A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Friday, November 29, 2019
Sri Lanka’s India Equation
The Rajapaksa family is virtually ruling the country. Gotahaya is the President; Mahinda is the Prime Minister and also in charge of key portfolios and Chamal Rajapaksa is another member of the cabinet, who is in charge of the Mahaveli development, agriculture and trade.
by Prof. V. Suryanarayan-2019-11-282-
The
victory of Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the Presidential election held on
November 16, 2019, with a massive mandate, not unexpected by Sri Lanka
watchers in India, opens a new chapter in Sri Lanka’s history and also
in Sri Lanka-India relations.
Gotabaya is a controversial figure; while the majority Sinhalese adores
him as a “savior” and a “war hero”, the minority Tamils (Sri Lankan
Tamils and hill country Tamils) and the Muslims view his ascendancy with
fear and trepidation. The EU Election Observation Mission in its report
has mentioned that the election was largely free of violence and
technically well – managed. However unregulated campaign funding, abuse
of state resources and media bias did not provide a level playing field
for all candidates.
Gotabaya in his campaign highlighted that if elected he would restore
law and order in the country. It was music to the ears of the majority
Sinhalese, especially in the wake of ISIS-inspired bombings last Easter,
that left more than 250 dead and at least 500 injured. The fact that
external intelligence agencies, including India, warned Colombo about
possible attacks, added to the discomfiture of Sirisena-Ranil team.
Other contributory factors included the rift between the President and
the Prime Minister, increasing corruption, mounting cost of living and
rising unemployment.
The Rajapaksa family is virtually ruling the country. Gotahaya is the
President; Mahinda is the Prime Minister and also in charge of key
portfolios –finance, economic affairs, policy development, Buddha
Sasana, water supply, urban development and housing and Chamal Rajapaksa
is another member of the cabinet, who is in charge of the Mahaveli
development, agriculture and trade. In Sinhalese perception the return
of the Rajapaksas to power symbolizes the ascendancy of the Ruhune, the
deep south which had always been in the forefront of Sinhalese
sub-nationalism.
Two important consequences must be highlighted. Voting has followed
ethnic lines and naturally ethnic polarization has widened. Because of
several acts omission and commission committed by the Tigers, the Tamil
struggle for autonomy and participatory democracy has suffered serious
reverses. The functioning of the elected governments in the northern and
eastern provinces is nothing much to rave about. Even on issues
relating to development activities in these two provinces the elected
governments are often ignored. Equally relevant, on the crucial question
of accountability for the war crimes, demanded by UN Human Rights
Agencies, Sri Lanka is unlikely to take any positive steps. The three
brothers are strong Sinhala nationalists and are determined to whitewash
the crimes committed by the trigger-happy armed forces during the
Fourth Eelam War. A winter of discontent is ahead of Sri Lanka.
Soon after Gotabaya was sworn in as President, S. Jaishankar, Minister
for External Affairs, Government of India, called on the President,
offered congratulations and good wishes and invited the President to
visit New Delhi at the earliest. What exactly transpired during the
talks is not known, but according to media sources Jaishankar conveyed
New Delhi’s expectation that Sri Lankan Government “will take forward
the process of national reconciliation, to arrive at a solution that
meets the aspirations of Tamil population for equality, justice, peace
and dignity”. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is visiting New Delhi on
November 29, his first state visit after becoming the President. The
visit underlines the importance that Colombo attaches to its relations
with India.
India: Main Focus of Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy
In his first major interview, Gotabaya Rajapaksa told the well- known
Indian journalist Nitin Gokhale that Sri Lanka wants be a “neutral
country”. It does not want to be a “bandwagon country” and it cannot
survive if “we get into the balancing act”. More important the President
added giving Hambantota “on lease for 99 years” by the previous
government “was a mistake”. He added that Hambantota is “strategically
important, economically important” and giving that “is not acceptable”.
He added “we should have control. We have to negotiate”. Is this only an
attempt to accuse the Ranil-Sirisena team of bartering away the
sovereignty of Sri Lanka? Will China re-negotiate with Colombo and give
away a crucial strategic asset in the Indian Ocean region?
On the proposed visit to India Gotabaya said, “I will reassure the
Indian Government that we will work with India as a friendly country. We
will not do anything that will harm the security interests (of India)”.
