A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Back to 500BC.
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Friday, September 1, 2017
Sri Lanka’s Sovereignty & Economy Confronting An Impossible Trinity
An
India-U.S. geostrategic and neoliberal economic alliance on the one
hand and an aspiring-to-be world power China on the other, with a
financially empowered neoliberal economic manager, IMF, acting as a
third form an impossible trinity that is redefining the political
sovereignty and economic destiny of many smaller nations. A
debt-burdened but resourceful post-war Sri Lanka with its strategic
location in the Indian Ocean is a classic victim of the pressures exerted by this impossible trinity.
When the Sri Lankan army defeated the LTTE in
2009 I described that victory as comprehensive and absolute but
Pyrrhic. It was pyrrhic not simply in terms of the enormous losses, both
in terms of economic resources and human lives, which were immediate,
but more importantly in terms of the long term damage that the war,
which was totally unnecessary to start with, was going to cost to the
country’s sovereignty and economic future. This may not have been
obvious at that time and certainly was not a serious concern for the
victors who were physically and emotionally basking in schadenfreude,
but now and within less than a decade the real cost of the war is
beginning to bite politically as well as economically.
The
situation that Sri Lanka is facing now is somewhat analogous, although
on a tiny scale, to that of the U.S. and its allies in the aftermath of
their Pyrrhic victory over Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Of
course to them it is not a question of national sovereignty, which in
any case has to be redefined in the face of globalization with porous
territorial borders, but rather the problem of domestic security in
their countries that has become a nightmare. The imperative demand to
secure borders and local population from so called terror attacks which
ceaselessly consumes huge amount of unaffordable dollars at the expense
of other more vital needs of the society such as education, health care
and welfare support to the vulnerable has brought home to policy makers
the real magnitude of the high-priced victory. Even though the Western
leaders don’t want to admit it openly, yet, the fact remains that the
steeply rising security costs are threatening to jeopardise the much
touted neoliberal economic model. In
that sense at least one of Bin Laden’s promises to “bleed the U.S. to
the point of bankruptcy” (he said this in a videotaped speech sent to
Aljazeera on 1 November 2004) may be nearing partial fulfilment.
Sri
Lanka’s political sovereignty and economic destiny have been virtually
compromised by successive governments since the 1980s partly because of
growing geopolitical pressures in the Indian Ocean and partly because of
financial indebtedness to foreign lenders, both of them are closely
linked to the civil war.
In
spite of Sri Lankan’s military superiority acquired through costly
state-of-the-art weaponry and aggressive recruitment of soldiery that
war would have prolonged even further had it not been for the covert but
decisive role played by India. Future
historians with access to the now secret documents on the war will have
more to say on the crucial Indian variable. Delhi was prepared to
betray the political support of Tamil Nadu and sacrifice the lives of
thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils not because Delhi loved the Sinhalese but
because of India’s strategic interest in the Sri Lankan economy and her
maritime waters. Similarly, China’s support during the war was also
coloured by her own national interest to gain market and add one more
pearl to her string of military and commercial facilities along the
Indian Ocean. These hard facts are now being openly displayed in the
various economic and strategic deals that are being signed between Sri
Lanka and India on the one hand and Sri Lanka and China on the other.
The actual outcome of these deals are more to the advantage of the
foreigner than to the local.
Economically
India is slowly but surely proceeding on her long term mission to
convert Sri Lanka into a profitable enclave for Indian capitalists. At
the same time, geo-strategically India’s desperation to gain a long term
leasehold over the Trincomalee harbour like her leasehold over Mattala airport are measures to counter the growing Chinese influence in the island. The 99-year leasehold over the Hambantota harbour
granted to the Chinese government was a payback to Chinese weaponry
used in the war and financial support to the island’s infrastructural
development. China also has been awarded the contract to redevelop the Colombo Port city.
Just as India wants to keep the Indian Ocean Indian in every sense of
that name so also Beijing wants to safeguard her trade routes along a
new silk road over the Indian Ocean which has now become crucially vital
in the face of tensions in the Pacific between Washington and Beijing.
In this new geopolitical great game Sri Lanka is bound to face
situations when she will be forced to make a choice between two or even
three – if one includes the U.S – confrontationists. It will be a cruel
choice that will tax Sri Lanka’s diplomatic skill to its extreme. Will
that also endanger her sovereignty?
The
IMF, the third of the impossible trinity, is a different kettle of
fish. Its sole mission is to train Sri Lanka as an obedient pupil of the
neoliberal economic school. As the supreme institution of the
neoliberal economic order IMF has invariably become the handmaiden of
Washington and the Wall Street. If getting economic and financial
assistance from India and China becomes too onerous the only other
source available to Sri Lanka is the IMF, but that supremo has its own
conditionality attached to its wallet. The so called structural
adjustment program and austerity measures assiduously preached by the
IMF ultimately benefits the rich at the expense of the poor. Broadening
the tax base by shifting from direct to indirect taxes, privatization of
state owned or state managed enterprises, operation of an untrammelled
free market, freedom for foreign multinationals are some of IMF’s cure
for national economic ailment. The recent IMF $167 million tranche to
Sri Lanka carries with it some of these conditionality. The usual IMF
mantra of short term pain for long term gain has not worked in any of
the counties that sought IMF assistance. If
Sri Lanka refuses to play by the IMF rules, then there the
international credit rating agencies that are IMF’s subsidiary managers
who will punish the nation by down grading its credit rating so that
other international lenders will keep away from assisting the nation.