A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Thursday, May 2, 2019
Thowheed Jamath, BBS both funded by single secret account - By Dr Wickramabahu
(Lanka-e-News
-01.May.2019, 9.00PM) ) Thowheed Jamath, BBS both funded by single
secret account’ Featured in a report last week. It further explained
that Intelligence authorities have now established that during the
Rajapaksa regime, a secret account of the defence ministry had funded
Thowheed Jamath, Bodu Bala Sena and other Muslim and Buddhist extremist
groups. The ‘Sathhanda’ reported quoting sources at the Presidential
Secretariat. There is clear information to prove that Thowheed Jamath’s
secretary Abdul Rasik Rafiquedeen was an Army intelligence member. It
was him who had given information in 2008 that a group of Mullahs from a
foreign country were in a mosque at Maradana. Coordinator was a retired
major general- a closest ally of ex-defence secretary Gotabaya
Rajapaksa, now a retired major general, had coordinated these Muslim and
Sinhala extremists, it has now come to light.
He was also head of the special security operations committee that
functioned on Gotabhaya’s instructions during the last presidential
elections.
This committee had planned a conspiracy to seize power on January 08,
but was foiled. Investigations into the conspiracy made no headway.
These leaders misled their followers. The secretary of Thowheed Jamath
was arrested on a complaint by BBS secretary Galagodaaththe Gnanasara
Thera, but both were in the pay from the same account. The two groups
had seriously misled their followers and provoked citizens into racial
and religious clashes, the sources said, adding that strong legal action
would be taken against both to establish peace and reconciliation in
the country.
How to check the spread of extremism..
It is clear that the attacks on Easter Sunday were carried out by local
radicals, under the pressure s of foreign fundamentalists. It is also
clear that there is little support for this group from the wider Muslim
community. While those involved could be swiftly identified and dealt
with, the bigger question is how to check the spread of extremism. Some
say violent extremism is a cult, not a religion. Then one can argue that
all god believing religions are cults, except Buddhism. Hence treating
violent extremism as a problem of religion or belief is a mistake. The
process of radical, violent mobilization shows closer links to that of a
belief in mythical irrational power. If “radical” beliefs produce
terrorists, then why doesn’t every political-Islamist mosque produce
terrorists? Even more complicated, why have most of those providing
material support to Islamic terrorist groups shown little understanding
of theology, but instead seem to be attracted to the thrill of jihad
adventurism. Then is it strong attraction to mythical adventure that
effect modern young people to extreme actions?
If that is correct, counter strategies based on empowering rational,
liberal voices by preaching mercy kindness and tolerance in more
“extreme” mosques may not be effective, indeed even counterproductive.
When confronted with countering evidence, committed extremist
individuals may become defensive and cling on initial beliefs more
strongly, driving fence-sitters towards extremism.
It is therefore problematic to assume that countering discussions,
showing extremists the error of their ways or debating theology would do
anything other than produce hostility and even heightened aggression.
To deal with extremism, the focus should be on weakening the
organizational ties within the movement in friendly manner, not on
debate. In debate people tend to defend more on emotion and intuition
than reason. If people are not working from clear ideological
standpoints there is little possibility of making headway through
discussion. On the other hand it may make more sense to counter the
networks and personal ties between individuals and terrorist groups,
using sensitive tactics. In that sense, this relief model maintains that
since ideology fails to predict or suppress terrorist violence, other
social factors such as alienation, mental health, or bonds with other
affected actors explains violence. Of course ideology matters; but
extremist ideological pulls exist within a social context. Hence it is
the social – class context that counter strategies should be focusing
on.
Extremist affective bonds grow around friendship, not Belief...
Most recruits to extremists and new religious movements come from those
who know one or more members of the group. The personal connection
between recruiter and recruited is far more important than the content
of the mythology as the testimony of former cult members shows:
“The way the Jesus Army worshiped was a bit odd at first … but I soon
got used to it. What really attracted me was the sincerity of the people
and the obvious love and bonding that they had with each other”.
Likewise, a participant in another cult reported that: “After his first
visit to the ideology center, he thought members of the centre were
crazy and decided not to go back. However, he thought about all the
people he knew there, and he recalled what a great friendship and warm
time he had with them. Subsequently he turned up for the rest of the
course.”
Similarly, terror networks operate around bonds of kinship and
friendship. One study found that 95% of foreign terrorists who joined
ISIS were recruited by friends or family.”
An extremist group is not simply a quixotic fringe group with unorthodox
practices: they are a commune of practice. In a sense, it is
reemergence of feminist commune of early human existence. For alienated,
isolated individuals, these groups create affective bonds of love and
attention received from nowhere else. The culture of jihad is more than
ideology: a large literature collected has found that terrorist groups
have cultures of practice that go far beyond doing terror. Terrorists
read poetry, weep and hug, sing, eat, and have a culture that can be
observed outside of the material threat they pose. This phenomenon of
early commune spirit is the “soft power” of jihad and other extremists,
which pulls recruits in not with force, but with social cultural appeal
and interrelation ties.
Extremist group thrive on intensive interaction between recruits and
elites and forge social interrelation. On the other hand Ex. groups rely
on exclusive and isolating bonding practices that forge the conditions
necessary for violence. Social inoculates the recruits from outside
influence, neutralizes the stigma frequently associated with
participation in such groups, and masks their deviant behaviour.
Conversely, the more civil connections a group has with others, the more
engaged they become in the democratic process. Cohesion and
overlapping, bridging ties between communities can prevent splintering,
ideological isolation, and foster mutual respect. Thus they become
fighters for an imaginary ideal.
By
Dr Wickramabahu Karunarathne
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by (2019-05-01 15:39:10)
by (2019-05-01 15:39:10)