A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, September 3, 2017
Picking a wrong week for a serious topic:Economic rationale for the beleaguered Provincial Councils
by Rajan Philips-September 2, 2017, 7:01 pm
This is hardly the week to start a new line of advocacy for the
beleaguered Provincial Councils. A quick glance of the headline stories
during the week gives a bewildering menu of options to pick a topical
theme for weekend comment. I have chosen to stay with a premeditated
theme despite the risk of being overlooked among other sexier and
excitingly gossipy political pursuits. But let me start with a short
list of the week’s headline stories as a warm up to a somewhat esoteric
theme.
The week began with the usual hullabaloo over yet another constitutional
amendment, this one involving provincial council elections. The
government is divided over the 20th Constitutional Amendment for
postponing elections to three provinces that are due this year. The
critics of the government are over the moon that there would be neither a
two-thirds majority in parliament nor unanimous support among the
provinces to ensure passage of 20A. The week ended with the government
being put on notice that it is going to be toppled over its handling, or
mishandling, of the SAITM matter. It’s that serious. And it is the
ultimate ultimatum after a series of penultimate ultimatums by the
congenitally sick and strike-driven GMOA. The wag would like to know
which part of the government is going to be toppled by members of the
learned profession: the part that supports 20A, or the part that opposes
20A but started the whole SATIM mess as part of a former government
whose heads are now part of the Joint Opposition. There are too many
bloody (not bleeding) parts (and heads) for the good of the country as a
whole.
Even the military is in parts – with two former chiefs battling in
public over war crimes allegations after an intrepid international
busybody filed war crimes lawsuits in Brazil and Columbia, with more to
follow in Argentina, Chile and Peru. And those who insist on war crimes
accountability, not so much for reconciliation as for eye-for-an-eye and
tooth-for-a-tooth retaliation, are also embattled and divided in their
own provincial house. The one Province that is the root cause for the
creation of the provincial-council system in the country has its first
elected council hopelessly divided and dysfunctional. The Chief Minister
of the Northern Provincial Council tired after venting hotheaded
resolutions is now in a mode of firing and hiring ministers to keep his
cabinet of four going. Fortuitously, the constitution limits provincial
cabinets to four ministers only, unlike the national cabinet that can
constitutionally limits its size and then ‘un-limit’ it at whim.
One headline story yesterday was about the JO’s ire at the American
diplomatic presence in a candle light vigil in Colombo to mark the UN
Day commemorating Victims of Enforced Disappearances. The JO spokesman
may have protested a bit too much about the transgression of diplomatic
norms. A more cutting exception would have been to draw contrast to the
torch-lit and hate filled White Supremacist march in Charlottesville,
Virginia, that the American President chose to justify and not condemn
it unreservedly. Yet in his own way, and quite inadvertently, Donald
Trump has become a teacher for negative revulsion of racism in any and
every form, in his own country and hopefully everywhere else. That is a
whole different story in itself.
Economic rationale for devolution
My pre-meditated theme for today is a follow-up to my article two weeks
ago on the august/August ruling of the Supreme Court that it is legal
and constitutional to advocate a federal form of government within the
present unitary constitution. While acknowledging the symbolic and
substantive significance of the court ruling, I also pointed out that
the ruling by itself does not address the political difficulties and
administrative challenges in achieving a successful system of
devolution, let alone federalism, in Sri Lanka. At the same time,
whether anyone likes it or not, the country has a system of provincial
governments and it makes no sense to let that system go on at great cost
without letting it do what it is supposed to do. What are provincial
governments supposed to do? This question has been flogged more than
enough from political, legal and constitutional standpoints, but not
enough at all from the standpoint of devolution economics.
