Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy lacks architecture: Dayan

Academic and former Diplomat Dayan Jayatilleke spoke to the Daily Mirror on the consequences of the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution against Sri Lanka, the importance of holding the Northern Provincial Council elections in a free and fair manner and Sri Lanka’s lack of foreign policy architecture.  



Consequences of the UNHRC resolution-THURSDAY, 28 MARCH 2013
Q: With regards to the United Nations Human Rights Council sessions, you have stated something along the lines of;  we have made enemies of our friends and become friends with our enemies, could you start off by elaborating on that statement?
I don’t think that we have become friends with them, because I don’t see any country in the world as an enemy of Sri Lanka. But Sri Lanka does have enemies and those are the hardcore fanatics we see in Tamil Nadu, who are becoming increasingly powerful, and also within certain parts of the Tamil Diaspora, but not the whole of the Diaspora, just some parts of it—I don’t think we have become friends with them.

We have not undermined our enemies and isolated our enemies, through prudent policies—both domestic and foreign. Therefore we have played into the hands of our enemies, in that sense we are our enemies best friends. We have been helping the enemy by doing what we should not do and not doing what we should do.
We have lost friends and this is demonstrable. There are three moments you should look at; 2013 this year’s vote in Geneva, 2012 the year preceding and 2009. Countries which voted with Sri Lanka and were staunch supporters of Sri Lanka in 2009, such as Brazil, have voted against Sri Lanka in 2013. Countries that supported us in 2009, voted against us in 2012 and 2013. Countries which abstained in 2009, such as Argentina, voted against us in 2013. South Korea, which never voted against us, abstained in 2009 and in 2012, voted against us in 2013. It is important to note that none of these countries has Tamil lobbies. You cannot attribute it to, what the government inelegantly calls, “the LTTE rump”—it is inexplicable.

" We have been helping the enemy by doing what we should not do and not doing what we should do "

Certainly Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay - these are countries with progressive, left-leaning governments—they are not part of the alliance of the United States and they are not asking for European Union membership. Therefore all these explanations are simply untrue—we have lost our friends.

Q: Are there going to be any tangible consequences for Sri Lanka, emanating from the terms of the resolution that was passed in Geneva this year?
Yes absolutely. In the first place we must understand that the Geneva vote is a barometer and if you go by the figures we have lost by a slightly bigger margin than last year. There was a steep drop from 2009 to 2012 and then we have not been able to put a floor underneath that fall because we have not been able to reduce the margin of defeat; that margin has increased. I am embarrassed by the official arithmetic, which adds the abstentions with those who voted for us. You might have an argument if someone voted against us earlier, abstained—then it’s ok, because it is a shift in our direction, at least half-way. However, if someone voted for us earlier and then abstained this year—you can’t really count that as a vote in our favour. What this really shows us is that Sri Lanka’s international standing has weakened and this will mean that our international enemies, the Tamil Eelam fanatics in Tamil Nadu and the Diaspora, will be emboldened to target us further.

The second effect is the campaign around the hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to be held in Colombo this year. Sri Lanka has already been targeted and the defeat in Geneva will feed into this.

The third are of course, the economic consequences—no investor, consumer, purchaser or tourist makes their decisions outside of social opinion.  There is such a thing as world-public-opinion and the former Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali once said:  “it is not true that there is only one super-power in the world, the United States—there are in fact two Superpowers and the other Superpower is world-public-opinion. Today both Superpowers are turning against Sri Lanka. This will have an effect on our markets and even on tourism from a certain sector. However, apart from those relatively intangible things there are serious concrete consequences.

We must note what the spokesperson for the US State Department Victoria Nuland said after the vote; that if Sri Lanka does not fulfil its obligation of a domestic process of reconciliation and accountability there will be further international consequences; this is not just a one off remark. It is rather unusual that following the vote there would be, not only a press conference by the US representative to Geneva Ambassador Donahoe, but also a statement issued by Secretary of State John Kerry—that is not usual. The US passes resolutions against countries all the time, however the Secretary of State does not issue statements on these occasions, he may make a reference to these resolutions in the course of some other statement. However, this time he made a statement specifically on Sri Lanka. Further,  Ambassador Michele Sison in Colombo, in a very well modulated and articulated set of remarks, said something quite telling. She said: “we the United States are in the process of building an international consensus” and that if Sri Lanka chose to not to abide by its commitments there are options within the Human Rights Council and outside it. I think it is very clear, to anyone who can read between the lines would know what is being said. One thing is very clear, and Ambassador Donahoe, has made that very clear—Sri Lanka is on the books, and under international scrutiny and the scrutiny of America. It is rather like these movies and you have a helicopter following a car in the day time and if its night time the helicopter has a spotlight—so they are tracking us. This has consequences and they have said openly, that if you don’t fulfil your obligations at a domestic level then the game moves to the next level.

Sri Lanka is running out of time and space, in 2009 we bought Sri Lanka three years of time and space—we didn’t use it well, we used it badly. We are still asking for time and space, but we are being told that we are running out of time.

