A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
A Brief Colonial History Of Ceylon(SriLanka)
Sri Lanka: One Island Two Nations
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Thiranjala Weerasinghe sj.- One Island Two Nations
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Sunday, March 1, 2020
Geneva Withdrawal: As Namaste turns nasty and coronavirus attacks markets
Last Monday, Modi’s India ‘bowed to the divine in’ (Namaste) Trump. The
namaste turned nasty even before President Trump left India after his
whirlwind trip. Deadly serious Hindu-Muslim clashes broke out in New
Delhi. Trump returned home furious, blaming the media for exaggerating
(as he sees it) the coronavirus threat and triggering stock market
collapses in the US and around the world. In Geneva, Dinesh Gunawardena,
Sri Lanka’s first Foreign Minister with a leftist pedigree, tried to
land as softly as possible his government’s decision to withdraw its
predecessor’s co-sponsorship of the UNHRC resolutions on postwar
accountability.
In one long week, South Asia saw the brash new Modi-Trump chumminess,
and the world watched the global sweep of the coronavirus and the market
carnage it caused. For the markets, it was the worst week since the
2008 recession. The wheels did not come off because the markets have
been performing at record levels after Christmas until now. Sri Lanka’s
withdrawal in Geneva is lighter than a pin prick in the scheme of
things, but it was a big move for the new government and a pointer about
the direction that it is still trying to establish.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has been in office for over 100 days. But
the government has been in a virtual holding mode, waiting for the
parliamentary elections and a constitutionally ambitious two-thirds
majority. As Executive President, Mr. Rajapaksa should be able to govern
with any parliament under the Jayewardene constitution. That was the
whole point of every word that JRJ uttered on the matter. The last
government foundered because of the inability of two (or one and a half)
parties and their leaders did not know how to cohabit. It is a
different situation now, with one governing party having two heads, one
in parliament and the other at the executive.
Politically the two are united by family, so any attempt to drive a
wedge between them will only cause grief to those who push the wedge.
Functionally, it is a different story with as many ropes as there are
hands behind the two leaders. The political unity manifests itself quite
robustly in the single-minded purpose to win the parliamentary
election, and win it two-thirds big. Don’t waste time looking at the
other party, the new Divided National Party and its never-ending
tomfooleries. On the other hand, the new government’s only discernible
purpose and direction is about winning the parliamentary election. The
withdrawal in Geneva fits four square into that strategy.
At the same time, the government would appear to have wanted to avoid a
full-throated withdrawal. It was a soft landing, as I said at the
outset. Dinesh Gunawardena was quite unlike his fiery father and father
of Sri Lankan Marxism, Philip Gunawardena. He was even more unlike his
predecessor, the yahapalana government’s first Foreign Minister, Mangala
Samaraweera, exaggerator par excellence. It was he who led the
co-sponsoring in Geneva, in 2015, promising the sun and the moon to Sri
Lankans and the fellow sponsors. Sirisena knew it, but the new
government is trying to wash off his hands saying that nobody told him
anything because the cabinet that he led took him to be a simpleton. The
performance of the previous government fell far short of the promise,
but there were significant achievements, such as the creation of the
Office on Missing Persons and the Office of Reparations.
Resolution 30/1 of 2015 and its annual successors were both the code and
the slogan in the Rajapaksa presidential campaign, along with the
promise to withdraw from the co-sponsorship. Much will be made of last
week’s withdrawal in the upcoming parliamentary election. Election
rhetoric about the withdrawal will be quite loud and perhaps even
obnoxious in contrast to the measured tone that Dinesh Gunawardena used
in his speech in Geneva.
Not Convinced
While withdrawing from co-sponsorship of the Resolution, Mr. Gunawardena
affirmed Sri Lanka commitment "to achieving the goals set by the people
of Sri Lanka on accountability and human rights, towards sustainable
peace and reconciliation." And to that end, the Foreign Minister said
that the government will appoint a new "Commission of Inquiry (COI)
headed by a Justice of the Supreme Court, to review the reports of
previous Sri Lankan COIs … assess the status of implementation of their
recommendations and to propose deliverable measures to implement them
keeping in line with the new Government’s policy."
In addition, the government "will also address other outstanding
concerns and introduce institutional reforms where necessary, in a
manner consistent with … (and) implement policies rooted in the
Government’s commitment to the people by advancing individual and
collective rights and protections under the law, ensuring justice and
reconciliation and addressing the concerns of vulnerable sections of
society." Lastly, the Minister assured that Sri Lanka will "remain
engaged with, and seek as required, the assistance of the UN and its
agencies including the regular human rights mandates/bodies and
mechanisms in capacity building and technical assistance, in keeping
with domestic priorities and policies."
In response, Michelle Bachelet, the Secretary-General and High
Commissioner of the UNHRC, would appear to have quietly rebuffed the new
government’s fresh promises. Specifically, the UN agency is "not
convinced with the appointment of yet another Commission of Inquiry to
address Sri Lanka’s human rights issues." Ms. Bachelet expressed concern
that the "very different approach" taken by the new government "to the
commitments previously made in the resolution (which) risks setting back
efforts to advance reconciliation, accountability and human rights. She
urged the government "to preserve and build upon the gains which have
been made over the last few years … (and) to ensure the Office on
Missing Persons (OMP) and the Office of Reparations (OR) are provided
with political and resource support. "The families of missing persons
from all communities, the High Commissioner said, "deserve justice and
redress."