On the question of “reconciliation process with the minorities”
Gotabaya did not touch upon the political and constitutional measures
that his government will undertake but emphatically maintained that
“development is the answer”. He added that the leaders of both Sinhalese
and Tamils were speaking about things “that are not practical,
impossible, only to fool the people”. He added that every citizen of the
country should be given an opportunity “to live as a Sri Lankan, to get
an education, live a better life, get a good job and live in dignity. I
will create that environment”.
India- Sri Lanka bilateral relations since independence have undergone
several twists and turns, confounding friends and critics alike. But the
crucial statement made by the Sri Lankan President in his interview
with Nitin Gokhale that Sri Lanka “will not do anything that will harm
the security interests (of India)” has to be analysed in greater detail.
For if we do not learn from history, we will be condemned to re-live
it.
Love-hate relations
All aspects of Sri Lankan life – demography, history, religion,
language, art, literature, politics, even dress and cuisine – have been
profoundly influenced by India. In 1927, Mahatma Gandhi, on the
invitation extended by the Jaffna Youth Congress, visited Ceylon to
popularise Khadi and prohibition. Gandhiji spoke at several places
touching upon Buddha’s heritage, temperance, khadi and untouchability.
According to Rajaji, who accompanied Gandhiji during his visit to
Ceylon, Gandhiji’s visit was an “unprecedented triumphal march”.
Gandhiji was so impressed by all-pervasive Indian influence that he
referred to Ceylon as “India’s daughter state”. During his visit to
Jaffna he referred to Ceylon as “India glorified”. Struck by the natural
beauty of the country, Gandhiji told that Ceylon “surpassed all my
expectations and so I could not help saying that Ceylon seemed to me a
fragrant beautiful pearl dropped from the nasal ring of India”. He
expressed the hope that the people of Ceylon “who have inherited and
adopted the teachings of the Great Master (Gautama Buddha) do better
than the children of the Motherland”.
Though a proclaimed agnostic, Jawaharlal Nehru was fascinated by the
life and teachings of Gautama Buddha. Nehru never failed to visit the
Samadhi statue of the Buddha in Anuradhapura whenever he visited the
Island. When he was in Dehradun jail, a Ceylonese friend sent him a
picture of this statue and it became his constant companion. In
Discovery of India Nehru has written that “it became a precious
companion for me and the strong calm features of Buddha’s statue soothed
me and gave me strength and helped me to overcome many a period of
depression”. No wonder that when the Constituent Assembly debated on the
selection of the national flag it unanimously adopted the flag of the
Indian National Congress, with the Charkha being replaced by the Ashoka
Chakra, indicating that Dharma will guide India’s policies and
programmes.
It must be pointed out that in Sri Lanka there is wide divergence
between theory and practice of Buddhism. In his absorbing book, Buddhism
Betrayed, Prof. Stanley Tambiah raised the embarrassing question: “If
Buddhism preaches non-violence why is there so much of political
violence in Sri Lanka today?”. The book carries in the front cover, the
photograph of a Buddhist monk shrieking and shouting. There is no Karuna
(compassion) in his face there is only Raudra (anger). It needs to be
highlighted that the assassin who killed S W R D Bandaranaike was a
Buddhist monk. And the monks had been in the forefront in preaching
intolerance and even violence against the minorities, whether Tamils or
Muslims.
Minority Complex of the Majority Community
Though the Sinhalese constitute three fourths of the island’s
population, they do not look at the Tamils as minority groups, but as
those who have links with South India with no loyalty to the island
Republic. It is a well-entrenched attitude. This idea got further
strengthened because the island was subjected to frequent invasions from
South India during the Chola period. In recent times the discomfiture
has been strengthened by wild statements made by the leaders of the
Dravidian parties that India should resort to military means to solve
the ethnic problem.
The ever present fear of the giant in the north made the Sinhalese
leaders seek external help to “checkmate” India. Thus, instead of
reciprocating the good will expressed by Jawaharlal Nehru Ceylon entered
into a defence agreement with Britain which permitted the latter to
station British troops in Ceylon. It was justified by Sir John
Kotelawala, the Ceylonese Prime Minister, who said, “the day Ceylon
dispensed with Englishmen completely, the island would go under India”.