" What this really shows us is that Sri Lanka’s international standing has weakened and this will mean that our international enemies, the Tamil Eelam fanatics in Tamil Nadu and the Diaspora, will be emboldened to target us further. "

Q: You said the game will move to the next level, what exactly is this next level of consequences?
There are several options and they have not spelt out these options. Knowing them as I do, I would think that they have a menu of options—I don’t think they have settled on which option they will go for. If we read the statement of Ambassador Donahoe; you could see that in the case of other countries and other situations the Human Rights Council has appointed a Commission of Inquiry. Therefore they have a menu of instruments available, but I think they will wait till next year and then move to the next level of instituting some kind of international mechanism. I dare say Sri Lanka will not comply with it and not allow anyone in and so forth. I am not saying that we should comply but we must understand that there is something beyond that, however if we don’t then we are labeled as not cooperative with UN mechanisms. We must understand that it is an escalating ladder and at every level we can make the wrong move and if we make the wrong move, we trigger the escalation to the next level. This is the scenario that I see unfolding.

Q: You referred to a Commission of Inquiry into Sri Lanka, but in essence has that not already happened with the UNSG’s Panel of Experts Report/ the Darusman Report and the Report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights? These are not officially constituted inquiries but they have served the same function.

Those are the building blocks; there are several of these reports. If you go way back you have the report by the International Group of Eminent Persons (IGEP) and that was localised as the Udalagama Commission Report. That report has disappeared. Then you have the Darusman Report and there is also the Charles Petrie report which is the UN’s inquiry into its behaviour during the last stages of the conflict—that is actually a report into Sri Lanka. That even has one and a half pages on Geneva 2009. It is not just about who the UN functioned. Then you have High Commissioner Navi Pillay’s Report and the further formal report that she is due to present in March.

Therefore the building blocks are all there and there is an interlock and reinforcement that has taken place. If you look at the resolution, it refers to Navi Pillay’s report and if you look at her report she refers to the Darusman Report. Therefore it builds that into the resolution. The resolution is an UN resolution, there is a UN mandate. Remember there are only three places you can get a UN resolution; the Security Council, but that is difficult due to the veto of China and Russia, the General Assembly which can go either way, which right now will not go against Sri Lanka (this can change any day) and the Human Rights Council—where there is no veto to protect us, that is why they tried to come at us through Geneva in 2009.
Now they have a reinforced UN mandate from 2012 and 2013 and they will get another one in 2014. This resolution embeds the Navi Pillay report, which in turn embeds the Darusman Report. You can see the web that has been woven.

CHOGM-bid a mistake

Q: Earlier you mentioned that Sri Lanka’s position as the host of CHOGM would be threatened by the resolution. There is also the possibility that Sri Lanka will be on the agenda of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) to be held in April. If this is the case, then our ability to host CHOGM is certainly compromised. How do you think Sri Lanka will be treated at CMAG?
I made this point to the President and the Foreign Minister at a working dinner, one and a half years ago, at which there were senior Ministers and officials of the Foreign Ministry—I said at this meeting, are we sure we are doing the right thing and not making a mistake in trying to host this Commonwealth Summit. Because I reminded them of the Beijing Olympics, it provided an opportunity for all the anti-China elements to mount a campaign, which they were able to withstand. However, that is China, the biggest market; it just cancelled the contracts for Carrefour and everyone fell in line. Sri Lanka does not have that capacity. Sri Lanka has set itself up as a target for a massive international campaign.

Whether the summit takes place in Colombo or not this campaign will take place. It will be used to further discredit and isolate Sri Lanka and whichever way it goes there will be a downside for us. The summit will not take place; there will be partial participation and a partial boycott or there will be full attendance and the platform will be used to make some very strong criticisms against Sri Lanka.
I made this point, but other council prevailed.

" Whether the summit takes place in Colombo or not this campaign will take place. It will be used to further discredit and isolate Sri Lanka and which way it goes there will be a downside for us "

Northern Provincial Council Elections

Q: The government promised that Northern Provincial Council Elections will be held by September this year. However,  it was revealed this week that the Elections Commissioner would not be able to make the necessary preparations for the elections, due to the fact that the Northern Provincial Council is yet to be constituted.  In light of this development, how will Sri Lanka be able to adequately respond to the demands of the resolution? And moreover do you think the government is sincere in its desire to have elections in the Northern Provincial Council?
The holding of the Northern Provincial Council elections is one of the very few cards that Sri Lanka has. We should have held it in 2009, which I advocated both privately and publicly. If we had held the election in 2009, it was Douglas Devananda who would have won, because the TNA was reeling. But the only thing that happened, besides not holding the election, was to remove the ambassador that suggested it.
As I predicted, it was the TNA that filled the vacuum. The TNA behaved badly but it was the government that was seen to change the goal posts and started talking about the PSC. All the arguments that the government puts forward are demonstrably  false; landmines, IDPs and so on—how on earth were they able to hold a Presidential Election and a Parliamentary Election and Municipal Elections in the same area— with those same landmines and the same displaced persons. It doesn’t make sense to anyone.