It is noted that in his second intervention, following the High
Commissioner, Minister Gunawardena confirmed that the OMP and OR offices
will be allowed to continue with their work. It would be interesting to
see how the government’s civilizational school of supporters will
respond to this concession by the government. But it also shows, however
softly the government may have executed its withdrawal, the withdrawal
symptoms are not going anywhere.
Sovereignty and Human Rights
Writing from his diplomatically free and politically untethered current
position, Dayan Jayatilleke has called the government’s move in Geneva
"Right Cause, Wrong Tactics." Dr. Jayatilleke is critical of the obvious
failure of the government, going by Minister Gunawardena’s speech, to
commit to implement the recommendations of the two COIs (the LLRC and
the Paranagama Commission) appointed by Mahinda Rajapaksa (MR) during
his second term as President. The failure of the MR Administration to
implement these recommendations was one of the reasons for Mr.
Rajapaksa’s defeat in 2015, and the principal reason for the sponsorship
of UNHRC Resolution 30/1 (2015) by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe
government. Why another commission to revisit the LLRC and other
recommendations? That is the question.
Beyond making specific criticisms and recounting at his usual length the
postwar diplomatic battles since he led the Sri Lankan forces in
Geneva, in 2009, Dayan Jayatilleke provides a succinct formulation of
the principles linking international system, national sovereignty,
domestic politics and human rights imperatives, which his old colleagues
in the new government, as well as the new permanent representative
designate to Geneva would do well to learn from. To paraphrase, the
international system is essentially an inter-state system in which
commitments made by a country’s state should not be unilaterally changed
merely because there is a change in government after elections.
National sovereignty is the defining value for a state. Democracy, on
the other hand, is predicated on popular sovereignty. Lastly, to quote
DJ, "for the United Nations, UNHRC, UNESCO and most UN/UN-affiliated
organisations, the highest values are universal human values, such as
human rights." Well said, Sir, and I could not help thinking that Dayan
Jayatilleke can do real justice to his obvious knowledge and occasional
brilliance when he is not in the pay of a government.
The main task for the government at the UNHRC and at home is, therefore,
to find a way "to balance and accommodate these four legitimate
principles," in a practical way. The obviously missing dimension in this
formulation is the matter of the ‘minorities’ who constitute Sri
Lanka’s plurality along with their majority co-existence. A part of the
primary task would be to include the minorities, their representatives,
in finding the balance between Sri Lanka’s international commitments and
credibility, national sovereignty, popular democracy, and human rights
imperatives. And a homegrown process of national reconciliation,
considering that the leaders of the present government privilege
anything homegrown over anything alien, will not at all be comprehensive
if it does not include the minorities and their representatives in that
very process.
In his speech in Geneva, Minister Gunawardena asserted that his
"government is committed to examining issues afresh, to forge ahead with
its agenda for ‘prosperity through security and development’, and to
find home-grown solutions to overcome contemporary challenges in the
best interest of all Sri Lankans." But he gave no indication how the
government will balance Sri Lanka’s international commitments on human
rights and national sovereignty, or how it will involve the minorities
in its homegrown efforts. It was left to High Commissioner Bachelet to
remind the government delegation that "the State must work for all its
people and the needs of all communities, particularly the minorities,
must be acknowledged and addressed."
The only hint about how the government plans to engage the minorities
came in Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s interviews in India. The
government will wait till the Provincial Council elections are over and
then ‘deal with’ whoever is elected from the northern and eastern
provinces. Then what about those who will be elected from these
provinces in the parliamentary elections, not mention the MPs from north
and east who are already in parliament? The government is also trying
to create alternative Tamil and Muslim representatives to the TNA and
the main Muslim parties who were associated with the
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government.
The government already seems to have a lock on some of the political
parties and potential representatives from the plantation Tamil
communities. It might be looking to create similar divisions within the
Sri Lankan Tamil and Muslim political formations. Regardless of the fact
such machinations are more likely to boomerang than succeed, such an
approach is unworthy of, and counterproductive to, any serious and
genuine effort towards reconciliation. It is unworthy as well of the
promises and commitments that Dinesh Gunawardena gave in Geneva, even
though they were diluted from what were given by Mangala Samaraweera in
2015.
To put it bluntly, there is no alternative way out for the government
but to directly and continuously talk with the TNA on all matters
pertaining to the UNHRC resolutions. The need is all the more imperative
after the withdrawal in Geneva. There is no need to wait for the
parliamentary or provincial council elections. And the engagement must
continue after the elections. It may be that after those elections, the
government may have to deal with more than the TNA representatives,
asserting less than their moderate positions.
The government has indicated that it is not going to do anything that is
not acceptable to the Sinhalese people. But it cannot determine what it
can do without talking with Tamil political leaders. And there is much
that can be done by a government that is honest and sincere without
risking a blowback from the Sinhalese. Our long post-independence
history shows that blowbacks occur only when orchestrated by governments
which do not want to do anything that is reconciliatory. Either it is
time that this deception is stopped, or it is time to acknowledge that
the annual pilgrimage to Geneva will continue even after this year’s
withdrawal.