A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Saturday, January 28, 2017
International laws in armed conflict
By Neville Ladduwahetty-January 27, 2017
POST-CONFLICT APPLICATION of IHRL and IHL
The position originally adopted by some participating in the e-mail
exchange was that IHRL and IHL concurrently apply in Armed Conflict.
Since then they have conceded that the Law applicable to Armed Conflict
of a non-International nature is IHL and furthermore that it is
applicable up to the cessation of hostilities in Sri Lanka in May 2009.
Their original position that IHRL and IHL concurrently applied was
influenced by a misguided notion that such a position would strengthen
Sri Lanka’s hand to address issues of accountability and also defend the
interests of the security forces better. However, what is evident from
the foregoing is that the concurrent application of IHRL and IHL is in
fact detrimental to Sri Lanka’s interests.
Since it has been conceded that only IHL applies up to the cessation of
hostilities i.e. May 2009, it means that their original position would
have jeopardized the interests of not only Sri Lanka but also those of
the security forces. Acknowledging this reversal is a manifestation of
integrity that is rare and therefore noteworthy. What is even more
heartening is that since IHL is more restrictive in its application and
offers greater latitude when engaging in an Armed Conflict, Sri Lanka
would be in a better position to meet the charges leveled against it
since most of these occurred prior to May 2009 than under their previous
position that IHRL and IHL operated concurrently.
Notwithstanding these clarifications it is important to note that the
ruling by the ICTY was that IHL continues to apply "beyond the cessation
of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or in
the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved".
Furthermore, although there was no formal peace settlement, the
rationale behind using this ICTY ruling to advantage is that if IHL is
applicable ONLY up to May 2009, IHRL cannot be enlarged beyond "hard
core human rights" until conflict related issues are resolved.
Considering the realities that prevailed post May 2009 such as the
situation in Manik Farm and other detention camps, the presence of land
mines in undisclosed locations, security related issues from potential
acts of terrorism, and identifying former LTTE combatants from bona-fide
civilians as well as the challenges associated with providing
humanitarian assistance to over 300,000 displaced that included
combatants, it would be unrealistic to expect IHRL to operate fully
beyond May 2009 without first addressing issues relating to human
safety. .
The need to restrict personal liberties until conflict related issues
are resolved is addressed in Article 2 Section 2 of the Additional
Protocol II. This states: "At the end of an armed conflict, all persons
who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been
restricted for reasons relating to such conflict, as well as those
deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the
conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5
and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty".
These are all provisions of IHL.
A more compelling reason not to apply IHRL and IHL concurrently
immediately after hostilities cease is that the starting point to relax
IHRL is the "hard core human rights". Therefore, the transition process
must necessarily be gradual. How gradual is a subjective call that needs
to be handled with caution if unintended complexities are to be
prevented. Under the circumstances stated above and strengthened by the
rulings of ICTY and ICRC the applicable Law beyond the cessation of
hostilities should be IHL.
CONCLUSION
This article is the result of a debate between two divergent views as to
which International Laws govern non-International Armed Conflicts such
as in Sri Lanka. Although Sri Lanka’s conflict had been categorized as
one that defeated Terrorism or as a Humanitarian Operation, it has now
come to be accepted as a non-International Armed Conflict. Despite this
categorization of Sri Lanka’s conflict as an Armed Conflict, which
particular International Laws are relevant to issues of accountability
have not been explored.
The position advocated by me since 2008 was based on the ruling by the
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) appointed
by the Security Council. My position was that the conflict in Sri Lanka
was an Armed Conflict and as such the International Law that should
govern the conflict was International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
Furthermore, that IHL should apply to the whole territory up to the
cessation of hostilities and beyond. The position advocated by others
was that International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian
Law should apply concurrently. It is heartening to note that the latter
group has now revisited their position and acknowledged that IHL applies
up the end of hostilities which in the case of Sri Lanka was May 2009.
The UN official publication cited above titled ""INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT" by the United Nations
Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, New York and Geneva, 2011
states: "Two arguments have specifically been raised against their
concurrent application. Firstly, it has been argued that international
human rights law and international humanitarian law are regimes that
apply in separate contexts – namely the former in peace time only and
the latter in armed conflict – and that concurrent or complementary
application is therefore, irrelevant. Second, it has also been argued
that if both bodies of law are applicable in situations of armed
conflict, then the question is whether one body of law would have
pre-eminence over the other as a matter of lex specialis" (p.54).
The fact that there are two equally valid positions depends on one body
of law being pre-eminent over the other. However, the pre-eminent law is
IHL because the provisions of IHRL are derogated to the point that only
the "hard core human rights" prevail during an Armed Conflict.
Therefore, the task is not to condemn one and extol the other but to
find which position would best serve the interests of the security
forces and Sri Lanka.
All of the above is academic to many readers. However, its impact on Sri
Lanka and in particular the fate of the security forces could be
significant. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that a clear and
unambiguous determination is made as to the International Laws that
should regulate investigations relating to accountability – should it be
IHL throughout the conflict and thereafter until conflict related
issues are resolved, or IHL up to May 2009 with IHRL and IHL applied
concurrently thereafter.
Such a determination should factor in the following statements in the
Preamble to the Additional Protocol II of 1977 on which IHL is based.
The relevant statements are: "Recalling furthermore that international
instruments relating to human rights offer a BASIC (emphasis added)
protection to the human person" and "Emphasizing the need to ensure a
BETTER (emphasis added) protection for the victims of armed conflicts".
This underscores the pre-eminence of IHL in Armed Conflicts.
Unless and until these issues are resolved there would not be a clear
remit to the judicial process particularly because the UNHRC of 2015
Resolution, A/HRC/30/L.29 states that the judicial mechanism should
"investigate allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and
violations of international humanitarian law, as applicable". Since the
words "as applicable" are vital there is a need to identify which
International Laws are applicable to accountability related issues.
