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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Tuesday, March 19, 2019
The American Empire’s History of Amnesia!
TRUMP’S ‘INCOHERENCE’ ON SOVIET INVASION AND . . .
"Not the power to remember, but its very opposite, the power to forget, is a necessary condition for our existence."
– Sholem Asch, The Nazarene, 1939.
As he approaches 75, Tom Engelhardt, the creator of the highly respected
website, Tomdispatch.com, believes his brain is, as he puts it,
"beginning to dump previously secure memories", but soon realised "that
such loss also involved gain", in that it made him "something of an
instant expert on one aspect of 21st-century America: the memory hole
that’s swallowed up parts of our all-too-recent history.
"I’ve been wondering whether aging imperial powers, like old men and
women, have a tendency to discard what once had been oh-so-familiar.
There’s a difference, though, when it comes to the elites of the aging
empire I live in at least. They don’t just dump things relatively
randomly as I seem to be doing. Instead, they conveniently obliterate
all memory of their country’s – that is, their own – follies and
misdeeds.
"Let me give you an example. But you need to bear with me here because
I’m about to jump into the disordered mind of a man who, though two
years younger than me, has what might be called – given present-day
controversies – a borderline personality. I’m thinking of President
Donald Trump, or rather of a particular moment in his chaotic recent
mental life.
"As the New Year dawned, he chaired what now passes for a ‘cabinet
meeting᾿. That mainly means an event in which those present grovel
before, fawn over, and outrageously praise him in front of the cameras.
"I’m about to plunge into history and our President is neither a
historian, nor particularly coherent. Fortunately, he’s surrounded by a
bevy of translators (still called "reporters" or "pundits") and we have
their notes. So here, as a start, is a much-quoted passage of his on
this country’s never-ending Afghan War from that cabinet meeting
(including all the ‘original᾿ incoherence):
"We’re going to do something that’s right. We are talking to the
Taliban. We’re talking to a lot of different people. But here’s the
thing – because mentioned India: India is there. Russia is there. Russia
used to be the Soviet Union. Afghanistan made it Russia, because they
went bankrupt fighting in Afghanistan. Russia. So you take a look at
other countries. Pakistan is there; they should be fighting. But Russia
should be fighting.
"The reason Russia was in Afghanistan was because terrorists were going
into Russia. They were right to be there. The problem is it was a tough
fight. And literally, they went bankrupt. They went into being called
Russia again, as opposed to the Soviet Union. You know, a lot [of] these
places you’re reading about now are no longer a part of Russia because
of Afghanistan."
The overlap between the fall of the Soviet Union and its foray into
Afghanistan is obvious, notes Engelhardt. The USSR invaded in 1979 and
left a decade later, in 1989. The superpower dissolved shortly
thereafter in 1991. But correlation is not causation. . . It was perhaps
among the many reasons the USSR collapsed. But it was not the reason.
"I was left alone, still dredging through my memories of that ancient
conflict, which, these days, no one but the President would even think
of bringing up in the context of the ongoing US war in Afghanistan. And
yet here’s the curious thing when it comes to an aging empire that
prefers not to remember the history of its folly: Donald Trump was right
that Russia’s Afghan misadventure is a remarkably logical place to
start when considering the present American debacle in that same
country.
"Let me mention one thing no one’s likely to emphasize these days when
it comes to the Russian decision to enter that Afghan quagmire in 1979.
At the highest levels of the Carter and then the Reagan administrations,
top American officials were working assiduously to embroil the Soviets
in Afghanistan and would then invest staggering sums in a CIA campaign
to fund Islamic extremist guerrillas to keep them there. [Not that
anyone in Washington is likely to play this up in 2019, but the United
States began aiding those Mujahidin guerrillas not after the Red Army
moved in to support a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, but six months
before.]
"Here’s how President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, described the situation almost two decades later:
According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujahidin
began during 1980, that’s to say, after the Soviet army invaded
Afghanistan. But the reality, kept secret until now, is completely
different: on 3 July 1979 President Carter signed the first directive
for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And
on the same day, I wrote a note to the President in which I explained
that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military
intervention.
And asked if he had any regrets, Brzezinski responded: "Regret what? The
secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the
Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets
officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in
essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam
War.’
Think about that largely missing bit of history for a moment, wrote
Engelhardt. Top US officials wanted to give the Soviet Union a version
of their own disastrous Vietnam experience and so invested billions of
dollars and much effort in that proxy war – and it worked. The Soviet
leadership continued to pour money into their military misadventure in
Afghanistan when their country was already going bankrupt and the
society they had built was beginning to collapse around them. They were
indeed suffering from what General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to
call ‘the bleeding wound᾿. And if that isn’t the language of disaster
(or bankruptcy or, perhaps more accurately, implosion), what is? Yes,
Afghanistan, that "," wasn’t the only thing that took their world down,
but the way their much-vaunted army finally limped home a decade later
was certainly a significant factor in its collapse.
Now, let me tax your memory (and especially elite Washington’s) just a
bit more, wrote Tom. Think again about the history that led up to the
American war President Trump was fretting about in that cabinet meeting.
Under the circumstances, it wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that
Brzezinski and his successors were just a tad too successful – or, to
put it another way, that they lured not one but two empires into their
trap; the second being, of course, the American one.
After all, in that 10-year Afghan proxy war (1979–89), they laid the
foundations for the creation by a rich young Saudi named Osama bin Laden
of a resistance outfit of Arab fighters. You know, Al Qaeda, or ‘the
baseʼ.
In other words, Brzezinski & Co. laid the foundations for what would
become a nearly 30-year American quagmire war (with a decade off
between its two parts) in a land that, in 1979, few Americans other than
a bunch of hippies had ever heard of. Here, then, is a small hint for
the President: You might consider starting to refer to Afghanistan – and
I assure you this would be historically accurate (even if you were
roundly criticized for it by the Washington punditariat) – as America’s
"bleeding wound."
"In a country in which implosive elements are already being mixed into
its politics, President Trump had his finger on something when he
brought up the Russian war in Afghanistan," wrote Engelhardt. "However
historically and syntactically mixed up he might have been, his brain
was still far more on target than those of most of the wise men and
women of the present Washington establishment."*