J V P Revolt and the Bangladeshi Crisis
Faced with the internal security threat posed by the Janata Vimukti
Peramuna (JVP) in April 1971, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike asked
for external assistance. The first country to respond spontaneously was
India. A senior diplomat then working in the Indian High Commission
told me that he took the next available flight to Thiruvananthapuram,
telephoned then Foreign Secretary T N Kaul who, in turn, got in touch
with the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The Government of India acted
swiftly. The Indian Air Force planes within minutes flew from Bangalore
to Colombo to defend the Katunayake airport. The Indian naval ships from
Chennai and Kochi sailed to Colombo to defend the Colombo harbor. The
JVP revolt was easily put down; a State of Emergency was proclaimed and
large number of Sinhalese youth were detained without trial.
How did Colombo respond to these gestures of goodwill? Six months later,
during the East Pakistani crisis, when India had banned over flights by
Pakistani planes over Indian Territory, Sri Lanka provided transit and
re-fuelling facilities for Pakistani air force planes and soldiers on
their way from West Pakistan to East Pakistan to carry on savage
reprisals against Bangladeshi nationalists. Was it not an act which went
against Indian interests? In that process did not Sri Lanka collude
with Pakistan and go against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of
East Pakistanis who wanted freedom from Pakistani domination?
India’s Nuclear Programmes and Sri Lankan Response
During the 1970’s one of the major foreign policy initiatives of
Sirimavo Bandaranaike was to get the Indian Ocean declared as a Zone of
Peace. With the support of non-aligned countries, especially India, Sri
Lanka was able to muster majority in the UN General Assembly to get the
IOPZ resolution passed in October 1971. But with India’s growing nuclear
capability Colombo began to change its stance. It began to support the
Pakistani proposal for making South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone.
What is more, when India “imploded” the bomb in May 1974 anti-India
sentiments came out into the open. In addition to concerns about super
power rivalry, Colombo began to express fears about India’s nuclear
capabilities. Sri Lankan diplomat Shirley Amarasinghe remarked: “We do
not want any great power here. We do not intend to drive out Satan by
Beelzebug and allow some other powers within the group of littoral and
hinterland states to take up the place of superpowers”.
It must be highlighted that when India exercised the nuclear option and
exploded the bomb in Pokhran in May 2008 there was an enlightened
government in Colombo. Lakshman Kadiragamar was the Minister for
External Affairs, who did not believe in checkmating India, but in
promoting bilateral relations. He was conscious of the fact that India
is the best guarantor of the stability and security of Sri Lanka and
welcomed India’s initiative.
Induction of IPKF:
The induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), on the
invitation of President Jayewardene under the provisions of the India
Sri Lanka Accord, enabled the Sri Lankan army to withdraw from the north
and the east and concentrate itself in tackling the JVP threat. The
JVP, it may be recalled, after 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord, gave up its
earlier form of class struggle and transformed itself as a champion of
Sinhala nationalism. Unprecedented violence was unleashed by the JVP.
For few weeks, according to many impartial observers, the security
situation in southern parts of Sri Lanka began to turn against the
Government. But gradually the Sri Lankan army got an upper hand. During
those turbulent days, Bheeshana Samaya, days of terror, as the Sinhalese
refer to it, the two rivers of exquisite beauty in Sri Lanka, Mahaweli
Ganga and Kelaniya Ganga, were clogged with dead bodies and foamed with
blood. Gradually the army got the upper hand and the JVP revolt was
crushed.
What is instructive for us in India is the fact that the military
marginalization of the Tigers, accomplished at heavy cost of men and
materials, did not earn for India the corresponding gratitude of the
Sinhalese. On the contrary it gave a fillip to Sinhala-Buddhist
chauvinism and provided justification for the argument that Sri Lanka
would soon become the client state of India. What was more embarrassing
for New Delhi was the fact that the hitherto two antagonistic entities,
Prabhakaran and President Premadasa, came together. It is well known
that President Premadasa provided lot of money and weapons to the Tigers
to fight against the IPKF. However, in the end, Premadasa had to pay
for the wages of sin. He fell victim to the cult of the bomb and the
bullet perfected by the Tigers.
In his memoirs, My Days in Sri Lanka, Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra, who
was High Commissioner from April 1989 to June 1990, narrates the policy
of brinkmanship practiced by President Premadasa. Sri Lanka was toyng
with the idea of abrogating the India-Sri Lanka Accord by an Act of
Parliament, recalling the Sri Lankan High Commissioner from New Delhi,
thus leading to “rupture” in diplomatic relations. President Premadasa
threatened B G Deshmukh, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi, who was sent to Colombo as a “special envoy” that he would
declare the IPKF as an “occupying force” which would sully India’s name.
