Ethnic Issue In SL: Power Sharing Is Counterproductive

By Dinesh Dodamgoda –October 31, 2016 

Dinesh Dodamgoda

Many political and opinion leaders consider power sharing as a solution to the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. Yet, power sharing is counterproductive and more likely to bring a recurrence of escalating conflict.

SL is for Power Sharing:

President Sirisena recently sought cabinet approval for an eleven-page draft of a national reconciliation policy based on the principle of power-sharing. In Delhi last year, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe also explained their effort in finding a power sharing and devolution based solution to the ethnic problem. The leader of the House Mr. Kiriella said that equal rights of the people should be ensured through power sharing with the periphery. Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP Sumanthiran stated that they want a mechanism of power sharing consistent with federalism. Even the former President Rajapakse promised India the full implementation of the 13^th Amendment plus.

Therefore, it is evident that almost all the mainstream political leaders believe power sharing as a magic formula that could solve country’s ethnic problem. However, power sharing is a counterproductive mechanism.

Power Sharing:

According to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘power sharing’ entered the English language as a term in 1972 in conjunction with the short-lived settlement in Northern Ireland. Power sharing institutions are to formulate institutions that distribute decision making rights between the state and society and within the state, among governmental organs and with a defined decision making procedure. As Arend Lijphart, the main consociational theorist, views, power sharing is a mechanism that secure participation of representatives of all significant groups in political decision making. Therefore, in an ethnically or religiously divided society a power sharing mechanism should secure participation of representation of ethno-religious elite from all significant ethno-religious groups in the making of governmental decisions.

Power sharing gives power to ethno-religious elite that comes from parties and groups which contributed or took part in creating, maintaining or ending ethno-religious conflicts. Therefore, the power that they would be given enhances these elites’ capabilities to press for more radical demands especially, once the violent phase of the conflict is over and the peace is in place. These capabilities give opportunity and power to these elites to ‘escalate conflict in ways that can threaten democracy and peace’[i]. This is evident in most of the conflict theatres especially, after severe conflicts such as civil wars.

These dangers are inherent parts of any power sharing mechanism, despite constitutional architects’ ability to include institutional constrains to limit such powers and capabilities that ethno-religious elites would be given to influence and control governmental decision making processes. Yet, power sharing institutions seek to ‘guarantee inclusive decision making, partitioned decision making, predetermined decisions, or some combination of these’[ii].

Inclusive decision making mechanisms in power sharing aim to include ethno-religious minorities’ will by guaranteeing participation of representatives of elites from main ethno-religious groups in the making of governmental decisions. This aim is to be achieved through mandates that guarantee allocated positions in the government such as appointing cabinet ministers from main ethno-religious groups or by providing opportunities for such ethno-religious groups to secure their representation in the state’s institutions through proportional representation (PR) systems.

Read More