I was watching the proceedings in Geneva and I took serious note of the statement by the permanent representative of Japan who was speaking in the wake of what I consider a very successful and well crafted visit by President Rajapaksa to Tokyo. It was one of the very few successful trips where I have seen a small team with the right people. I did not see the usual caravan of the circus around him, so I thought well done and a trip that accomplished something for Sri Lanka.
The Japanese said that his country is not voting with the United States because at the summit level meeting between Sri Lanka and Japan; Sri Lanka committed itself to holding the NPC elections in September 2013. This is not the first time that the commitment has been made, I think that he was sincere when he made that commitment and I still think he is, because he knows how serious this situation is.

" All the arguments that the government puts forward are demonstrably  false; landmines, IDPs and so on—how on earth were they able to hold a Presidential Election and a Parliamentary Election and Municipal Elections in the same area— with those same landmines and the same displaced person. It doesn’t make sense to anyone. "

This is built into the resolution, and it is one of the amendments that was brought in. Therefore if for any reason we do not hold those elections, or if we try something smart like dismantling the 13th amendment and then hoping that the TNA will boycott and then holding the elections, or holding the elections in 2013 and then dissolving NPC in 6 months—we are going to do our enemies a great service, bigger than we have ever done.  We are going to fall into the trap that has been set for us, because this is one of the few cards we have to play. The 13th amendment-i.e the Provincial Council Elections-is one of those cards and the other is the LLRC report.
If we do not follow through on this, we are in very grave danger, not least because 2014 is an election year in India and we have already seen the dynamics in our only and giant neighbour. There is a change taking place in the context of Sri Lanka’s external relations; and the main variable is what is happening in India now—it is not going our way. It is in our interest that we have this over and done with before the elections in India bring even greater political space for the anti-Sri Lankan elements in Tamil Nadu and before a coalition administration takes office in Delhi, which is at least as susceptible to Tamil Nadu as the government of M.G Ramachandra when he was the Chief Minister in the 1980’s. We know that even a strong leader like Indira Gandhi and a popular one like Rajiv could not resist the lobby from Tamil Nadu—we are headed back into that circle the cycle is turning. Therefore we have to have those elections in a manner that is transparent and fair and we have to have it on time.
I always had a concern that certain hard-line elements within the power structure would attempt to delay, defer, dilute and frankly sabotage the President’s sincerely made commitments on devolution in the NPC.

Foreign Policy

Q: You have said in the past that in order for Sri Lanka to stem off the cold war between ourselves and the rest of the world we need to honour the promise we made in 1987. Essentially you are saying that India is our only ally. But some would say that Sri Lanka is attempting a foreign policy where we are playing India and China against each other, to our benefit, despite the fact that this strategy had not really worked.  
 I am not sure that India is a consistent or constant ally. The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is similar to the relationship between Vietnam and China. They share a civilisation heritage, they have been friends at one point and there has been friction at other times. This relationship between large countries and small but proud neighbours—is a relationship that has its contradictions, but it is a relationship that has to be managed.
India can do far more damage to us than we can do to them, we have to be aware of our acute strategic vulnerability. This does not mean that we should be a vacillating state, Sri Lanka never was—but there are better ways of handling India. Madam Indira Gandhi took into custody Kuttimani and handed him over to Madam Bandaranaike, I am not saying that we could go back to that golden age, but there was such a time. As far as playing China against India goes, it is one thing to engage in an adroit, flexible, multi-polar power balancing game and Sri Lanka used to do it well. And I am saying that Sri Lanka used to do it well.

Q. When did Sri Lanka lose its ability to play this game of power balancing?
That ended with the death of Lakshman Kadirgamar—very clearly. When Minster Kadirgamar was alive we balanced relations between the US, China and India. This was done, not in a cunning way, because today people mistake low cunning for high intelligence—that was not Kadirgamar’s style. This balance that he carried out was with a marginal tilt towards China and I think that was the right kind of policy and also a marginal tilt to Russia. Because these states are supportive of the concept of National Sovereignty.

"  I am not sure that India is a consistent or constant ally. The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is similar to the relationship between Vietnam and China "

What is happening now and what has happened for a while is a delusion that we somehow have a China card that can outplay all other cards in the deck that the other countries hold—that is not true. Someone should take a good look at the world map, we are on India’s doorstep and China is very far away from us, China does not have and will not have for the next few years the kind of Navy or Air force that can project power safely to Sri Lanka to help it ward off any imitable projection of power by India.

I have always said that managing our relationship with India will always be the pivotal point of Sri Lanka’s external relations.

" I have always said that managing our relationship with India will always be the pivotal point of Sri Lanka’s external relations "

Q. What is your opinion on the failure of Sri Lanka to properly balance our position within the Non-Aligned Movement?
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy lacks architecture, what we have is acrobatics and not architecture.  We need an architecture and that has to have at least two axis; verticallyour relationship with India and horizontally our relationship with the rest of the third world.
If we were managing our relationship with the non-aligned well, you could not have Malaysia who supported us in 2009 abstaining in 2012 and 2013. You could not have Brazil a powerhouse of the non-aligned movement, Uruguay, Argentina and Peru voting against us.  You could not have Angola and Ethiopia who voted for us in 2009 abstaining.  These are all non-aligned countries.