A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Tuesday, December 3, 2019
Rise And Rise Of Populism In Sri Lanka
There are two intersecting structural forces at play here. The first is a growing militarisation of the state apparatus and the second is the expansion of exceptional powers within wider civil society.
The election on 16 November 2019 of Sri Lankan President Gotabaya
Rajapaksa — the brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa — ushers
in an authoritarian populist regime that upholds a form of
ethno-religious nationalism. The foundation of such a regime is in the
new bourgeoisie that has emerged over the last two decades.
Sri Lanka's President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother and former
leader Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was appointed as the new Prime Minister,
are seen during the swearing in ceremony in Colombo, Sri Lanka 21
November, 2019 (Photo: Reuters/Liyanawatte).
Gotabaya was secretary of the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development
under the Mahinda Rajapaksa government (2005-2015). He presided over the
brutal end of the civil war in 2009 that has been the subject of much
international inquiry. He oversaw security agencies that were accused of
human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and torture. It
appears that Gotabaya’s election victory will strengthen the power of
this security apparatus and the extensive use of ‘exceptional powers’
within the constitution.
But what gave rise to his victory?
The 2015 election of then president Maithripala Sirisena in coalition
with the United National Party (UNP) was touted as ushering in an era of
democratic renewal. Instead, it was mired in a contest between then
prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and Sirisena, whose lack of
political skill was matched by his political opportunism. Nonetheless,
the coalition did make some legal changes, including limiting
presidential power and opening up — albeit limited — democratic
political space.
But Wickremasinghe was not capable of building a sustainable political
coalition within the new political terrain that had emerged over the
last two decades. While personalities and the day-to-day political
dramas were important, these were secondary to the reality that there
was increasing resistance within the state apparatus that includes
security institutions where ethno-nationalism has a strong ideological
resonance.
There are two intersecting structural forces at play here. The first is a
growing militarisation of the state apparatus and the second is the
expansion of exceptional powers within wider civil society.
Since the 1970s Sri Lanka has faced two insurgencies: one in the south
in the 1980s and the other a more protracted civil war against the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north that ended in 2009.
These two insurgencies profoundly shaped state institutions —
particularly regarding the adoption of exceptional or emergency powers
that permitted the governing authorities to bypass normal constitutional
process — effectively creating parallel state institutions.
The exceptional powers that give the military and police extensive
authority have become normalised. These exceptional powers have been
used to manage and contain political activity in the north of the
country, but they have had wider repercussions for the country as they
create formal and informal networks of power.
This has led to the growing power and influence of the repressive state
apparatus — the military and the police — and potential criminalisation
of political dissent. This is not just an escalation of
authoritarianism, but it is likely to result in a more militarised
approach to governance. More crucially, the Gotabaya presidency will
cement the influence of those far-right ethno-nationalist groups with
links to the new party formed by the Rajapaksas, the Sri Lanka People’s
Front (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna or SLPP), and to the repressive state
apparatus. One such group, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), is linked to
radical right-wing Buddhist monks with state connections. It has been
extensively involved in attacks on Muslims in open defiance of legal
institutions.
Much like the relationship between the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and
the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, the BSS and other groups act as the
stormtroopers of right-wing populist parties like the SLPP in Sri
Lanka. These groups are hostile to pluralism and liberal institutions
and have become more influential, particularly among sections of the
petit bourgeoisie. These organisations will undoubtedly play an
important role during Gotabaya’s presidency as they provide a support
base within far-right civil society. The use of these groups and
organisations as instruments of political governance is a manifestation
of the informal networks of power that have emerged within the state.
There has been the emergence of a new assertive bourgeoisie that has
benefited from authoritarian politics. This is a bourgeoisie that
developed on the back of neoliberal policies implemented by successive
Sri Lankan governments since 1977 that was until then a rare example of a
third-world welfare state.
It is often forgotten that Sri Lanka was one of the first experiments of
the rapid introduction of market reform, with former president JR
Jayewardene overseeing the shift from being a third-world welfare state.
Over time, these reforms led to the emergence of a bourgeoisie that had
diverging interests to the old mercantile groups. This business class
was strongly supportive of market-oriented policies and was facilitated
and supported by access to state resources and projects, including
property development and infrastructure projects such as the Port of
Colombo.
Most analysts view these infrastructure projects as driven by strategic
interests and often overlook that these projects bring benefits to the
bourgeoisie that the Rajapaksas and politicians in all major parties are
linked to. There is a myopic focus by political analysts on the
strategic competition between China and the United States that ignores
how these conflicts are shaped and used by domestic social forces. The
key point here is that strategic conflict needs to be understood in the
context of the emergence of the new bourgeoisie.
There will be ongoing challenges to this regime. The fact that its
majority is largely confined to the Sri Lankan Buddhist hinterland, and
with the pressures of household and public debt growing and income and
asset inequality widening, will intensify social conflict that will
challenge this regime.
Kanishka Jayasuriya is Professor of politics and international studies at Murdoch University, Perth.