In a fit of anger Premadasa told Deshmukh that he would “commit
suicide” if his request for the IPKF to cease its operations against the
LTTE was not met before July 1989.
The wheel turned full circle again. When the military crisis deepened
during the Third Eelam War, after the fall of the Elephant Pass to the
Tigers in April 2000, and the Tigers were ready to re-enter Jaffna,
their former stronghold, not only Sri Lankan Government, but even the
hard core sections of the JVP pleaded for Indian military intervention.
Having burnt its fingers already, New Delhi turned down the request.
Indian Naval Diplomacy at Its Best
When Tsunami struck Sri Lanka in December 2004 the Indian response was
spontaneous. Though a victim of Tsunami itself, the Government of India
immediately mobilised its resources and extended timely help to its
immediate neighbours – Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia.
India was the first country to send assistance to Sri Lanka - within
hours – after the Tsunami which claimed over 30,000 lives in the coastal
districts spread across the northern, eastern, southern and
southwestern parts of the island. Indian relief workers were involved in
a range of operations, including emergency medical aid, the setting up
of relief camps, clearing debris and reconstructing damaged bridges. The
magnificent role played by the Indian Navy constitutes one of the
golden chapters of India’s naval history and diplomacy. It included the
mapping of the Colombo harbor which was completed effectively and
swiftly.
It must be pointed out that Tsunami, which wrought havoc in Indonesia,
had the effect of bringing together the Achenese rebels and the
Indonesian Government, which paved the way for the settlement of the
Achenese separatist problem. Hope entertained by Indian observers that a
similar denouement will take place in Sri Lanka did not materialize due
to the intransigence of both sides – Sri Lankan Government and the
separatist Tigers. As a result, Indian assistance extended to Sri Lanka
did not reach the Tamils in the north and the east to the extent India
would have liked.
India and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
We can choose our friends, but not our neighbours. What is more, in
South Asia we cannot make a clear distinction between domestic
developments and foreign policy. To illustrate, if there are
Hindu-Muslim riots in India, the Muslims in neighbouring countries will
naturally get agitated. If religious conversion on a mass scale takes
place in Bangladesh and Pakistan and if the Hindu minority is
pressurised/coerced to embrace Islam, the Hindus in India will be
concerned. If the Tamils in Sri Lanka are discriminated against by the
Sinhalese-dominated governments ,the Tamils in Tamil Nadu will naturally
get agitated and will express their support and sympathy to their Tamil
brethren across the Palk Strait. Keeping this reality in mind we in
India have to evolve a realistic neighbourhood policy. As the dominant
power in the region, which lies at the very centre of South Asia, India
has the responsibility of preventing genocide in neighbouring countries.
In other words, in its foreign policy, New Delhi must uphold, both in
letter and spirit, the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)”.
The R2P is a revolutionary doctrine in the theory and practice of
international relations. Promulgated by Australian visionary and former
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who had taken keen interest in the
prevention and resolution of conflicts, the theory is gathering support
and momentum in different parts of the world. It was unanimously adopted
by the UN General Assembly at the 2006 World Summit, but has not been
implemented because of the strong opposition put forward by states who
are taking shelter behind state sovereignty to commit genocidal crimes
against their own people.
In simple words, R2P spells out that the primary responsibility of
protecting the people from mass atrocity lies with the State itself. As
Gareth Evans has aptly put it, “State sovereignty implies
responsibility, not license to kill”. But when a State is unable or
unwilling to take responsibility, the international community cannot
turn a Nelson’s eye to gross violations of human rights. The
international community should take preventive action. R2P’s primary
tools are persuasion and support, not military or other coercive
methods. But when all means fail, then the alternative of military
intervention should be considered.
Sri Lanka, as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in 1983, is “not just
another country” and what happens in the island will have its
repercussions in India. If fire rages in your neigbbourhood, you must
extinguish the fire before it engulfs you. This policy was adhered to by
New Delhi in the case of Sri Lanka even before the ethnic fratricide in
July 1983. Three illustrations are given below to substantiate this
point.
