Friday, April 16, 2021

 Why US-Sri Lanka Pact ACSA Kept A Secret: Tied To US Defense Law


By Daya Gamage –

Daya Gamage

Currently when the August 2017-signed 83-page military agreement between Sri Lanka and the United States – Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement (ACSA) – is still kept a secret document, and whether the operation of the agreement still a mystery, a glimpse of what an ACSA is, what it means to the United States, what the policymakers of the United States attempt to achieve in signing an agreement of this nature and its impact on the country that enters into such an agreement with the U.S., and the regional impact following such military engagements when the Indo-Pacific is fast becoming battle ground are valid questions.

The 2017 ACSA was a renewal of the 2007 agreement signed by then Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa with U.S. ambassador Robert Blake on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka’s Defense Ministry and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

The process is: US Secretary of Defense arrives at the determination to enter into an ACSA treaty with a (non-NATO) country in consultation with the US Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, in Washington, needs to get a serious feedback from his diplomatic representatives resident in that country. Two classified diplomatic cables dispatched to Washington from the U.S. Embassy in Colombo a month prior to the signing of the March 2007 ACSA –determined that the signing of the military treaty clearly falls within the U.S. Code Title 10 Section 2342.  So was the 2017-signed ACSA.

The March 2007 ACSA became a solid forerunner to the enlarged and enhanced 83-page ACSA signed between the United States and Sri Lanka in 2017. During 2007, the U.S. was very much involved in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and in 2017 Washington is seriously engaged in a steady military build-up in the Indo-Pacific region to face the Chinese military and economic expansion. Washington has already entered into three military-technology agreements with India.

Despite candidate Rajapaksa declared at a media briefing in October 2019, a month before the presidential election, that Sri Lanka benefited from the signing of the 2007 agreement, a once-classified diplomatic cable signed by Ambassador Robert Blake to Washington nevertheless stated (QuoteSri Lanka, positioned astride major sea lanes and at the doorstep to India, can play a significant role in military readiness as political and military efforts shift focus on Asia in the new millennium.

The signing will expand DOD’s capacity and capability to conduct global operations by adding another logistical option in South Asia and provides flexibility to U.S. forces moving through the region.

Since this agreement primarily benefits U.S. forces, we think there are strong arguments to proceed with signing the agreement(End Quote)

The 2007 as well as the 2017 ACSA between the two countries were directly governed by a US Federal law 10 U.S. Code §2342.

This is precisely why the Sri Lankan people need to know the clauses of the 83-page 2017 ACSA which the Sri Lanka administration has decided to keep a secret. If the 2007 classified diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy, Colombo to Washington declared the agreement was in favor of the United States, there is strong reason believe that the 2017 agreement too was in favor of Washington. Furthermore, it is dictated by the US Federal law 10 U.S. Code §2342.

The issue is: Why is the 2017-signed 83-page ACSA kept a secret under the Gotabaya Rajapaksa presidency, and in what manner Sri Lanka has undertaken its part of responsibilities. The president undoubtedly is aware of the significance of an ACSA as he was one of the signatories to the original pact in 2007. He is now the Minister of Defense to know the ambit of the 83-page pact.

The agreement allows both countries to transfer and exchange logistics supplies, support, and re-fueling services clearly benefitted the United States in its military operation in the Asia-Pacific region – specifically US Pacific Command (USPACOM) which is now US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). That’s the only angle everyone knows, but there are obviously other significant undertakings.

Cross Services agreements – dictated by the U.S. Code Title 10 Section 2342 – under which a long process of U.S. Government (USG) assessment takes how useful a non-NATO country – such Sri Lanka – could be to the national interest of the United States: it could provide some answers as to why the 2017 ACSA is kept a secret. 

The U.S. Code declares (Quote) (a)(1) Subject to section 2343 of this title and to the availability of appropriations, and after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense may enter into an agreement described in paragraph (2) with any of the following: (among others)

(D) The government of a country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but which is designated by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the limitations prescribed in subsection (b), as a government with which the Secretary may enter into agreements under this section. (End Quote)

Here’s Sub-Section (b):

(Quote) (b) The Secretary of Defense may not designate a country for an agreement under this section unless –

(1) the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States; and

(2) in the case of a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Secretary submits to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives notice of the intended designation at least 30 days before the date on which such country is designated by the Secretary under subsection (a). (End Quote)

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