The economic rationale for devolution and decentralization is the
normative proposition, called the ‘Decentralization Theorem’ in the
literature, that in the absence of economies of scale and the need for
national level co-ordination, public goods and services are better
delivered at sub-national levels for lower costs and higher benefits
than they would be at the national level. Wallace Oates, the University
of Maryland Economist, who formulated this theorem, has also
differentiated between the political/constitutional approach to
devolution and decentralization, or more generally to federalism, on the
one hand, and the economic approach to them, on the other. To the
economist, the entire public sector has a vertical structure with an
inherent scope for national/sub-national decision making regardless of
whether or not there are formal constitutional arrangements for such
decision making.
The question that obviously arises is why formal arrangements would be
needed if such devolved decision making could go on inherently, so to
speak. The answer is that such decision making is invariably impeded or
constrained both in the absence of formal arrangement, as well when
formal constitutional arrangements are in place. The challenge is in
finding a balance between governance structure and the assignment of
goods and services, as well as policy decisions, between different
levels of government. The governance structure must be broadly
understood to include not only the legislative and executive branches at
the national and sub-national levels, but also the judiciary, and the
organization and function of political parties in the electoral process.
As for the bundle, or ‘vector’, of goods and services, as well as
government policies, there should be flexibility for these components to
move ‘up’ (to national/supranational levels), or ‘down’ (to
provincial/local levels) within the vector.
Historically, few constitutions, if any, have come into being following
an economic assessment of the governance structure and the distribution
of government functions. A rare exception could be the European Union
which at once embodies both ‘supranational integration’ and
‘subsidiarity decentralization’ of the functions of independent European
states. What is remarkable about the EU is the emphasis on the
principle of subsidiarity and the practical success in its application.
While EU has run afoul of many national governments on account of its
‘supranational growth’, it has also cultivated much support at local
levels within each European country by providing local communities a new
voice in political decision making and new protection for local
products in the context of globalization. In a sense, the European Union
embodies both the ‘coming together’ and the ‘holding together’
processes of federalism that I referred to in my article on the Supreme
Court ruling on federalism.
In other situations, the two processes lead to different institutional
challenges in achieving a good balance between national and sub-national
assignment of responsibilities and decision making. In the ‘coming
together’ situation, where pre-existing units decide to set up a federal
system, new federal institutions are created and invested with powers
and resources overarching existing ‘state’ (as in the US) or provincial
institutions. On the other hand, in the ‘holding together’ cases, that
better represent the Sri Lankan situation, new (provincial) institutions
are created in between existing national and local government
institutions. India’s colonial experience was in itself a quasi-federal
experience that encompassed not only government administration but also
the organization of the anti-colonial struggle, including especially the
organization of the Congress Party itself. Not surprisingly, the Indian
constitutional experience is seen by some as ‘federal’ with strong
unitary features, and by others ‘unitary’ with strong federalist
features.
In Sri Lanka’s case, its colonial and post-colonial experiences are not
conducive to successfully implement the new provincial-government
system. In terms of the Decentralization Theorem that I referred to
earlier, the goods and services that are most amenable to delivery at
the sub-national level include education, health, municipal services
including waste management, local and regional transport etc. And they
are provided for in the Provincial Council List of powers in the
Thirteenth Amendment. But the newly created provincial governments
cannot take over these tasks unless they are progressively handed over
to them by the national government. Even the present government, while
vociferously promising constitutional changes to improve the system of
devolution, is undercutting its own mission in daily decision making in
each and every area that should properly be left to the provinces.
There are other obstacles as well among the different components of a
decentralized governance structure which, as I noted earlier, include
the judiciary as well as political parties and the electoral system. My
current refrain is that the Supreme Court ruling on federalism is
indicative of positive legal thinking. But it cannot take the project of
devolution any further than the premises of the court unless there are
corresponding changes in the political and administrative spheres. These
changes cannot be brought about by waving constitutional magic wand.
The economic approach that I am suggesting here needs to be taken
further to identify and overcome roadblocks and bottlenecks that have
emerged over time – from Donoughmore to JRJ and beyond, in each of the
powers and functions that the 13th Amendment has assigned to the
provinces, but on which none of the provincial governments have been
able to make any headway for nearly 30 years.