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Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Saturday, April 28, 2018
The military still holds all the levers in Burma’s future
NEARLY two and half years after the historic victory of Aung San Suu
Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma’s (Myanmar’s) general
election, the optimism regarding its long road to becoming a stable,
effective and inclusive democracy is beginning to wither away.
On 28 March, 2018, Burma’s parliament elected U
Win Myint as its second President. Like former-President Htin Kyaw, the
new president is also a trusted partner of State Councillor Aung San
Suu Kyi, which keeps her at the helm of decision-making.
However, despite the transition, Burma’s military – also known as the
Tatmadaw – still holds more than a quarter of the seats in the
parliament, allowing it to veto any decision. It also controls the
ministries of Defence, Border and Home Affairs, giving it control over
the peace process spearheaded by Suu Kyi with Myanmar’s Ethnic Armed
Groups (EAG).
Moreover, the shape of Burma’s international engagements shows an
increasing recognition of the Tatmadaw around the world – despite the
bad press surrounding its crackdown on the Rohingya Muslims.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has been the international profile of Suu Kyi
herself, more than Burma’s military, which has suffered the most from
the Rohingya crisis. Beyond her reticence on the issue, Suu Kyi has
been seen as trying to protect the military and blame the international media for its “misinformation campaign”.
Moreover, by steering the political transition in Burma, the Tatmadaw
has been able to position Suu Kyi as the political and diplomatic face
of the country – which translates to the NLD leader facing the brunt of
global criticism.
The European nations which not so long ago shunned the country’s top generals laid out a red carpet for
the Tatmadaw delegations several times in 2017. In contrast to the
presidency of Barack Obama, Burma seems to be low among the foreign
policy priorities of the Trump Administration. For instance, during
then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Burma in November last
year, he adopted a moderate tone by not condemning the government.
This US policy line could also be construed as wanting to avoid
marginalising the Suu Kyi government at a time when the military has
been increasingly gaining popularity among
the Burmese public. Moreover, it could also be seen as a way to ensure
that Burma does not tilt any further into China’s geopolitical orbit.
Shortly after the Tillerson visit, the Trump Administration made a reversal, calling the violence in Rakhine an act of ethnic cleansing. By late December, his government had imposed targeted sanctions on generals it holds responsible for the Rohingya crisis and limited certain forms of military cooperation.
However, this could be seen more as a reaction to the international media and to lobby groups in
Washington who want stricter action against the Tatmadaw, rather than
any serious attempt to de-legitimatise Burma’s military. According to some analysts,
US policy towards Burma is still guided by its “emotional” attachment
to seeing Suu Kyi in power rather an articulation of its interest in
Burma.
Aside from the US-China dynamic, Burma has also been a theatre of contestation for influence between China and India.
India’s national security concerns in the country emanate out of the
insurgency movements in its northeast region, which shares porous
borders with Burma. These concerns have seen New Delhi adopting a more
pragmatic approach in its ties with Naypidaw. When responding to a
question on the Rohingya crisis last October, then-Indian Foreign
Secretary S Jaishankar also advised a more “locally sensitive approach.”
In recent years, India has strengthened its defence ties with Myanmar.
While the West was criticising Naypidaw last September, Burma’s Chief of
Navy, Admiral Tin Aung San, was in India discussing procurement of
offshore patrol boats from New Delhi. In November the two countries
kicked off the India-Myanmar Bilateral Military Exercise (IMBAX-2017).
India has so far supplied a
huge array of weapons systems to Burma, increasing its naval,
transportation and land combat capabilities. Earlier last year, the two
countries also signed a deal worth US $37.9 million for supply of torpedoes.
India hopes that close defence ties will motivate the Tatmadaw to
curtail the operations of Indian EAGs who use militant group bases
inside Burma to launch attacks on Indian security forces.
However, India might not necessarily receive the benefits it hopes for
through these weapon sales. The Indian insurgent group NSCN (K) signed a
ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw in 2012. Thus, it makes more
sense for the Tatmadaw to use these weapons against the Kachin, Ta’ang,
Kokang and Rakhine rebel groups, against whom the Tatmadaw has increased
military operations since 2016.
More worrying for India, between 2013 and 2017, China has emerged as a major arms supplier to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
China has also further used the void provided by the Trump
Administration’s lack of initiative to increase its political influence
in Myanmar. The Suu Kyi government had kick-started a nationwide
ceasefire negotiation with EAGs in Myanmar through the 21st Century
Panglong Peace Conference in 2016. However, since then the EAGs in
northern Burma have allied under the banner of the Northern Alliance and now demand increased involvement from China in the peace negotiations with the government.
The main beneficiary of the evolving situation seems to be the Tatmadaw.
It continues to mount its offensive on the EAGs while shifting the
responsibility of carrying out ceasefire negotiations to China and the
civilian government of Burma.
More than ever, the evolving political dynamic in Burma shows the deep
inroads that its military has made into all sources of power. The
Tatmadaw has used Suu Kyi’s aspirations and the international pressure
for change to extract leverage from geopolitical rivalries in the
region.
In doing so, it has bargained itself out of a position where it would be
forced to compromise, to one in which it can not only increase its
legitimacy internationally, but retain its primacy in Burma’s political
future.
By Monish Tourangbam, Assistant
Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International
Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), in Karnataka,
India; and Pawan Amin, research scholar at the Chinese Studies
Programme, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International
Studies, JNU (New Delhi). Originally published on PolicyForum.net.