India’s Response to ethnic riots in 1958
The first organized violence against the Tamils took place in Colombo in
1958 and death and destruction were the order of the day. Y D Gundevia,
who was then Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, met Governor General
Oliver Goonetileke and candidly told him that the Tamils in Colombo were
feeling unsafe in the national capital. Ambassador Gundevia suggested
that it was better to shift them to the safety and security of Jaffna
peninsula. The Governor General concurred with this view and with Indian
assistance ships were arranged and those Tamils who wanted to leave
Colombo were transported to Kankesenthurai. There were few hundred
Sinhalese living in the Northern Province at that time, mainly involved
in the bakery business. Their lives were not in danger, but as a
precautionary measure, they were brought back to the Sinhalese areas.
During the height of the Fourth Eelam War I used to narrate this
incident in several forums and used to plead that India should take the
initiative, get in touch with the United States and member States of the
European Union and persuade/pressurise the President to declare a cease
fire so that innocent people who were caught between the Sinhalese
Lions and the Tamil Tigers could be rescued and taken to safe areas.
Unfortunately, my voice turned out to be a voice in the wilderness. And,
what is more deplorable, when the Tiger guerrillas got in touch with
the Indian diplomats and told them that they would like to surrender
they were asked to approach the Sri Lankan armed forces and hold aloft
the white flag of surrender. As the international Human Rights
Organisations have pointed out some of those who held aloft the white
flag were also mercilessly shot down. Thus, India became an unwilling
accomplice to a dastardly crime. As Lady Macbeth put it, “There is the
smell of the blood still. And all the perfumes of Arabia will not
sweeten my little hand”.
Organised Riots in Plantation Areas, 1981
The second illustration pertains to the organized riots which took place
in the plantation areas in the middle of 1981 engineered by powerful
forces within the United National Party (UNP) and carried out by lumpen
sections of Sinhalese population. Their objective was apparent – to
drive out as many Indian origin Tamils to India before the
Sirimavo-Shastri Pact expired in October 1981. The Indian High
Commissioner Thomas Abraham deputed two of his junior colleagues, Gopal
Krishna Gandhi and Ranjan Mathai to the plantation areas to make an
on-the-spot study of the situation. Gopal Gandhi and Ranjan Mathai
reported that the riots were pre-planned and were masterminded by
leading members of the ruling party. Thomas Abraham immediately went to
the riot affected areas, though W T Jayasinghe, then Foreign and Defence
Secretary, tried to dissuade him on the plea that the Government will
not be able to provide him adequate security. Thomas Abraham told W T
Jayasinghe: “I am going to meet my people. I do not require your
security. Courtesy demands that when the High Commissioner leaves the
capital he should inform the foreign office”. Thomas Abraham was shocked
by the senseless violence taking place in the planation areas. In one
of his memorable statements, which made many of us proud, Thomas Abraham
declared that if the Sri Lankan Government could not restore law and
order and provide security to the Indian Tamils, India will have to
think in terms of taking its own steps. The chauvinist elements in Sri
Lanka accused Thomas Abraham of interfering in the internal affairs of
the country. But Thomas Abraham stuck to his principled stand. The
warning sent shock waves through the Sinhalese establishment. President
Jayewardene acted swiftly and normalcy was returned to the hill country.
India and Emergency Regulations
The third illustration took place in July 1983, when Shankar Bajpai was
additional Secretary in charge of Sri Lanka and Bernard Tilakaratne was
Sri Lankan High Commissioner in New Delhi. Five days before the ethnic
fratricide took place in Colombo, Shankar Bajpai summoned Bernard
Tilakaratne to the Foreign Office and told him about India’s concerns
“about what is happening in Sri Lanka”. Bajpai made particular reference
to the Emergency Regulations that were operative in Jaffna permitting
disposal of the dead without inquests. The Sri Lankan envoy ventured to
ask whether the concern was conveyed from Tamil Nadu. He was told that
the concern was being expressed “at the highest political level”.
Understandably the Sri Lankan press reacted with unprecedented hysteria.
It accused India of “meddling in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka”.
“Big Brother, shut up” was the screaming headline in a leading
newspaper.
Much water has flowed through the Ganga, Kaveri and the Mahaveli since
then and Indian policy towards the island became one of bending
backwards to placate its southern neigbbour. Another incident deserves
mention. During the height of the Fourth Eelam War when civilian
casualties were very high, the South Block expressed its concern through
the website. The senior officials did not even want to summon the High
Commissioner to express India’s concern.
