is a necessary step towards
putting Sri Lanka on a respectable pedestal in the international
community of nations.’ This whispering makes an attempt to ignore the
possibility of any ethnic, communal or caste discontent pertaining to
development projects. It would instead suggest that this is for the
prosperity of Sri Lanka, which will eventually benefit everybody from
any identity-group. It may seem to be a very familiar stance in
contemporary India too.
It becomes obvious that the Chinese presence in social whispering is
meaningfully accidental. This is not to say that the concrete
manifestations of the Chinese presence do not inspire whispered
narrative accounts. Instead, the idea is that the socio-political
divides are so deep that anything could engender ethnic apprehensions
narrated in the informal walks of everyday life. These are among the
strains of thought that emerged from the accounts in my field diary as I
recently travelled from Colombo to Batticaloa, some three hundred
kilometers away in Eastern Province. To my trepidation, my assumption
was vindicated. As soon as the tourist van entered Tamil-dominated
areas, my fellow traveller, a young Tamil academic from Eastern
University and formerly a student at Jaffna University, exclaimed: ‘after
this point, it’s the land of a superior race.’ Upon inquiry, I gathered
that the reference was to the perceived Tamil cultural superiority and
industriousness, which often seem to manifest in everyday conversations.
Traversing the tropical landscape, sublime lagoons, and arresting
serenity in the surroundings, there appears little doubt about Tamil
pride and prejudices in their sense of ‘homeland.’ But then, Tamil
subjectivity is scarred by the military aggression in the recent past,
as well as persistent grudges about the lackluster unfolding of
democratic processes and institutions. The Lankan model of democracy is
clearly farcical for the Tamil populace (and perhaps for many Sinhalese
too), asserted a scholar from Jaffna visiting Eastern University
in Batticaloa. And many ordinary folks at local cafes could be overheard
reiterating a similar view, by mostly harping on the
‘underrepresentation of Tamils’ in not only political processes but also
in state machineries more generally. A young scholar researching on
Tamil performance art observed, ‘You may find quite a few Tamils in the
lower rung of the hierarchy in the Lankan bureaucracy, but seldom any on
the top positions.’ An oft-repeated message in this part of Lanka is
about the perceived Sinhalese conspiracy to keep Tamils away from the
realms of crucial decision-making. And in this regard, they find the new
regime much the same as the old one(s). This is not only in politics
and ordinary life. An art historian of reckoning opined that even
historiography in Sri Lanka narrates stories of Tamil society and
culture only in the footnotes. ‘How many Tamil scholars are
mentioned in the debates in social sciences, arts or in public
discussions in Sri Lanka,’ asks an evidently disappointed Tamil
political scientist.
Apprehension Beneath Comprehension
With the above-mentioned excerpts from freewheeling
interactions – without data sets, tables and graphs, it is possible to
surmise that post-war Lanka is grappling with a deeply ethnicised sense
of subjectivity. At one level, it seems nearly impossible to devise a
scheme of reasoning beyond the ethnic divide as things prevail at
present. Equally tough is task to cultivate an inclusive
liberal-romantic-utopia cutting across different ethno-cultural
communities in Sri Lanka.
Nevertheless, could there be a shared dream of Sri Lanka in this wake?
To find an optimistic answer, one expects that the
state machineries ought to be doing something qualitatively different to
engender an alternative subjectivity for Lankan communities. And
perhaps the goals of governance should ideally rise above playing the
India-China game to more realistically and inclusively redefine notions
of development and a more hopeful collective vision of the future. The
latter is necessary as a more socially sensitive measure to bring about
inter-ethnic partnership, as it were. Of course, beyond the state, this
also ideally should be a prerogative for civil society as well as
individuals. Or else, the seeming lull could bring about a storm of a
bizarre nature in times to come. The chill of the thought compels even
an irreverent anthropologist to turn to the Buddha with a prayer: let an
awakening be.
Readers who enjoyed this post may find “Contending with rejection and exclusion: Take two on the Kuliyapitiya debacle” and “(Re)conceptualising reconciliation: Transitional justice in Sri Lanka” instructive.