A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Saturday, November 30, 2019
Welcome to the Global Rebellion Against Neoliberalism
As distinct as the protests seem, the uprisings rocking Bolivia, Lebanon, and scores of other countries all share a common theme.
A
supporter of former president Evo Morales holds a Bolivian flag during
clashes with police in La Paz, Bolivia, November 13, 2019. (AP / Natacha Pisarenko)
By Ben Ehrenreich-NOVEMBER 25, 2019
Something—someone—keeps
knocking at the door. It’s cold out there and getting colder, but the
people inside are cozy on the sofa with the TV on and a blanket on their
laps. But there’s that knock again: at the front door now, then the
side door, then the back. Maybe it’s the wind. Now there’s knocking at
the windows and the roof and the walls of the house—who knew they were
so thin? It’s hard to understand: How could so many people be knocking
all at once?
But they are, and it’s getting louder. Last week you could hear the banging in Colombia—in Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Medellín, a curfew declared, the army in the streets—and the week before that in Iran,
a steady beat that quickly spread to more than 100 cities. At least 100
protesters have been killed so far. It’s hard to know if there were
more, or exactly what is going on: The government shut off the Internet
on the protests’ second day. But even when there’s a steady connection,
it’s hard to put it all together: Protests have been roiling through Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Spain, Sudan, the UK, and Zimbabwe—I’m
sure I’m leaving someplace out—and that’s only since September. Some
have been the fleeting, routine sort that snarls up traffic for a day.
Others look more like revolutions, big enough to topple governments,
shut down entire nations.
Something is happening here. But
what? And why now? In the last 12 weeks, protests have spanned five
continents—most of the planet—from wealthy London and Hong Kong to
hungry Tegucigalpa and Khartoum. They are so geographically disparate
and apparently heterogeneous in cause and composition that I have not
yet seen any serious attempt to view them as a unified phenomenon. (I
don’t count The New York Times’ determination that the discontent can be traced to “pocketbook issues”—as close to class analysis as the paper of record gets.)
On the face of it, there appears to be little that unites them. In Iran,
the announcement of a 50 percent hike in fuel prices set it off. In
Germany, the Netherlands, and France, farmers blocked highways to
protest environmental regulations. The outrage that has been shaking
Hong Kong since June started with proposed legislation that would have
allowed extraditions to mainland China. In Chile the spark was a hike in
the cost of public transportation, in Indonesia an oppressive crime
bill, in Lebanon the announcement of new taxes on everything from
gasoline to WhatsApp calls.
Some of these movements have been organized by unions or formal
opposition parties, but many are of the horizontal, leaderless sort.
(“Be like water,”
as the Hong Kong protesters put it, channeling Bruce Lee.) No
overarching revolutionary ideology unites them. No vanguard party is
rushing to the front. The single left-right axis on which the world was
split for most of the last century is no longer always helpful.
Right-wingers, and the United States government, have cheered the democratic aspirations of demonstrators in Hong Kong, Iran, and Bolivia—before the coup that
toppled Evo Morales anyway—while scorning or ignoring them more or less
everywhere else. The more doctrinaire quarters of the left have sniffed
imperialist interventionism behind the Hong Kong and Iranian protests
while affirming the legitimacy of pretty much every other popular
movement on the planet.
If you can squint past the smoke from the barricades, the commonalities start to stand out. In Chile,
anger over a 3 percent raise in metro fares revealed a population not
merely miffed by “pocketbook issues”—the fare hike pushed transit costs
to 21 percent of the monthly salary of a worker earning the minimum wage—but so exhausted by austerity, so squeezed by
low wages and long hours and debt, so fed up with the greed and
blindness of the wealthy few who run the country that they were ready to
burn almost everything down. A few hours after declaring a state of emergency and
dispatching the military into the streets, billionaire President
Sebastián Piñera went on TV to remind the citizenry that Chile’s “stable
democracy” and growing economy make it a “true oasis” on an otherwise chaotic continent. “The practices that underpin prosperity are not popular,” The Economist drily observed.
In another corner of the same echo chamber, not long after Egyptian police rounded up thousands who dared to demonstrate in September, the country’s finance minister lamented that
the “fruits of [Egypt’s] economic reform were not captured by ordinary
people.” Measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund had in fact
caused inflation to rise 60 percent over three years, plunging millions
into poverty. This is what a Morgan Stanley analyst recently called the “best reform story in the Middle East.”
The disconnect between elite perception and mass experience is as widespread as it is fundamental: All of
the countries recently experiencing popular revolts—and most of the
rest of the planet—have for decades been ruled by a single economic
model, in which the “growth” celebrated by the pedigreed few means
immiseration for the many, and capital streams into American and
European accounts as reliably as sewage flows downhill. Chile was a notorious early
laboratory: Pinochet’s assassination squads worked in tandem with
Chicago-trained economists to create an “economic miracle” that only the
fortunate, the unscrupulous, and the blind were able to appreciate.
Should popular mobilizations in Bolivia fail to reverse the November 10
coup, they can expect similar acts of god.
The word gets thrown around a lot these days, but this is what neoliberalism means:
a globally applicable method for preserving the current overwhelming
imbalance of power. It works microcosmically on a municipal level—think
decaying public transit systems with an apparently bottomless budget
for racist fare enforcement, while billionaires hop in helicopters from
rooftop to rooftop—and macrocosmically on a planetary scale, in which
national elites collude with multinational corporations and
international financial institutions to keep labor cheap and wealth and
resources confined into established channels.
For most of the early 2000s, abundant Chinese capital and high prices
for commodities like oil, gas, minerals, and agricultural products meant
that some poor countries had options. For a little while, they could
avoid the draconian “reform” traps attached to IMF loans: the usual
slash-and-burn austerity recipe of public-sector cuts, privatization of
state-held resources, and the gutting of labor protections in the name
of “liberalization.” In Latin America, leftist governments won ground,
and poverty and inequality plummeted. But the commodities boom sputtered
out, the Chinese economy has stalled, and, after years of what must
have been painful soul-searching, the IMF has stepped back in with the same old and discredited solutions.
Local elites have been happy to play along, hacking away at their own
populations to keep the money flowing. In March, Ecuadorean President
Lenín Moreno signed a deal with the IMF for a $4.2 billion loan, and in October,
as required, slashed public sector wages and fuel subsidies, causing
the price of diesel to double—and many thousands of mainly indigenous
Ecuadoreans to pour into the streets. (Moreno soon fled the capital and
agreed to abandon the austerity package.) In Lebanon, Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri announced a raft of new consumer taxes—on
fuel, tobacco, and phone calls made via Internet messaging services—as
part of a deficit-reduction package required by foreign lenders to
secure an $11 billion loan. After 12 days of protests in which as much
as a quarter of Lebanon’s population took part, Hariri resigned. The
protesters haven’t quit.