Continuing Ambivalence on Devolution to Provinces
The greatest threat to nation building in Sri Lanka comes from the
Sinhalese perception that Sri Lanka is a Sinhala-Buddhist state and the
minorities have to adjust themselves to Sinhalese supremacy. The 13th
Amendment, which was introduced after India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987
provided for the substance of federalism in a unitary state. A review of
developments since 1987 clearly illustrates that the limited devolution
to the provinces is being progressively undone by successive
governments. The merger of the North and the East, an article of faith
as far as the Tamils are concerned, has been undone by a judicial
pronouncement. Mahinda Rajapaksa has made it clear that police powers
will not be devolved to the provinces. The composition of an upper house
to protect the interests of the federal units has become a forgotten
chapter. The bureaucracy is still dominated by the Sinhalese. The armed
forces are predominantly Sinhalese. The military presence in the north
and the east continues and the job opportunities created as a result of
development activities is grabbed by the Sinhalese.
In multi-ethnic societies we must make a clear distinction between
citizenship and nationality. Citizenship implies political loyalty to
the state irrespective of ethnic origin. You may be a Sinhalese, Tamil
or Muslim, but you are a citizen of Sri Lanka and your loyalty is to the
Sri Lankan state. The second pertains to nationality, which includes
cultural moorings. You are a Tamil, you follow Tamil culture, you
practice Hindu religion and you have your education through the Tamil
language, while being a loyal citizen of Sri Lanka. In other words, the
success of nation building will depend upon the nature of political
system. If the political system provides sufficient space for multiple
identities to co-exist harmoniously the nation building experiment is on
the right track. But if it does not provide for tolerance of multiple
identities, tensions and fissures will develop. A meaningful solution to
the problem of ethnicity and nation building can be found only if the
political system enshrines tolerance, devolution, power sharing and
autonomy.
India-Sri Lanka Relations – Coming Months
Let us hope that President Gotabaya Rakjapaksa and his team will discuss
all these problems in a free and frank atmosphere. If the past is an
illustration, India carries no ill will towards Sri Lanka and would like
the island republic to emerge as a happy and harmonious nation. One
problem which New Delhi faces today is to take the political parties of
Tamil Nadu along. The AIADMIK Government and the opposition Dravidian
parties still harp on events of the past and live in a world of make
believe. They do not understand that a policy of confrontation will only
result in Sri Lanka’s increasing dependence on China for economic,
political and strategic survival.
With the co-operation of Tamil Nadu New Delhi can resume the shipping
service between Rameshwaram and Talaimannar. It would give a fillip to
the promotion of trade and cultural relations. The connectivity between
the two countries can be developed further if the proposal made by Ranil
Wikramasinghe to have a land bridge gets translated into action. Tamil
Nadu can contribute a lot for the amelioration of 70,000 war widows who
continue to live in poverty and destitution. Educational opportunities
in Tamil Nadu should be enhanced so that Sri Lankan Tamils can come to
Tamil Nadu for higher education. It should be pointed out that among the
very first graduates of Madras University, which was started in1857,
were two Sri Lankan Tamils – Viswanatha Pillai and Thamodaran Pillai. I
can multiply the opportunities for fruitful co-operation between the two
countries.
Conclusion
The greatness of a nation, Mahatma Gandhi once said, depends upon how
secure the minorities feel in that country. Twelve days before his
assassination, Gandhiji wrote in the Harijan: “All Hindus, Muslims,
Sikhs, Christians and Jews, who people this vast sub-continent and have
adopted it as their own motherland, have an equal right to it. No one
has a right to say that it belongs to the majority community only and
that the minority community can only remain there as an underdog”.
“What we call the beginning” T S Eliot wrote years ago “is often the
end”. “And to make an end is a beginning. The end is where we start
from”. In the beginning of this essay, I referred to Gandhiji’s visit to
Ceylon in 1927. Let me conclude the essay with another statement of
Gandhiji. Speaking in the Nalanda Mahavidyalaya he appealed to the
students to follow the teachings of the Buddha: “If you do not represent
the teachings of the Buddha in your own lives, you having belonged to
this institution will be considered useless … You can reproduce the
central teaching of the Gautama in your own lives… He gave us the
unadulterated law of mercy –and he insisted upon purity of life”.
Gandhiji was deeply pained by the growing canker of communalism in the
island, but he held out the hope that if the Ceylonese adhered to the
Master’s teachings, to quote Gandhiji again, you “can outstrip us and
set an example”.
Dr. V. Suryanarayan is Founding Director and Senior Professor
(Retired), Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of
Madras. His e mail id: suryageeth@gmail.com